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Preface 
 
In one of his papers while, explaining and defending heterophenomenology (a methodology for 
scientifically investigating human consciousness), Daniel Dennett writes the following: 
 
In short, heterophenomenology is nothing new […]. This point has sometimes been 
misunderstood by scientists who suppose, quite reasonably, that since I am a philosopher I 
must want to scold somebody for something, and hence must be proposing restrictions on 
standard scientific method, or discovering limitations therein. (Dennett 2003b, 13) 
 
Although when reading this line for the first time I found myself chuckling – as happens often when 
I am reading Dennett – the phenomenon referred to in the quotation is very real and since I am also 
a philosopher and, moreover, will be commenting on particular scientific investigations a short note 
in advance seems in order.  
I am not out to scold anyone. The main purpose of this project is to argue for the importance 
of striving for maximal explicitness of methodology-implying assumptions behind scientific research 
into consciousness and conscious intentional action. Being explicit about one’s assumptions is 
helpful in scientific investigations in general. However, it is particularly crucial in scientific 
investigations of consciousness and conscious intentional actions, for the latter two phenomena are – 
if real phenomena at all – salient in that they invoke many intuitions that are far-between and often 
do not speak for themselves.  
My strategy in arguing for this is threefold: I discuss a case of scientific investigation into 
conscious intentional action that suffers from unclarity as to its precise subject of investigation, 
precisely because the assumptions involved are tacit and, arguably, confused. Furthermore, I discuss 
a case of deliberately explicit assumptions that are of the wrong kind in several illustrative ways. 
Lastly, I provide and defend my own explicit set of suppositions for scientific investigations into 
consciousness and conscious intentional action.  
The first two strands of the argument are mainly critical, but emphatically not to be read as of 
a scolding kind. The third strand is my own inference to the best explanation concerning the nature 
of consciousness. All strands although reflecting my own opinions are first of all illustrations aimed 
at engaging scientists working on the topics of consciousness and consciousness intentional action 
with the conceptual problems I suggest are at stake.  
1 
Chapter 1 
Overview of the project 
 
1.1 General introduction 
In 1982 a group of researchers lead by Benjamin Libet published a set of results that shocked and 
occupied significant parts of the scientific and the philosophical community ever since (Libet et al 
1982). Libet and co-workers reported that the onset of brain activity leading up to certain self-
initiated actions also preceded the moment at which their subjects became aware of their intention to 
perform the action. Apparently we only become conscious of our intentions to do something after 
our brains have already initiated the actions unconsciously. According to Libet (1985, 1999, 2004) 
this finding has implications for our idea of ourselves as having free will, since free will at least seems 
to require that we consciously initiate our actions.  
In the foreword of Libet’s most recent book the American psychologist Stephen Kosslyn 
writes:  
 
Libet’s work has focused on the temporal relations between neural events and experience. He 
is famous in part for discovering that we unconsciously decide to act well before we think 
we’ve made the decision to act. This finding has major implications for one of the deepest 
problems in philosophy and psychology, namely the problem of “free will”. (S.M. Kosslyn in 
Libet 2004, p. X)  
 
I have the strong impression that despite many people’s critical attitude towards Libet’s conclusions, 
Kosslyn’s characterization of Libet’s work is currently still endorsed by even more people. Moreover, 
even people not satisfied with this kind of account often tend to get confused about what is in fact at 
stake in the Libet-experiments. Why is this so? One of the main reasons for the ongoing confusion 
brought about by Libet’s work is that it is directly or indirectly and apparently as well as factually 
related to several fundamental philosophical problems, which are not adequately addressed by Libet 
himself, but nevertheless shape his experimental paradigm and influence the way in which he 
interprets the data flowing from it. In this book I argue for the importance of being explicit about 
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methodology-implying assumptions behind scientific research into consciousness1 and conscious 
intentional action in particular. Libet’s research is the perfect example of the kind of confusions not 
living up to the latter demand can lead to. Therefore chapter 2 and 3 of this book are devoted to 
Libet’s work and to answering the question of what Libet was actually investigating.2  
 Daniel Wegner’s book The Illusion of Conscious Will, which appeared in 2002, provides another 
illustration of the problem I want to address in this project. Briefly, Wegner argues that conscious 
will is a feeling and although it is an important feeling in that it pervades everyday human life it is not 
to be thought of as causing our actions. According to Wegner the notion of conscious will as a 
causally efficacious factor is an illusion. Although the feeling of conscious will indeed accompanies 
our actions, the actual causes of our actions, laid bare by scientists, are to be found in the workings 
of the brain. In arguing for the illusory nature of the notion of conscious will taken as causally 
efficacious Wegner also refers to Libet’s neurophysiological work (Wegner 2002, 49-55). Wegner, like 
Libet, does not restrict himself to the phenomenology of intentional action but relates his (and 
others’) empirical material to the problem of free will (for example Wegner 2002, 26-8, 318-24). 
However, in Wegner’s book, as in Libet’s work there are a host of philosophical problems in the 
background that are not or only superficially addressed while in fact they are crucial for at least some 
of the conclusion being drawn.3  
Wegner’s book and Libet’s experiments are rather influential in that they are read or at least 
known of by many, even outside Academia. The popularity of these writings can partly be 
understood in light of the general current interest in applying cognitive neuroscience for 
understanding the human mind and, of course, by a never ceasing fascination for the problem of free 
will. Given this influence it is all the more important to be clear on what these writings are actually 
about and to find out whether if the experimental data they invoke in fact have implications for our 
thinking about free will.  
                                                  
1 ‘Consciousness’ here refers to phenomenal experience, which is roughly what Thomas Nagel (1974) calls 
‘what-it-is-likeness’, and is also intended when people apply the notorious term ‘qualia’. In chapter 7 below I 
present a theory on the nature of consciousness in terms of phenomenal facts. 
2 For other attempts see for example W. Banks, S. Pockett, and S. Gallagher (eds.) (2006), T. Honderich 
(2005), and A. Mele (forthcoming). 
3 See for example Bayne (2006) who addresses some important philosophical issues involved in Wegner’s 
work. 
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I am of the opinion that doing philosophy of mind often requires that one also takes a look 
at what is going on in psychology and cognitive neuroscience. However, in the case of Libet and 
Wegner I doubt whether their work is in fact dealing with what they think it is dealing with. In this 
project I focus on Libet’s work as a case-study, but the general insights provided throughout the 
book will undoubtedly also be of use when evaluating Wegner’s work.  
 This book is divided in three parts that each consist of two or three chapters. In part I I 
discuss an example of scientific research into conscious intentional action with implicit methodology-
implying presuppositions, namely Libet’s work, which provides a particularly good illustration of the 
problem I wish to address. Part II concerns a set of explicit suppositions for scientific research into 
consciousness and conscious intentional action that are of the wrong kind in several ways and is 
supposed to be illustrative of how not to make one’s presuppositions explicit. In part III I present 
my own view on the role of methodology in scientific research into consciousness and conscious 
intentional action in particular. Finally, I present and defend my own explicit suppositions 
concerning the nature of consciousness. 
 
1.2 On the contents of part I 
Now for some more detail concerning the contents and status of the chapters making up the parts. 
As mentioned above part I is devoted to Libet’s research as an example of scientific research into 
conscious intentional action with implicit methodology-implying presuppositions. In chapter 2 I 
present Libet’s methods and theses (section 2.1). In section 2.2 I discuss a kindred empirical study - 
inspired by work allegedly done by late neurophysiologist W. Grey Walter - that I conducted with 
some colleagues from psychology and philosophy at the University of Tilburg (the Netherlands). 
Section 2.3 is about some recent experimental work inspired by Libet’s design.  
In chapter 3 I discuss the main conceptual and phenomenological problems that are involved 
in the Libet-experiments. The questions I will try to answer are the following. Firstly, what are the 
Libet experiments about? In other words: what was Libet investigating? My answer to this first 
question will be that Libet’s work is only superficially related to the problem of free will and insofar 
as it is concerned with this problem it deals with it in a rather uninteresting manner, where 
uninteresting is not a matter of personal taste, but signifies that even when taken on Libet’s own 
terms his data are not particularly shocking. I argue for this in section 3.2. Moreover, the Libet-
experiments neither address the problem of mental causation, which is the problem of accounting 
for the idea that our actions are caused by mental states such as intentions, beliefs, and desires (see 
4 
particularly Kim 1998, 2005).4 I argue for the latter in section 3.4. In my view the Libet-experiments 
had better be understood as an attempt to experimentally investigate intentional action. There are a 
lot of research groups all around the world working in this domain presenting themselves under 
headings such as ‘Intention and Action’ or ‘Motor Control’. The interesting thing about Libet’s 
research however is that besides the cerebral physiology associated with intentional action it also 
explicitly addresses the phenomenology of intentional action. In section 3.1 I shall argue that 
unfortunately Libet misconstrues the phenomenology of intentional action.  
The latter aspect inspires the second question to be answered in chapter 3, namely: is that 
which Libet is investigating best approached in the manner he does? In other words: should we apply 
Libet’s methods in scientifically investigating intentional action? My answer to this second question 
will be negative, but arguing for this is a complex matter since besides technical doubts concerning 
Libet’s method (see section 2.2) it also involves critically examining Libet’s methodology – which is 
partly tacit - and how it influences his method.5 In section 3.5 I shall also briefly evaluate the more 
recent research inspired by Libet’s work that was presented in section 2.3.  
Finally, there is the following question: are there defensible alternatives for Libet’s method of 
scientifically investigating intentional action that also take account of the phenomenology involved? 
My answer to this question will be less decisive and more general. To put it briefly, I think that at this 
point in our investigations of intentional action we cannot and should not exclude the possibility that 
there are alternative scientific approaches for investigating intentional action. However, figuring out 
                                                  
4 To be sure, there are good reasons for thinking that Libet was indeed interested in some form of mental 
causation, but of another kind than the form discussed in section 3.4, which is the problem of mental 
causation as it was posed by the philosopher Jeagwon Kim (1998, 2005). I have in mind the problem of 
phenomenal causation, which is the problem of understanding how phenomenology can make a causal 
difference in the world (see e.g. Tye 1995, 18). I present the problem of phenomenal causation in chapter 5 
and argue that although Libet was indeed interested in this problem when conducting his experiments he does 
in fact not really address the problem. In chapters 7 and 8 I present my own suggestions on how to solve the 
problem of phenomenal causation.  
5 A terminological note on the distinction between method/methodical and methodology/methodological. 
Methodologies are theories of methods and as such describe, explain and valuate methods for (scientific) 
inquiry in particular contexts. Methodologies for example fix how we should interpret the raw data generated 
by means of a certain method. Methods are learned belief-forming procedures (Goldman 2000, 18) that shape 
inquiry. 
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what exactly these alternatives should be is very much an ongoing project fundamentally involving 
the practical dimension of actually doing the experimental investigations (see also my considerations 
in chapter 6). Fortunately, there are proposals and also practices available for initial orientation, some 
of which will be briefly discussed in section 3.6 and chapter 6. 
 
1.3 On the contents of part II 
While part I is about an example of scientific research into conscious intentional action with implicit 
methodology-implying presuppositions, in part II I present an example of deliberately explicit 
methodology-implying suppositions for scientific research into consciousness and conscious 
intentional action, that are of the wrong kind in several ways. Part II shows that being explicit about 
one’s assumptions is not enough, we should also make sure we embrace the right ones. Moreover, 
part II provides an inventory of pitfalls that I set out to avoid when formulating my own 
suppositions in part III.  
In part II I focus on Max Velmans’ philosophy of mind. Velmans describes his general 
project as formulating a theory of consciousness that is compatible both with science and common 
sense (Velmans 2000, 3). An important part of Velmans’ theory of consciousness is his projection-
thesis, which says that in many cases our experiences are projected from our brains into the world 
outside. According to Velmans the projection thesis is backed up by our everyday (common sense) 
phenomenology. I think that Velmans here seriously misdescribes our everyday phenomenology and 
makes a supposition that, although explicit, is of the wrong kind. Velmans’ mistake, however is 
illustrative of the general insight that the facts involved in the phenomenology of our experiences are 
not always as straightforward as we might initially think them to be (in an important sense they don’t 
speak for themselves). This insight is of fundamental importance for scientific research into 
consciousness and conscious intentional action. 
 Chapter 5 is about the problem of phenomenal causation that I briefly mentioned in footnote 
4. I present the problem as it is posed by Velmans and discuss the solution he proposes which is put 
in terms of a dual-aspect metaphysics. Although Velmans poses the problem of phenomenal 
causation in a clear and forceful manner I think he does in fact not succeed in solving the problem. 
This again has to do with Velmans’ suppositions, which this time are of the wrong metaphysical kind. 
Importantly, I do not (at least not only) mean to say that Velmans is wrong in defending dual-aspect 
monism and that he had better opt for, say, a form of physicalist monism or substance dualism. 
Rather, my worry is that the way of doing metaphysics associated with theories such as dual-aspect 
6 
monism, physicalism or substance dualism is of the wrong kind in that it goes beyond the facts in a 
way that makes those theories meaningless. Although this point is probably hard to understand in the 
abstract form in which it is presently stated, further elaboration has to wait until chapter 5 lest this 
section will dramatically loose its introductory character. The general insight however is relevant for 
our thinking about the role of methodology-implying assumptions behind scientific research into 
consciousness and intentional action, because it tells us something about which kind of suppositions 
are meaningful, and hence can be expected to do some work, and which are just – potentially 
retarding – lumber on the train of thought heading for an understanding of consciousness and 
conscious intentional action.  
 
1.4 On the contents of part III 
Part III is entitled ‘Consciousness, facts and methodology’, consists of three chapters and is intended 
to be the more constructive part of this project in which I present my positive view on the role of 
methodology in the scientific study of consciousness, and my own explicit suppositions concerning 
the nature of consciousness, explicitly minding what has been said in part I and II. 
In chapter 6 I go into the general question of whether and how phenomenology should play 
a role in scientific investigations of consciousness. I approach this question by discussing and 
comparing two general views on this issue that present the two extremes of a range of methodologies 
available, namely Daniel Dennett’s heterophenomenology and Francisco Varela’s 
neurophenomenology. I will defend the thesis that we do not have to and should not presently 
choose between heterophenomenology and neurophenomenology. Progress in working out the right, 
context- and task-sensitive, methods for studying consciousness and the way in which 
phenomenology is involved in them (if at all) is best guaranteed by keeping them both – and all 
reasonable methodologies in between – in the running. Of main concern is that we are explicit about 
the methodologies we apply and the suppositions about consciousness that inspire them.  
In chapter 7 I present a theory on the nature of consciousness in terms of phenomenal facts, 
basing myself on work by Tim Crane and Thomas Clark. Libet obviously thinks that there is a fact of 
the matter when it comes to the experiences of his subjects. I share this intuition, but since we are 
doing philosophy some work has to be done to at least embed this intuition in a theory on the nature 
of consciousness in order to justify its correctness. In short, I defend the view that phenomenal 
experiences are identical to certain biological (particularly neural) functions. Moreover, the theory I 
present, contrary to for example Velmans’ metaphysics of mind, is supposed not to go beyond the 
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facts (in the particular sense to be clarified below). In other words, my theory is supposed to be of 
the right (metaphysical) kind.6 Incidentally, if true, this theory also saves phenomenal causation.  
Chapter 8 is entitled ‘Dynamical systems theory as an approach to phenomenal 
consciousness’. Within the context of the present project, the function of chapter 8 is to provide a 
general and, admittedly, speculative proposal on the biological implementation of phenomenal 
consciousness. The shortest route to this theoretical sketch goes via the problem of mental causation.  
So what I shall do in chapter 8 is the following. First, I relate the dynamical systems approach 
to mental causation (DST/MC) to Kim’s formulation of the problem of mental causation and his 
suggestions for solving it (see also section 3.4). Also I show in what way DST/MC might provide an 
alternative that is worth wanting. My claim is that Kim’s model falls prey to the so-called problem of 
causal drainage (Block 2003), which is the problem that if one accepts Kim’s views on mental 
causation this seems to have the consequence that, as Block puts it, the apparent causal power of 
mental and other macro-properties drain into the bottom level of physics (Block 2003, 133) 
relegating all higher-level causation to the land of illusions. DST/MC can be taken to provide an 
alternative to Kim’s model, however in my view it cannot do this without some metaphysical help 
from the philosopher Carl Gillett, who provides us with a model of realization that is different from 
Kim’s and which can be used to strengthen and clarify DST/MC.  
Although the resulting picture of mental causation might to some – particularly those in the 
tradition of thinking about mental causation following Kim – seem convincing, I think it is spawned 
by mistaken suppositions about the ontological status of folk-psychological categories such as 
intentions. As in Kim’s approach, in DST/MC intentions are reified and thought of as things or 
processes (probably located in the head). That such a reification of for example intentions is not 
mandatory is exemplified by more Wittgensteinian approaches to mental vocabulary such as 
proposed by G.E.M. Anscombe (1957) or Daniel Dennett (1991b). Adopting one of these 
alternatives would in fact dissolve the problem of mental causation as it is posed by people like Kim. 
Incidentally, this insight is also relevant for the evaluation of Libet’s work since Libet also seems to 
presuppose that intentions are things to be looked for in (or near) the brain. Again, although Libet 
does not take an explicit stance on this issue it might very well have been an important inspiration for 
                                                  
6 I put ‘metaphysical’ between brackets, because most of the actual metaphysical work is to be found in 
chapter 8. In my favoured terminology chapter 7 is mainly about ontology, where the crucial point is that our 
ontology also involves phenomenal facts.  
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the questions he chose to ask and the experimental methods he opted for in order to answer those 
questions. 
In conclusion of chapter 8 I suggest that although DST/MC is mistaken there might be room 
for dynamical systems theory as an approach to phenomenal consciousness. If this is indeed the case 
it provides us with a speculative theory of phenomenal causation. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part I: An example of scientific research into conscious intentional action with 
implicit methodology-implying presuppositions 
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Chapter 2 
The Libet-experiments: methods and theses 
 
2.1 The Libet-experiments 
Do people have free will? This typically philosophical question has recently also made it into the 
realm of experimental psychology. The scientist most famous for experimentally investigating ‘free 
will’ is the neurophysiologist Benjamin Libet. Libet exploited Kornhuber and Deecke’s (1965) finding 
that voluntary7 movements are preceded by a particular kind of electrophysiologically indicated 
neural activity which they called the ‘Bereitschafts-Potential’. In English the latter translates as ‘readiness-
potential’ and is often abbreviated as RP. I will use this abbreviation in the rest of this book. Libet 
found that while the RP starts before the eventual motor act, subjects report consciousness of their 
intention to act only some time after the start of the RP. This seems to suggest that the processes 
culminating in the allegedly freely willed action have an unconscious origin. But if this is indeed the 
case should we then still speak of a freely willed action? In what follows I present a general 
description of the Libet-experiments based on Libet et al (1982) and Libet (1983, 1985, 1992, 1999, 
2004). For more detailed information on the experiments – like the materials involved - I refer to 
these publications. Of course, when the details of the experiments are relevant for the present 
analysis I will introduce them into the discussion. 
During the Libet-experiments subjects sat in a chair opposing a clock.8 At the beginning of 
each trial the clock started of from the twelve ‘o clock position and the subjects were told that they 
could execute a voluntary action at any time after the sweep-second hand of the clock had made its 
first full circle. The relevant brain activity was registered by means of electroencephalography (EEG). 
Letting the subjects perform a flexion of the wrist or finger at a self-chosen moment operationalized 
the voluntary action. The activity in the muscles associated with the motor act was recorded using 
                                                  
7 ‘Voluntary’ here should be interpreted in ‘light-mode’, in other words as neutral towards the truth of falsity 
of philosophical doctrines such as libertarianism. It here just means that the decision of when to move to was 
left to the participants; they were not forced to move. 
8 This was not a normal clock, but a clock devised by means of a cathode ray oscilloscope. The ‘oscilloscope 
clock’ consists of a spot of light that revolves around the periphery of a screen in 2,56sec. (instead of 60sec. 
for a sweep-second hand of a regular clock) in a clockwise manner. Each marked off ‘second’ (in the total of 
60 markings) represents 43msec. of actual time. (see Libet et al 1999, 50) 
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electropmyography (EMG). The onset of the motor act as well as the timing of the clock were 
recorded by a computer.  
Libet conducted two series of experiments with this setup. In the first series subjects were 
asked to flex their wrist or finger at a self-chosen moment after the sweep-second hand of the clock 
had once fully revolved the clock. These subjects were asked to let the urge to act come to them and 
act spontaneously whenever they wished to do so. Some time after every trial the subjects were asked 
to report the ‘time’ on the clock at the moment they became conscious of their intention to act.  
In the other series of experiments the subjects were asked to perform an action at a pre-given 
point in time, for example when the clock reached the three ‘o clock position. The subjects were also 
asked to make sure that start of the action coincided as precisely as possible with the point in time 
that was given beforehand. During the first series of experiments Libet found that approximately 
550msec. before the actual motor act (recorded by means of EMG) an RP (recorded by means of 
EEG) started. The clock positions the subjects reported after every trial showed that they had a 
conscious intention to act at approximately 200msec. before the eventual motor act. During the 
second series of experiments, in which the subjects were told to perform an action at a pre-planned 
point in time, it was found that the RP onset was approximately 1000msec. before the actual motor 
act. Based on these results Libet made a distinction between two sorts of RP: type I and type II. The 
type I RP is associated with pre-planned actions, starts approximately 1000msec. before the motor 
act and graphically (EEG) appears as a steadily rising line. Type II RP’s are associated with 
spontaneous voluntary acts (associated with free will as some might say), start approximately between 
700 and 400msec. before the motor act and graphically are somewhat dome-shaped.9  
Libet wants to conclude from his data that we have no free will in the traditional libertarianist 
sense. Libertarianists defend the view that free will is not compatible with determinism and hence 
determinism must be false (for more on free will and determinism see section 3.2 below). Libet 
assumes that free will in the libertarianist sense requires that our conscious intentions are the causes 
of our actions, whereby our intentions are not themselves caused. The latter seems to be falsified by 
the experimental data. Nevertheless, Libet points to the fact that some of his subjects reported an 
urge to act, while eventually not actually performing the action. The urge was thus rejected (‘vetoed’) 
and the subject waited for another urge to present itself. From this Libet gathers that apparently free  
 
                                                  
9 For typical RP recordings see for example http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Readiness_potential.  
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Figure 1: This diagram visually summarizes Libet’s findings. Taken from Libet et al (1999, 51).  
  
will does not consist in the initiating of actions, but in the decision to perform or not to perform a 
certain action if the urge to do so presents itself. There is no objective proof for Libet’s hypothesis of 
free will as the possibility of vetoing (the free won’t), only subjective evidence (Danto 1985, Latto 1985, 
Nelson 1985, among others also pointed to this problem).10 
 
2.2 Grey Walter revisited 
One of the most significant problems with Libet’s design is that subjects are asked to monitor the 
clock and their ‘stream of consciousness’ simultaneously (see Haggard 1999, 293, but also Libet, for 
example 1983, 637-38 and 1985, 534). Participants in the experiment were required to divide their 
attention between the clock and their conscious mental life, which involves a kind of cross-modal 
matching that is known for its unreliability. In their (1973) Sternberg and Knoll reported what they 
called the ‘prior entry phenomenon’ according to which ‘events which occur in an attended 
perceptual stream are perceived earlier than simultaneous events in an unattended stream’ (Haggard 
1999, 293). Libet has tried to control for these possible effects by having the participants report the 
time of awareness of a skin stimulus that was delivered at an irregular, randomized time after the start 
of each trial. According to Libet:  
 
                                                  
10 According to Libet, however the existence of a (libertarianist) veto possibility is not in doubt, see Libet 
(1999, 52 and 2004, 137-147). 
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To the extent that simultaneous observation of visual clock time and awareness of skin 
sensation shares similar processes and difficulties with simultaneous observation of clock 
time and awareness of urge to move, one may regard any measured “error” in reports of 
stimulus time as an estimate of the potential error in reports of W (time of awareness of 
wanting to move). (Libet 1985, 534)  
 
Libet found that although the skin sensations were generally reported as occurring somewhat in 
advance of the actual time of delivery, the amount of error did not threaten his findings concerning 
the difference between onset of the RP and the time at which subjects became aware of their 
intention (Libet 1985, 534). Libet’s efforts at controlling for possible prior entry effects have not 
convinced many other researchers (see for example Breitmeyer 1985, Stamm 1985, Underwood and 
Neimi 1985), which partly has to do with the fact that Libet’s design involves relying on a first-
person report concerning the timing of awareness of intention that cannot be checked by a third 
party, but also with doubts concerning the assumption Libet makes in the above citation that the task 
of timing skin sensations and the task of timing urges to move involve similar processes. Below I 
present a design that might avoid the objection from the prior entry phenomenon, however – as we 
will find – this design has problems of its own.  
Daniel Dennett  refers to an experiment of late neurophysiologist W. Grey Walter (1910-
1977) as a good demonstration of the central contention of his Multiple Drafts Model of 
consciousness (Dennett 2003a, Dennett and Kinsbourne 1992, see also section 3.3 below). 
According to Dennett the Grey Walter-experiment is methodically superior to the experiments 
conducted by Libet. Unfortunately, the Grey Walter-experiment as described by Dennett has never 
been replicated and since there is no official publication available, it is not even entirely certain 
whether or not the experiment was ever really conducted by Grey Walter himself. 11  
 In the Grey Walter-experiment an electrode was placed in the motor cortex of the subject in 
order to record the electrical activity in that part of the brain. The hypothesis was that changes in the 
measured activity must be associated with the initiation of intentional actions. The experimental set 
up was as follows. Subjects were placed in front of a projection screen and were told that they could 
replace the current projection by pushing a button that would advance a slide-carousel. What the 
                                                  
11 Dennett and Kinsbourne (1992) refer to a presentation to the Ostler Society delivered by Grey Walter at 
Oxford University (England) in 1963. I have not been able to find more information about the contents of 
this lecture.  
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subjects did not know was that the button was a dummy and that the advancing of the slide was in 
fact caused by an enhanced signal from the electrode in their motor cortex. Interestingly, during the 
experiment subjects allegedly reported having the strange experience of the slide projector anticipating 
their intention to act.12 Just before the subjects pushed the button in order to advance the slide, the 
carousel (controlled by the activity in the motor cortex) already changed the slide.  
The results of Grey Walter’s experiment might at first sight seem to back up the results of the 
Libet-experiments and might prima facie seem more reliable for at least two reasons. Firstly, in this 
experiment subjects were not asked to report afterwards (based on their memory) the onset of their 
conscious intention to act. Elimination of this memory factor would at least seem to enhance 
reliability. Secondly, the requirement of reporting the timing of the subject’s conscious intention to 
act as in the Libet-experiments is such an artificial task that it can be thought to influence the natural 
course of events in performing an intentional action. Normally, one just acts without concentrating 
on one’s intentions. Such a possible disturbance of the natural course of events is not to be found in 
the Grey Walter-experiment. Subjects in this experiment play a much more passive role, while in the 
Libet-experiments the subjects had to divide their attention between the clock and their conscious 
mental life. As pointed out earlier, such cross-modal matching is known for its unreliability 
associated with the prior entry phenomenon. 
In 2005 Herman de Regt, Geert van Boxtel13, and myself decided we wanted to replicate the 
Grey Walter-experiment for two reasons: Firstly, it would be historically interesting since the Libet-
experiments generated a lot of discussion in the literature and replication of the Grey Walter-
experiment could have consequences for our thinking about the Libet-experiments.14 Secondly, we 
then thought a successful replication of the Grey Walter-experiment would provide evidence against 
some theories of mental causation that are currently discussed in the philosophy of mind. For 
                                                  
12 ‘They reported that just as they were “about to” push the button, but before they had actually decided to do 
so, the projector would advance the slide – and they could find themselves pressing the button with the worry 
that it was going to advance the slide twice!’ (Dennett and Kinsbourne 1992, 168) 
13 Dr. Herman de Regt is assistant professor philosophy of science at the University of Tilburg in the 
Netherlands. Dr. Geert van Boxtel is assistant professor of psychology at the University of Tilburg. 
14 For example Daniel Wegner writes the following about the Grey Walter-experiment: ‘Dennett swears this 
report is not apocryphal, but unfortunately this work was never published and seemingly has not been 
replicated by others since. A discovery of this kind would be absolutely stunning, and I’m thinking Grey 
Walter may have been pulling his colleagues’ legs.’ (Wegner 2002, 69, footnote 4) 
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reasons that will become clear in the course of this book – particularly section 3.4 – I would now not 
endorse the latter claim anymore.  
Nevertheless, it seems worth mentioning our little experimental excursion here for several 
reasons. Firstly, because we did in fact not manage to replicate the experiment for the same reasons 
as Haggard et al, who also attempted this (Haggard and Clark 2003). This is interesting, because the 
common reason for our failure, which I will discuss below, will help us in properly evaluating Libet’s 
work and also because it provides yet another reason for the idea that the experiment allegedly 
conducted by Grey Walter is probably a myth.  
The second reason for briefly discussing our experimental study is that it gave me the 
opportunity not only to access a laboratory and participate in an actual experimental investigation on 
the side of the researchers, but also to participate in the experiment as a subject.15 The latter provided 
me at least with some personal experience concerning the phenomenology of being engaged in the 
kind of experimental tasks also deviced by Libet et al, which is valuable since the phenomenology of 
the subjects participating in the Libet-experiments is not only of great importance for the 
conclusions Libet eventually draws, but also a source of hot debate. These phenomenological 
concerns will be discussed at several places below and now and then I will draw on my personal 
experiences as a test subject. In the remainder of this section I will briefly present the stages of our 
attempt to replicate Grey Walter’s experiment, the reason why our attempt failed, and what I take all 
this to imply for the interpretation of Libet’s results. 
Because we could not do an invasive study like Grey Walter had allegedly done, we had to 
find a way to trigger from the EEG generated RP. Moreover, we had to find a way to reliably trigger 
from the EEG signal within single trials. And here, immediately, is the problem, for besides the fact 
that there is quite some variability in EEG signal between subjects doing the same task (see our first 
pilot study described below) there is also great intertrial variability within the same subject doing the 
same task (see our second pilot study described below). This is no great surprise when one realizes 
that the RP is only recognized after grand averages of EEG activity over a large number of trials are 
                                                  
15 In fact most of the actual experimental work was done by drs. Lien van de Vliet, who conducted the 
experiments for her doctoral thesis and who was so kind to tolerate my presence in the lab, while she was 
working. The doctoral thesis entitled Towards Classifying Single-Trial EEG in a Voluntary Action Paradigm can be 
obtained by sending a request to tvandelaar7@gmail.com.  
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computed.16 As we will see even filtering the signal and subjecting it to various algorithms does not 
result in a reliable single-trial trigger. This rather dramatic result forces upon us the question of what 
Grey Walter had been triggering on (if at all). 
In our first pilot study we measured RP’s in a setting in which subjects made voluntary 
movements with their right index finger in order to examine signal variability within and between 
subjects with respect to various candidate trigger criteria. This study was done with four participants 
- among whom was the present author – who were comfortably seated in front of a computer screen 
with their right hand on a button. Their task was to sit still, fixate on a yellow cross on the screen and 
push a button at self-chosen moments. Button pushes were immediately followed by a photo of an 
animal or a landscape on the screen, which remained for 500msec. Each subject participated in two 
experimental blocks, both consisting of 100 trials. We recorded and analyzed motor-preparatory 
activity contralateral and ipsilateral to the responding hand. Again, for more details see Van de Vliet 
(2005).  
In an effort to compare different candidate trigger criteria we computed the mean amplitudes 
for raw C3, C1, Cz, and C4 activity as well as the Lateralised Readiness Potentials (LRP) and 
Laplacians for each participant (averaged over trials and time locked to response). C3, C1, Cz, and C4 
refer to locations of the scalp in accordance with the international 10-20 system of electrode 
placement. The locations mentioned here are associated with the motor cortex, but we also recorded 
from other sites in order to compute Laplacians.  
The Laplace operator is a differential operator and can among others be used to increase the 
spatial resolution of EEG scalp surface recordings. The outcomes of such computations on EEG 
data are called ‘Laplacians’. For example LaplC3 = FC5 + FC1 + CP5 + CP1 – 4(C3).  
The LRP is computed by first subtracting potentials recorded from electrodes placed over 
the left and right motor cortices and than averaging the asymmetric values for left- and right-hand 
movements yielding a measure of the average lateralized activity (the LRP) as subjects prepare to 
move (Cacioppo et al 2000, 62-3). Since the present study only included right-handed events, the 
LRPs were defined as: LRPC1-C2 = (C1R – C2R) and LRPC3-C4 = (C3R – C4R) where the subscript ‘R’ 
signifies that we are dealing with right-handed events (see Van de Vliet 2005, 20).  
                                                  
16 For a good introduction into and overview of the ins and outs of event-related potentials like the RP see M. 
Fabiani, G. Gratton, and M.G.H. Coles ‘Event-Related Potentials’ in J.T. Cacioppo et al (2000). For an 
introduction into event-related potentials in the context of motor preparation see chapter 19 in Cacioppo et al 
(2000), C.H.M. Brunia and G.J.M. van Boxtel ‘Motor Preparation’.  
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We found that although participant variability was relatively small subjects did differ 
substantially with respect to which components were most clearly developed. As for the trial 
variability within subjects we found none of the criteria mentioned above (raw activities, LRPs, and 
Laplacians) generated a reliable pattern across different trials that could be used to trigger from.  
In order to find out if and how trial variability in EEG pattern could be minimized we 
conducted a second experiment. This experiment was an in-depth study with the present author as 
the only participant. We attempted to improve trial consistency stability by means of training. Also 
we incorporated a bimanual task in which the subject choose between left- or right-hand responses, 
because this might enhance the possibility of manipulating C3 and C4 deflections (see Vidal et al 
2003 and Taniguchi et al 2001).17 In the single-case study we used roughly the same design as in the 
first experiment only now more blocks (16) were involved (training), some of which with a bilateral 
task (block 1-4). Each block again contained 100 trails. 
To put it briefly, we found that even after extensive filtering and manipulation of the raw 
data (we focussed on C3 and C4 Laplacians, see Van de Vliet 2005, chapter 4) there is too much 
inter-trial variability to reliably trigger from the EEG signal. Our results agree with the general 
remark made by Haggard and Clark in their (2003) that ‘[they] could not trigger from the RP, as its 
amplitude at the scalp is low relative to the background EEG noise’ (705).  
What implications should this have for our thinking about the experiment Grey Walter is said 
to have conducted? One might for example wonder whether the above difficulties in finding a 
reliable signal that can be used to trigger the computer are relevant at all in an invasive study such as 
Grey Walter’s. However, in my view they are very relevant, for although Grey Walter’s design is 
indeed preferable to Libet’s in that its subjects play a more passive role, it isn’t clear exactly what 
activity Grey Walter was triggering from. The electrodes are said to have been in the motor cortex, 
but the motor cortex is a large area. It is important to realize that the problem is not so much the 
strength of the signal – which the above citation from Haggard and Clark might seem to suggest – 
since the signal might be artificially enhanced. The problem really is in the variability of the signal.  
Imagine that Grey Walter did indeed generate the feeling of anticipation by means of his 
design than he would not have known what he actually triggered on. There is a lot going on in our 
brain all the time so what excludes the possibility that Grey Walter actually triggered on ‘background 
                                                  
17 An important difference with the tasks of Vidal et al (2003) and Taniguchi et al (2001) is that the present 
study does not involve a reaction time task. 
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noise’ instead of from the RP? One might attempt to counter this suggestion by pointing out that the 
electrodes were in the motor cortex and that we know that the dominant activity in that area during 
tasks like the one in Grey Walter’s design is activity associated with the RP. However, this bird does 
not fly since if there is one thing that our results show it is that when taken on a trial by trial basis 
there is no such entity as the RP. As we saw there are all kinds of things going on and somewhere 
hidden in this activity is a pattern which only surfaces after a great amount of trials. These 
considerations should make us conclude that at best Grey Walter might have had a lucky shot.  
Also take into account that even if Grey Walter would have triggered directly from the cortex 
while simultaneously recording its activity by means of EEG, this would not really have made the 
case more convincing when it comes to backing up Libet’s conclusions. Still we would not know 
whether we triggered from the RP (i.e. activity associated with initiating this particular action) and 
not only because of the considerations in the previous paragraph, but also because of low spatial 
specificity of EEG measurements. Even in this imagined mixed design, we would not know whether 
the activity picked up by the electrode and triggering the projector is the same activity as that 
represented by the EEG signal. Without such a match we do not know whether we actually triggered 
from the RP and hence the results become useless as a way of backing up Libet’s conclusions.  
I conclude that given our results it becomes even more likely that Grey Walter’s experiment 
is indeed a myth. Moreover, even if the experiment – in its original invasive design - can actually be 
replicated it would be unclear what we were actually triggering on. The latter problem remains in a 
mixed design as considered in the previous paragraph. All in all the Grey Walter-experiment would 
hardly back up Libet’s design, nor his conclusions.  
 
2.3 Recent work inspired by Libet’s design 
Notwithstanding the serious amount of critique that Libet’s work has generated through the years in 
both the philosophical and the scientific arena, it still draws people’s attention and fuels heated 
debates, more often than not – unfortunately – about the question whether we have free will or not.  
In this section I shall give an impression of some recent research that has been inspired by 
Libet’s investigations. I will concentrate on the work of Haggard et al and Lau et al. Although these 
scientists are indeed inspired by Libet’s work, in their publications the issue of free will is less 
emphatically present. Nevertheless, it is important to mention these studies here, since as in Libet’s 
original work there are assumptions involved concerning the nature of consciousness and intentional 
action which require consideration in an adequate evaluation of studies using the kind of designs 
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under scrutiny here. What exactly is at stake will be clarified in later sections, particularly section 3.4. 
Here I just briefly look at the studies themselves.  
 In 1999 Haggard and Eimer published a paper in which they extend Libet’s design and partly 
replicate Libet’s results: 
 
This study therefore extends Libet’s design (Libet et al 1983) in three ways. First, we 
compared M and W judgements [respectively the reported time of the actual movement and 
the reported time at which subjects felt the urge to make a movement, TvdL] between a 
fixed-movement condition and a free choice condition, in which subjects chose freely on 
each trial between two voluntary actions [left hand or right hand key press, TvdL] to make on 
each trial. Second, we measured the LRP as an additional indicator of movement selection 
and studied its relation to W judgements. Third, we tested Libet’s hypothesized causal 
relation between W judgement and brain potentials by investigating whether random 
variation in the time of the former was accompanied by covariation in the latter. (Haggard 
and Eimer 1999, 129)  
 
Haggard and Eimer found no significant difference between RP onset in the fixed-movement 
condition and the free choice condition (Libet’s RPI and RPII)18, while in general their RP’s onset 
was considerably earlier than those reported by Libet et al (1983). Moreover, they found that the 
intra-individual variations in W judgements covaried with the onset of the LRP, but not with the 
onset of the RP. According to Haggard and Eimer the latter result suggests that although ‘the LRP 
onset is not the starting point of the psychological processes that culminate in voluntary movement 
[…] it may be the starting point of conscious awareness of our motor performance’ (Haggard and 
Eimer 1999, 132), where the LRP is linked to the selection of a specific action such as using the right 
hand or the left hand instead of moving a hand in general. In 2001 these findings were also published 
in the Journal of Consciousness Studies together with critical comments of Libet (see Haggard and Libet 
2001). 
                                                  
18 Haggard and Eimer point out this is also in conflict with other studies such as Praamstra et al (1995), Touge 
et al (1995), and Dirnberger et al (1998) and that the absence of a difference between RPI and RPII is 
probably an artefact of their study. Furthermore, although Praamstra et al (1995) do report a difference in 
amplitude of the RP between fixed and free conditions there is no significant difference in RP onset. 
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 In 2003 Haggard and Clark published a paper in Consciousness and Cognition in which they 
reported the phenomenon of intentional binding. In this study Haggard and Clark compared 
subjects’ timing of either their own intentional actions or induced involuntary movements and 
subsequent effects (auditory tones) of these. Involuntary movements were induced by means of 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Again the method being used to measure the perceived 
time of events was Libet’s (see Libet et al 1983). Skipping an enormous amount of technical details, 
what Haggard and Clark found was that when subjects intentionally produced the auditory tone the 
perceived time of the action shifted forward in time towards the intended effect while the perceived 
time of the auditory tone shifted backwards in time towards the action that produced them. TMS 
induced movements resulting in the same effects reversed the binding effect. (Haggard and Clark, 
697) A study of Tsakiris and Haggard (2003) generalizes the phenomenon of intentional binding to 
somatic effects. 
 Than there is some interesting work done by Lau and colleagues that is also inspired by 
Libet’s seminal studies. For example, in the 2004 paper entitled ‘Attention to Intention’ Lau et al 
investigated the brain mechanisms involved in attention to intention by using fMRI to measure the 
enhancement of activity when subjects attend to their intentions (Lau et al 2004a, 1208). Conditions 
in which subjects made self-paced actions and attended either to their actual movement or their 
intention to move were compared. They found that: 
 
When [subjects, TvdL] attended to their intention […] there was an enhancement of activity 
in the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA). [We, TvdL] also found activations in the 
right dorsal prefrontal cortex and left intraparietal cortex. Prefrontal activity, but not parietal 
activity, was more strongly coupled with activity in the pre-SMA. (Lau et al 2004a, 1208) 
 
Lau et al conclude from this that ‘activity in the pre-SMA reflects the representation of intention’ 
(2004a, 1208) and ‘that attention to intention may be one mechanism by which effective conscious 
control of actions becomes possible’ (idem, 1210). In another study (Lau et al 2004b) these 
conclusions are repeated and supplemented by the hypothesis that:  
 
[…] the dorsal prefrontal cortex is in fact associated with attention to the selection of action, 
but does not play a unique role in the generation of internally initiated actions. (Lau et al 
2004b, 1407)  
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Although I did not go into their designs it will be clear that the latter two studies are of a very 
different kind compared to Libet’s work in terms of their materials (fMRI versus EEG). 
Nevertheless, and this is what is important for my purposes, they do still make use of Libet’s idea 
that one can attend to one’s conscious intentions.  
Recently there have appeared a lot more studies inspired by Libet’s work (see Haggard and 
Magno 1999 or Lau et al 2006a, 2006b, and Lau et al 2007, to name just a few more) using not only 
fMRI, EEG and TMS, but also making use of patients with focal brain lesions (see Sirigu et al 2004). 
These studies slowly provide us with an increasingly differentiated picture of the neural processes 
associated with intentional action. A critical evaluation of the philosophical drawbacks of Libet’s 
work might also have implications for our opinion about and interpretation of the kind of 
investigations just mentioned.  
Comparing the studies mentioned here to Libet’s work we can see an interesting shift away 
from the emphatic link between the empirical findings and the problem of free will and towards an 
interest in the neural processes underlying (the phenomenology of) intentional action. One of the 
relevant philosophical questions now becomes whether these researchers approach their alleged 
subject matter in the right way. I now turn to what I take to be some of the conceptual groundwork 
that is required for a serious attempt at answering this question.  
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Chapter 3 
The Libet-experiments: phenomenological and conceptual problems 
 
3.1 Doubts from phenomenology 
In the Libet-experiments participants were asked to report the time at which they became conscious 
of their ‘intention’, ‘wish’ or ‘urge’ (etc.) to act. Several authors (Breitmeyer 1985, Bayne 2006, 
Graham et al 2003) have remarked that although this might sound like an innocent request at first, 
closer scrutiny of the phenomenology of intentional action might render the request dubious. The 
worry voiced by these authors is that when acting in everyday life we are not so often, if ever, aware 
of intentions before our actions. We just act. 
This was also my experience when doing the tasks in our own experiments (see section 2.2). 
Whether in the single-hand task or the choice-task, I never experienced the onset of a conscious 
intention. Of course, I was not involved in a task in which I was asked to monitor my own 
experience and to report the onset of my conscious intention by means of a clock. However, out of 
curiosity, during the task I did now and then pay attention to my experiences on several trials, 
‘looking’ for intentions, wantings, or urges. However, in most of the trials I had no awareness of 
such mental events, accept maybe for the occasional urges. My phenomenology while doing our task 
is better described as an ongoing awareness that I was going to push the button in the very near 
future (while seeing a yellow dot in the centre of the computer screen before me) and than just 
pushing it. In some trials I experienced urges to push the button, but ‘decided’ that it was too soon, 
only to press the button somewhat later. Whatever the value of these descriptions, being a participant 
in our own experiments made it very clear to me that there is definitely a particular phenomenology 
involved in doing the experimental tasks, but that it is very hard to give a fitting description of the 
phenomenology insofar as it was clear what I really experienced at all.  
Let’s take the issue outside the laboratory. Imagine that you are driving a car or a bicycle. 
When taking a left you do not first form the intention to go left or become aware of wanting to go 
left, you just go left. Also when unlocking your own front door while talking to a friend, you do not 
first form the intention to unlock the door before in fact turning the key, rather you just unlock it. 
Nevertheless, these are examples in which we would describe ourselves as acting intentionally or – 
when pushed - maybe even freely. We definitely feel that we are the authors of these actions 
 Taking seriously the idea that in the case of intentional action we become aware of an 
intention before we actually act has another strange consequence. Again imagine yourself driving a 
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car and taking a left. Do you only become aware of the intention – if any - to turn left or do you also 
form the intention to switch on the blinker? Additionally, maybe you form the intention to brake in 
order to slow down so you can in fact make the turn and don’t we also need an intention to turn the 
steering wheel? The same kind of story can be construed in the case of unlocking your front door 
while talking with a friend. Do you form the intention to pick the keys out of your pocket? Do you 
become aware of your intention to put the key in the lock and, additionally, to turn the key, while – 
additionally – pulling the door slightly towards you so that the unlocking comes to pass more fluidly? 
Of course this is absurd. How many intentions do we need to become aware of before we can truly 
be said to act intentionally or freely? Moreover, these descriptions – I take it - do not answer to most 
people’s everyday phenomenology of being an agent. 
 It might be objected that I am not being fair to Libet here, because the examples I mention 
above are typically the kind of actions that we have undertaken many times before and hence most of 
the time proceed automatically, where ‘automatic’ is used to bring out that the idea we are dealing 
with behavior that is not carried out as ‘consciously’ as typically intentional or ‘freely willed’ actions. 
So let’s adapt one of the above examples so that it qualifies more obviously as ‘freely willed’ or 
intentional in Libet’s scheme of things. This time imagine that you are not walking to your own front 
door, but to the door of your new office at your new job, while talking to two of your new 
colleagues. Half an hour ago the person at the reception gave you the key to your office, which is not 
a normal key, but a swipe card that comes with a code. You are not familiar with this way of 
unlocking doors, and of course – since it is your first day – you do not know your way around in the 
office yet. This seems to be a typical situation in which you cannot rely on automatic behavior. 
Nevertheless, I doubt whether when you arrive at the door you indeed become aware of your 
intention to unlock the door, or - when realizing that you do not know where to put the swipe card – 
become aware of your wanting to ask one of your new colleagues to open the door for you. What 
would probably happen is that you just pick the swipe card out of your pocket – feeling a little 
nervous – and ask your colleagues how it works – maybe feeling a little curious. In other words, you 
just act, and afterwards you might describe your actions as intentional, but this does not imply that 
you became aware of an intention before acting. 
 To put it briefly, Libet’s description or interpretation of the phenomenology of executing 
(simple) actions does not answer to most people’s experience of themselves while acting 
intentionally. In this sense Libet’s phenomenology of free or intentional action is naive. If true this 
has grave implications for the validity of Libet’s results, because asking participants to report the time 
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of their conscious intention to act is very suggestive of there in fact being such an onset of awareness 
of intention, which in turn, according to Libet, is crucial for the question whether we have free will 
or not. However, it could be the case that although participants in fact are not normally aware of 
intentions before their actions – most likely they have never paid attention to the phenomenological 
aspect of their actions nor to their experiences in the seconds preceding actions – they do report the 
onset of awareness of wanting to act in order to live up to the experimenter’s request. The 
experimenter probably knows what he is doing! If however, the experimenter provides his subjects 
with biased terminology that is phenomenologically naive – possibly not living up to actual 
phenomenology – we are justified in asking the question what he was in fact measuring. 
 I am not saying that there is no sense in which, or situations in which, we can sensibly speak 
of having intentions to do certain things and even becoming aware of such intentions. I am only 
saying that we should not apply talk of intentions in contexts where they do not belong on pain of 
(suggestive) confusion. I can, for example, sensibly say that I have the intention to go to Thailand 
next summer. What I mean is that I have planned to go to Thailand next summer. I could even say 
that I am aware of my intention to go to Thailand next summer, meaning that I am currently 
entertaining thoughts about my plan to go to Thailand next summer. Also when talking about what I 
did at an earlier moment in time I can meaningfully say that, for example yesterday morning, I had 
the intention – or rather intended, or wanted – to go to the beach. These are all examples in which 
folk-psychological terminology does uncontroversial semantic work, but this work has little or 
nothing to do with the work it is purported to do in Libet’s investigations.  
 As several authors recently pointed out (for example Graham et al 2003, Haggard and 
Johnson 2003) the phenomenology of doing has not been given very much attention in the 
philosophy of mind of the last three or four decennia. Cognitive science also has largely ignored the 
topic. Lately, however an increasing number of philosophers and scientists acknowledge and argue 
for the relevance of the subject for understanding intentional action, and the relevance of 
phenomenological considerations for understanding mental life in general.19  
 In this section I have shown that the task of Libet’s experiment is artificial in two ways. 
Firstly, it is artificial in that it presents participants with a very unusual task which thus probably 
involves an unusual phenomenology. Secondly, Libet’s work is artificial in that it involves suggestive 
                                                  
19 See for example work of Shaun Gallagher, Dan Zahavi, Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, Patrick 
Haggard to name a few. Interestingly, most of these authors emphatically profess to be inspired by work of 
Wittgenstein and work in the continental tradition of people like Merleau Ponty, Husserl, and Heidegger. 
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terminology invoking notions such as ‘awareness of conscious intention’, and ‘awareness of wanting’ 
that steers participants in the interpretation of their own experiences during the experiment. I have 
not provided a positive account of the phenomenology involved being a participant in Libet’s task 
and will not provide such an account in this book. However, I do hope to have convinced the reader 
that the description Libet gives of the phenomenology of doing his task is naive and stands in need 
of adjustments if not wholesale substitution.  
 
3.2 Free will 
According to Libet, the data he presents have implications for our thinking about free will. Libet 
defends the view that, although we have free will, it operates differently than we might initially have 
thought it would. His conclusion is that apparently free will does not resign in the conscious 
initiation of actions – after all actions, according to Libet, are unconsciously initiated by a RP – 
rather, free will is exemplified in the capacity to vetoe an act once one is aware of one’s intention to 
act.  
But are the Libet-experiments really about free will? This is the question I want to answer in 
this section. My reply, in a nutshell, is that Libet’s work is only superficially related to the issue of free 
will and, moreover, in a rather uninteresting manner. To clarify this reply we need to know some 
more about what discussions about free will are about. In fact, we do not need to know that much 
more, but we do need some more than is provided by Libet, who’s knowledge of available theorizing 
about free will – as will appear below – needs some serious updates. I will thus start by giving a very 
short introduction into thinking about free will and than relate it to Libet’s work. 
 The participants in the traditional discussion on free will can roughly be divided in two 
classes, compatibilists and incompatibilists. Compatibilism is the view that determinism and free will 
are compatible and incompatibilism is the view that they are not. There are many different kinds of 
determinism, but the kind that is relevant here is that of causal determinism, which is roughly the 
thesis that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of 
nature.20  
                                                  
20 See for example the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on causal determinism: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/. Giving a precise definition of causal determinism is 
an intricate endeavour, if only because of is demands a certain amount of clarity on the issue of causality. For 
my purposes in this project however the general definition above suffices.  
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Given the distinction between compatibilism and incompatibilism three general positions 
emerge. Firstly, there are those incompatibilists we call ‘libertarianists’ who defend the view that we 
have free will and that determinism must be false (see for example Kane 2002). Than there are 
incompatibilists who claim that determinism is true and hence that there is no such thing as free will. 
The latter are called ‘hard determinists’ (see for example Pereboom 2001). And finally, there is a 
whole range of compatibilist positions espousing the view that although determinism might be true 
that does not exclude our having free will or being free in a particular sense (see below for some 
influential varieties). 
 Lately the discussion about free will and freedom has mainly focused on devising different 
forms of compatibilism. This probably has to do with the fact that it is simply more of an intellectual 
challenge to formulate a clear and convincing form of compatibilism, than to continue the clash 
between libertarianism and hard determinism. The latter discussion rather quickly reaches a deadlock, 
since – as most philosophers agree – one cannot resolve the debate on determinism and 
indeterminism by philosophical argumentation alone, while convincingly proving or falsifying 
determinism by empirical means is presently impossible (see for example Earman 1986).  
Also apart from its initial commonsensical appeal there are some rather obvious problems for 
libertarianism that threaten its coherency. For example, the danger for libertarianist free will resigns 
in the idea that if every event is causally necessitated by antecedent events, the will is also causally 
necessitated. This raises the hope that if one could just prove the falsity of determinism free will is 
saved. However, rejection of determinism seems to lead directly to the opposite conclusion, namely a 
world in which the course of events is based on chance. Such a chancy world does not grant one free 
will either, since now what I will is still not my decision, but Lady Luck’s. So, neither determinism, 
nor indeterminism is compatible with libertarianism and since there appears to be no logical space 
between determinism and indeterminism the prima facie chances of libertarianism as a viable 
position on free will seem rather low.  
Another reason for doubt concerning the libertarian idea of free will is the very 
commonsensical phenomenological insight that one simply cannot will what one wants, which is 
exactly what free will in the libertarianist sense presupposes. However, phenomenologically there 
seems to be no point in time before actually willing something at which I can decide (in the sense of 
originate) what I want and even if there would indeed be such a point this would immediately lead to 
an infinite regression, since a truly free will in the libertarianist sense also requires that I want, what I 
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want to want and so on and so forth.21 Rather, what I want seems to be something I am in some 
sense just confronted and stuck with. 
  The general shift of attention from incompatibilism to compatibilism in thinking about free 
will has generated important developments that are not mentioned by Libet. I give a short overview 
of the most important compatibilist views on free will proposed in the last four decennia.  
 In 1963 Strawson published a paper in which he defends the view that the conflicts between 
compatibilists and incompatibilists and the framing of the debate about free will in terms of different 
analyses of the ‘ability to do otherwise’ (see for example Aune 1967 and Lehrer 1968) were 
misguided. According to Strawson this overly intellectualized way of thinking about freedom has no 
application outside the philosopher’s Ivory Towers. What is in fact important for understanding 
freedom are what he calls ‘reactive attitudes’. Reactive attitudes are feelings like resentment, gratitude 
or forgiveness that provide the basis for our holding others morally responsible. Strawson defends 
the view that the concept of freedom is only intelligible when framed in relation to reactive attitudes 
and operationalized in practical contexts of holding others or oneself responsible for particular 
actions. Within this holistic network of concepts found in our everyday linguistic practices reactive 
attitudes fuel our immediate moral judgments, while the measure in which anyone acts freely is the 
ground for holding someone responsible for what he or she did. Giving up on our reactive attitides 
and the notion of freedom as a guide to moral responsibility is not a live option, since it would 
utterly destroy our daily practices of jurisprudence and make human interaction impossible. This 
‘normal language’ approach to freedom clearly places practical considerations over theoretical 
concerns and indirectly provides another way of arguing for compatibilism in that it uncouples the 
possibility of moral responsibility from the issue of determinism, while maintaining the idea of 
freedom as a precondition for moral responsibility.  
Another important player in the recent debate about freedom is the philosopher Harry 
Frankfurt. In 1971 Frankfurt presented his hierarchical model of the will, thereby introducing an 
original new way of articulating free will into the debate. In his hierarchical account Frankfurt 
differentiates between first-order and second-order desires and volitions. A volition is a desire that in 
fact moves an agent to action. For example, while I am writing this paragraph I have a rather strong 
desire for hearing a record that I bought last weekend. My desire to listen to the record is a first- 
order desire. However, I know for sure that would I in fact play the record my concentration would 
                                                  
21 This point is often ascribed to Voltaire (1752/1924, 145). 
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be dimished to such an extent that I would not be able to fullfil my desire of finishing this section 
today. My desire to wrap up this section today is also a first-order desire. Moreover, I would really 
like myself to be the kind of person that wants to finish this section today, for I know that the 
consequences of not finishing this section today, in terms of guilt and restlessness, will be severe, 
while tonight there will be plenty of time to listen to my new record. The desire to be the kind of 
person that wants to finish this section today is a second-order desire. Now, according to Frankfurt I 
am free if my second-order desires mesh with my first-order desires. Therefore, if I actually 
effectuate my desire – which thereby becomes a volition - to finish this section today, and ignore my 
musical yearnings, I have acted freely. To put it briefly, having free will, according to this model 
consists in having second-order volitions that guarantee the ‘mineness’ of the action or inaction in 
question. Incidentally, Frankfurt’s thereby also provides a meaningful way of saying that one can (or 
cannot) will what one wants regardless of the world being of determinist nature of not. There are 
several problems with Frankfurt’s model which resulted in a serious amount of critical as well as 
constructive literature (for example Watson 1975). All in all it is no overstatement to say that 
Frankfurt has practically redefined the problem of free will. 
 Finally, Daniel Dennett should also be mentioned here. Dennett’s early thinking about 
freedom is presented in his Elbow Room (1984) in which he asks himself (and us) what really are the 
varieties of freedom worth wanting. Dennett eventually opts for a form of compatibilism that he 
later embeds in an evolutionary context (Dennett 2003a). The starting point for Dennett’s view is 
that in our everyday practices we in fact do not use and do not need the Libertarianist’s metaphysical 
notion of could have done otherwise, which would turn us all into causae sui. All we need, and 
factually talk about, is an epistemic notion of could have done otherwise (see the lottery analogy in 
Dennett 2002, 91).  
Dennett further illustrates the intuitions driving his view by means of Conway’s Game of Life 
(see Dennett 2003a, chapter 2), arguing that even if the fully deterministic workings of that cellular 
automaton are analogous to the actual world there would still be room for freedom in that the 
deterministic laws at the bottom layer – the voxels in Conway’s Life World – do not necessitate 
deterministic laws figuring at the level of the Life World’s inhabitants such as Gliders and Guns. The 
point is that entities at the latter level, which can be discerned from the design stance (see Dennett 
1987), cannot be fully understood in terms of the laws and entities discerned from the physical stance 
(see Dennett 1987), for reasons of complexity. The same goes for human beings, who cannot be fully 
understood from the physical stance. This condition is the basis for our everyday understanding of 
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each other as free creatures, and rightly so, or so says Dennett, for we are indeed free in this 
epistemic sense.  
When Dennett embeds his view in an evolutionary framework, he shows how freedom can 
be a gradual phenomenon reflected in an organism’s range of options. Options are here not to be 
understood in the sense of having more choices between for example different kinds of detergents, 
but rather as the measure of autonomy an organism has relative to his environment. For example, 
birds are differently constrained than humans. Birds can fly, humans cannot. On the other hand 
humans can read, write and do mathematics, and, moreover, build earoplanes so they can fly after all. 
There is a sense in which we have other options, and probably also more options, than a bird, or an 
elephant for that matter. It is in this sense that we are more free – or less constrained – than other 
species. All in all Dennett offers us a complex and many-sided notion of freedom that is, again, 
different from the views offered by the other authors discussed above. 
 I have presented some of the major positions in the recent literature on free will. This brief 
impression can be considerably extended both in breath and in depth. There is, however, no need to 
do so here for my main aim in presenting these views is to show that Libet has a rather narrow view 
of the varieties of free will available. In fact, the only variety that plays a role in his work is the 
classical libertarianist variety.22 This in itself would not be a bad thing – after all maybe Libet has 
considered (some of) the positions referred to above, but just decided that libertarianism provides 
the only variety of free will worth wanting. However, Libet eventually suggests that his experimental 
results provide evidence for the truth of a particular form of libertarianism (the veto-hypothesis). 
This is one bridge too far. Even if we, for the moment, accept Libet’s interpretation of his own 
results as related to the libertarianist notion of free will, closer scrutiny brings out that the relation is 
rather uninteresting, in the sense that it does not really provide more insight concerning whether or 
not we have free will than provided by the debates that were going on long before Libet appeared on 
the scene.  
 Let’s recapitulate Libet’s general line of reasoning to see why this is so. According to Libet 
the fact (if it is a fact) that the RP precedes our conscious intention to act implies that we are not free 
in the sense that we consciously originate our actions. This result throws doubt on the libertarianist 
notion of free will in that this notion pretty much assumes that if there is free will than it consists in 
                                                  
22 Recently there has been a modest revival of libertarianist intuitions in the form of the notion of agent 
causation (Chisholm 1982, O’Connor 1996), so Libet is not entirely alone on this, but on the whole he 
definitely defends a minority position. 
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me (a person, a soul, an agent or what have you) having the ability to decide what to do next (for 
example flex my wrist or not), where the decision is thought of as being a conscious decision that 
initiates the action in an originating causal sense. If Libet’s results are valid the latter notion of free 
will has to be rejected – or so it seems. But this is going too fast, for now imagine that Libet had 
found that the onset of the RP and the time his participants became aware of their intentions to act 
coincided. Would those results justify the classical libertarianist notion of free will? Sure, they would 
not exclude libertarianism, however a lot more work needs to be done in order to argue for it in a 
positive manner.  
This is so because a lot here depends on one’s theory on the relation between the mind and 
the body and specifically the relation between the mind and the brain. Someone who defends the not 
unpopular view that the mind is in fact identical to the brain would definately not take Libet’s results 
as conclusive evidence for libertarianism, on the contrary. The truth of some form of mind-brain 
identity would place my conscious intentions directly in the causal goings-on of the natural world, 
immediately excluding libertarianism, whether the causal goings-on in question are deterministic or 
indeterministic. Note that these problems also arise in case the conscious intention would have 
preceded the RP. In the latter case, arguing convincingly for libertarianism would also require work 
on the mind-body problem. 
 Now, what about the veto-hypothesis? As we have seen in section 2.1 after having argued 
that we do not have free will in the sense that we consciously initiate our actions, Libet claims that 
we do have the ability to consciously veto an action in the time between our becoming conscious of 
our intention and the actual action. This notion of a free won’t is undoubtedly inspired by 
libertarianist intuitions, and it is vulnerable to the same critique as mentioned in the case of the 
conscious intention coinciding with or preceding the RP. Moreover, the libertarianist free won’t is 
even more curious in that it is supposed to occur without originating from preceding unconscious 
processes like the RP  (Libet 1999, 52 and 2004, 145-47). Again, building a convincing case for a 
form of libertarianism based on these data requires more work on the mind-body problem. The 
obvious candidate for making Libet’s case is a form of dualism and indeed Libet suggests at several 
places, especially in his last book (Libet 2004, chapter 5), that for him this is a life option. The theory 
he defends – conscious mental field theory -  might best be characterized as a form of interactionist 
emergentist dualism. Libet emphatically points out that he is not proposing a form of substance 
dualism (Libet 2004, 181). In short, the idea is the following: 
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[...] we may view conscious subjective experience as if it were a field, produced by appropriate 
though multifarious neuronal activities of the brain (Libet [...] 1994). Such a field would 
provide communication within the cerebral cortex without the neural connections and 
pathways in the cortex. A conscious mental field (CMF) would provide the mediator between 
the physical activities of nerve cells and the emergence of subjective experience. [...] A[n] 
attribute of CMF [...] would be a causal ability to affect or alter some neural functions. (Libet 
2004, 168)  
 
Unfortunately, Libet’s arguments for his brand of dualism are rather meagre and certainly do not give 
the impression that he is familiar with the relevant literature. Most importantly, his preferred form of 
dualism is vulnerable to two of the canonical objections that have been directed at dualist theories of 
the relation between the mind and the body for centuries, namely the problem of how they relate to 
the thesis that the natural world is causally closed and how we should think of the causal interactions 
between the material and the allegedly non-material phenomenal experiences. 
 Is it fair to criticize Libet in this manner? I am not sure. Being a philosopher who is also 
interested in psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, biology and other scientific domains that 
are related to philosophical problems, such as the problem of consciousness or the mind-body 
problem generally, I know very well how hard it is to keep up with, or even know of the relevant 
literature available. Some such condition probably also applies to Libet; one just cannot work on all 
the problems and take in all the relevant literature at the same time. Nevertheless, given the fact that 
Libet has apparently inspired other scientists to walk his walk (see especially Wegner 2002) it is 
important to have a clear picture of what these scientists actually are investigating: free will, 
intentional action, mental causation or maybe even something else?  
In this section I have presented some arguments for the claim that Libet’s work is only very 
superficially concerned with free will – it only addresses libertarianism - and only in a rather 
uninteresting manner since it adds nothing to resolve the traditional debates. Moreover, the notion of 
free will apparently involved in Libet’s work is an ‘old variety’ for which there are many alternatives 
that are not in conflict with Libet’s reported results and, moreover, might in general be more worth 
wanting.  
I also suggested that for Libet’s interpretation of his work to be convincing he needs to be 
clearer on how he envisions the relation between the mind and the brain. More specifically, properly 
evaluating Libet’s results requires that one has an explicit theory on the relation between 
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consciousness and the brain. To be sure, I am not demanding a final theory or even a convincing 
theory, but just an explicit theory, whose defender has taken into account at least some of the 
relevant literature. In the next section I will present one influential critique on Libet’s work that is 
based on a specific view about the relation between consciousness and the brain in order to create a 
feel for the relevance of theories on consciousness in interpretating Libet’s work.  
 
3.3 Closing the Cartesian Theater 
In their article ‘Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain’ (1992) 
Dennett and Kinsbourne (D&K) discuss Libet’s experiments. According to D&K Libet’s 
counterintuitive conclusions originate from archaic and false ideas about consciousness that he 
applies in interpreting his experimental results. In what follows I first articulate the concept of 
consciousness that D&K attribute to Libet. Also I will briefly consider D&K’s alternative proposal. 
Then I shall discuss D&K’s arguments against Libet’s allegedly archaic notion of consciousness. 
Finally, I evaluate D&K’s critique and its implications for the interpretation of Libet’s experiments. 
 D&k claim that Libet’s notion of consciousness is that of consciousness as a Cartesian 
Theater. The Cartesian Theater is a metaphor for the place in the brain where consciousness takes 
place or resigns (D&K 1992, 141) and is to be associated with Descartes’ dualistic theory of 
consciousness (or rather thought). In Descartes’ theory the pineal gland is the place where all the 
sensory information comes together and where the interaction between the material brain and the 
immaterial mind takes place, in this way causing conscious experiences. Cartesian dualism has not 
many defenders today – at least not in academic philosophy of mind - but according to D&K the 
Cartesian Theater is still omnipresent in the form of what they call ‘Cartesian materialism’. Cartesian 
materialism rejects dualism, but maintains the idea of a central place in the brain, a finish line, (D&K 
1992, 142), where all information comes together and conscious experience starts: a new Cartesian 
Theater. Although the notion of consciousness expressed by the metaphor of the theater is 
intuitively appealing we had better get rid of it, or so say D&K. 
 What is wrong with the Cartesian Theater? According to D&K the theater-metaphor for 
consciousness is misleading because, besides invoking the idea that consciousness is to be thought of 
as arising at a place ‘where all information comes together’, it also involves the idea that 
consciousness has an audience. However, there is in fact both no such extra observer in the brain – 
an homunculus – that is looking at the gathered information, nor any assembly point to look at. 
D&K’s alternative proposal is their so-called Multiple Drafts model (MD model) of consciousness, 
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which is actually another metaphor for understanding the nature of consciousness. According to the 
MD model the brain is incessantly processing and ‘interpreting’23 information form the senses. This 
processing and ‘interpreting’ of different kinds of sensory input24 takes place ar several places in the 
brain and involves specialized systems functioning simultaneously. The information coming from the 
senses is constantly adjusted at several levels in the light of new input. D&K characterize the parallel 
streams of information as different drafts (D&K 1992, 144) and in this way articulate the central 
feature of the MD model, namely the absence of a final, canonical draft that can be identified with 
the ‘real’ conscious experiences. Within the MD model there is no such ‘last version’, there are 
streams of information and no final story. Another important characteristic of the MD model, in 
which it decisively contrasts with the Cartesian Theather, is that the brain processes sensory input 
only once. Different streams of information are processed in parallel at different locations in the 
brain and are not subsequently also send to a specific (functional) place in the brain, the Cartesian 
Theater where they are presented to an audience (the subject). According to D&K there simply is no 
such place, the brain itself is already ‘headquarters’ and there is no need to look for an extra 
obeserver in the brain that sees what the brain ‘sees’.  
 The MD model of consciousness throws doubt on the feasibility of Libet’s temporal 
judgment tasks and calls for another interpretation of his results. Why this is so can be clarified by 
D&K’s distinction between Orwellian and Stalinesque revision. They introduce this distinction – 
which will turn out to be illusory – by means of an example from psychology, the phi-phenomenon. 
The phi-phenomenon is a form of apparent motion that arises when looking at alternating points of 
light at fixed locations at particular distances from each other. In case of an optimal interval of 
illumination (around 150msec.) one sees one point of light that travels between the two locations 
(Reber 1997). The (apparent) motion is also perceived when the points of light are of different 
                                                  
23 Yet another metaphor. In the rest of this section I will in fact use a lot of these kind of metaphors, but I 
emphasize here that I do indeed think of them as metaphors unless noted otherwise. After having read Bennett 
and Hacker’s (2003) book on the philosophical foundations of neuroscience I am very much aware that it is 
not, at least not primarily, brains that see, interpret, feel, and so on, but persons or organisms. Although I 
underwrite Bennett and Hacker’s warning that we should be very much aware of applying such concepts to 
brains, I do not think that once one is aware of this it does much harm.  
24 Visual information, tactile information, auditory information, and so on and so forth. Within each domain 
different aspects of the information are also processed by different systems; think for example of the aspects 
of form and color in the visual domain. 
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colors. When for example one of the lights is green and the other is red one perceives one moving 
source of light that abruptly changes its color halfway between the two locations where the lights 
actually are. Where does the apparent motion come from? It seems to be the case that the brain 
employs a strategy that brings it about that what in reality are two alternating light sources are 
perceived as one moving light source, but how does this work? After all, before the second flash of 
light is perceived the brain cannot ‘conclude’ that there is movement involved, however before the 
second source of light has been perceived I have already seen the light source move and even change 
its color! Is my brain pulling my leg? Van der Waals and Roelofs suggested that we here have an 
example of backwards projection (D&K 1992, 146). The brain ‘reinterprets’ the incoming 
information after the second flash of light as movement and this ‘story’ is projected backwards in 
time.  
 D&K are unhappy with the latter way of looking at things and introduce the distinction 
between Orwellian and Stalinesque revision to clarify their concerns. Imagine you see a man without 
glasses running by. One second after you have seen this happen your memory of a man with glasses 
that you saw earlier this week contaminates your memory of the man who just ran by. When you are 
asked whether the man who just ran by had glasses on you answer in the affirmative. Here you are 
the victim of Orwellian revision, in analogy with the rewriting of history by the Ministry of Truth in 
George Orwell’s 1984. After your conscious experience of the running man without glasses your 
memory of that man is rewritten and from that moment on you think you just saw a man with 
glasses running by. 
 Stalinesque revision, in analogy with the show trials that were presented in Stalin’s Russia to 
imprison dissidents, is another way of arriving at the false judgment that the running man wore 
glasses. In the case of Stalinesque revision your conscious experience of the man running by is 
contaminated by your memory of an earlier man with glasses, which results in your hallucination of 
the running man as having glasses. In this second case you remember your conscious hallucination. 
Again you will claim that the man who just ran by wore glasses. Although you will not be able to 
judge whether you are in fact the victim of Orwellian or Stalinesque revision these indeed seem to be 
different situations, involving different processes. 
 Let’s take another look at the phi phenomenon; is this a case of Orwellian or of Stalinesque 
revision? The notion of projection backwards in time is typically Orwellian. Assuming a red and a 
green source of light you would first experience the red flash, then the green flash, whereupon the 
brain decides that this sequence of inputs involves movement and consequently rewrite the memory 
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of the two flashes as the moving of one source of light that changes its color. Finally, the resulting 
story is projected backwards in time. The Stalinesque interpretation on the other hand would be that 
as soon as all the information (the red flash and the green flash) is in, the ‘movement’ is added and 
the resulting story appears in consciousness with a small delay, resulting in a hallucination of one 
moving source of light that changes its color. Again, different processes seem to be involved in the 
Orwellian and the Stalinesque accounts. But is this really the case? 
 D&K point out that the distinction between Orwellian and Stalinesque revision requires that 
we can discern between consciously experienced and (not yet) consciously experienced. Such an 
absolute distinction can indeed be made when one accepts a Cartesian materialist model of 
consciousness. However, when one gives up on Cartesian materialism in favour of the MD model 
then the distinction between Orwellian and Stalinesque revision becomes an apparent distinction. 
Assuming a form of Cartesian materialism one can sensibly wonder when and where information 
becomes conscious – reaches the theater – but for someone who has accepted the MD model trying 
to answer questions about the where and when of conscious experience is a mistaken enterprise. The 
MD model involves parallel processing of information and does not assume a place where all the 
information comes together, which could figure as an unambiguous finish line where information 
becomes conscious. Within the MD model the point of view of the experiencer, is spread out over 
the brain making absolute criteria for the when and where of conscious experience impossible at the 
small time scales we are dealing with, in for example the phi phenomenon, but also in the Libet-
experiments. According to D&K at these small time scales the distinction between Stalinesque and 
Orwellian revision, that seems so sensible at larger time scales, breaks down and cannot be be made 
form either the perspective of the subject (first-person) or the investigator (third-person) making it a 
difference that does not make a difference. 
 However, if we accept the MD model, how are we supposed to understand the fact that we 
do seem to have a consistent interpretation of temporal properties of sensory information? 
Understanding this, according to D&K requires that we sharply distinguish between the information 
that is represented (the content) and the representings (the vehicle). Imagine for example that your 
toes and your head are touched simultaneously. Given the distance the different units of information 
(‘head being touched’, ‘toes being touched’) have to travel from the body parts to the brain one 
would expect that the touch on the head would be felt earlier than the touching of the toes. 
However, what you will experience is a simulteneous touch of your toes and your head; a correct 
interpretation of what is going on in the world (D&K 1992, 148-49). How does this work? A 
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possible solution is provided by the idea of content-sensitive settling, according to which the brain 
represents temporal properties by ‘comparing’ salient, low-level features of the information units. 
According to this hypothesis the brain ‘knows’ how to temporally interpret information coming from 
the head or the toes based on the location on the body – salient, low-level feature of the content in 
question - from which the information originates. In other words, D&K suggest that given the MD 
model representation of time in the brain does not necessarily use time-in-the-brain.  
 What should all this imply for Libet’s work? According to D&K, although Libet does 
distinguish between vehicle and content (see for example Libet 1985, 559), he does not draw the 
right conclusions, because he still hangs on to the possibility of an absolute timing of conscious 
experience, which he wants to relate to temporal properties of processes in the brain. The way in 
which Libet presents his results is Stalinesque: the brain waits until all information is in upon which 
the scene in which I perform a freely willed act is presented in the theater. However, one can also 
give an Orwellian account of Libet’s results. In the latter scenario the subject would be conscious of 
the RP, but this information is not saved. When the subject is later (after the trial) asked for the clock 
time at the moment he became conscious of his intention to act history has already been rewritten.25 
Once again we cannot decide what is the right account, but as we have seen D&K draw the 
conclusion that neither of the accounts is actual, since their is no absolute place or time at which 
information becomes conscious. The fact that Libet assumes that there is such a Great Divide (D&K 
1992, 159) lead him to his conclusions concerning the nature of free will (although as we saw in the 
previous section on free will there are more assumptions at work here). If the data provided by Libet 
would be interpreted in the light of the MD model no anomalies would occur and, moreover, Libet 
would not be justified in his conclusions concerning the nature of free will.  
 
3.4 Libet and the problem of mental causation 
The problem of mental causation is problem of how to account for the idea that the mental - for 
example intentions, beliefs and desires – can be causally efficacious. How can my intention to get a 
beer be the cause of my getting out of my armchair and walking to the fridge? How does my 
intention to flick my wrist or push a button actually cause these actions? Although I argued that Libet 
does not really address the problem of free will in any interesting manner his work might be 
construed as an experimental approach to the problem of mental causation. The main authority on 
                                                  
25 D&K base this Orwellian account (D&K 1992, 166) on Jasper (1985).  
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the problem of mental causation is the philosopher Jaegwon Kim. In this section I shall first present 
the way in which Kim poses the problem of mental causation. Next, I shall relate the problem of 
mental causation to Libet’s research and argue that Libet should not be understood as addressing this 
problem. 
 Kim defends the view that the only way of saving mental causation is to reduce the mental to 
functional, physical properties. His main argument in arguing for this thesis has become known as 
the causal exclusion argument, which works against a background of minimal physicalism captured 
by the thesis of mind-body supervenience in combination with the thesis that the physical domain is 
causally closed. The thesis of mind-body supervenience says that: 
 
Mental properties supervene on physical properties in the sense that if something instantiates 
any mental property at M at t, there is a physical base property P such that the thing has P at 
t, and necessarily anything with P at a time has M at that time. (Kim 1998, 39)  
 
The idea that the physical domain is causally closed comes down to saying that every physical event 
has a complete and sufficient physical cause. As Kim puts it: ‘no causal chain will ever cross the 
boundary between the physical and the nonphysical’ (Kim 1998, 40).  
 Now the causal exclusion argument unfolds as follows. Suppose we have an apparant case of 
mental-mental causation in which an instance of mental property M causes another mental property 
M* to be instantiated. Given mind-body supervenience we know that M* has a physical 
supervenience base P*. This forces the question upon us of whether M* gets instantiated because it is 
caused by M or because of the instantiation of P*. If one wants to be a physicalist and thus accepts 
the supervenience thesis and the causal closure of the physical one should choose the latter option 
and face up to the claim that if M is to have any causal influence on the coming to be of M* this 
influence has to go via P*. This results in the thesis that M caused M* by causing P*, however as we 
will see this thesis does not obviously give us mental causation either. Given mind-body 
supervenience we know that M has a supervenience base P, which given causal closure of the 
physical qualifies as a sufficient cause for P. This excludes M as causally relevant for causing P* (and 
hence M*) unless one accepts a scenario of overdetermination in which both M and P cause P*, but 
this is, again, incompatible with the causal closure of the physical domain that says that P* can only 
have one complete and sufficient physical cause. This results in the following scenario, which 
apparantly leaves little room for mental causation: 
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The M-to-M* and M-to-P* causal relations are only apparent, arising out of a genuine causal 
process from P to P*. (Kim 1998, 45) 
 
 According to Kim the only way out of this mental causation-hostile scenario is to reduce the 
mental (M and M*) to the physical (P and P*). He proposes to do this by means of functional 
reduction. The model of functional reduction consists of three steps: 
 
Step I [Functionalization of the target property] 
 Property M to be reduced is given a functional definition of the following form: 
   
  Having M = def. having some property or other P (in the reduction base  
domain) such that P performs causal task C. 
 
For a functionally defined property M, any property in the base domain that fits the causal 
specification definitive of M (that is, a property that performs causal task C) is called a 
“realizer” of M. 
 
Step II [Identification of the realizers of M] 
 Find the properties (or mechanisms) in the reduction base that perform the causal  
task C. 
 
Step III [Developing an explanatory theory] 
 Construct a theory that explains how the realizers of M perform task C. (Kim 2005,  
101-2)  
 
This model allows one to make species- and possibly even context- or individual-specific type 
identifications between instantiations of mental properties and instantiations of physical (particularly 
neural) properties which warrants the causal efficacy of the mental by reducing it to properties of the 
physical realm. 
 I have been going very fast and a lot more can be said about Kim’s model, but what I need in 
this section is just a quick and authorative sketch of the problem of mental causation that can help us 
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clarifying what Libet might in fact have been investigating. I come back to Kim’s approach to the 
problem of mental causation in chapter 8 where I will criticize some aspects of his solution. Now 
let’s take a closer look at the relation between Libet’s work and the problem of mental causation.  
Can the Libet-experiments be understood as addressing the problem of mental causation? 
Part of the answer to this question has already been given in section 3.2 where I discussed the 
relation between Libet’s work and the problem of free will. There we saw that if Libet wants to argue 
against the traditional libertarianist notion of free will from the finding that an RP precedes our 
intentions to act or for a new libertarianist notion of free will via the veto-hypothesis, he needs to tell 
us some more about his ideas concerning the relation (if any) between the mind and the brain. In fact 
given the way Libet sets up the problem of free will it comes very close to the problem of mental 
causation. After all, according to Libet, (libertarianist) free will requires that our conscious intentions 
cause our actions, which immediately requires an answer to the question of how intentions can be 
causally efficacious, which is Kim’s problem. Libet might be taken to argue that there is no such 
thing as mental causation in the sense that our intentions cause our action, but that there are other 
mental property instances that do have causal influence, namely the mental veto. As noted in section 
3.2 Libet has not much to offer when it comes to the relation between the mind and the brain, 
particularly when it comes to the veto-hypothesis. Moreover, what he has to offer (the CMF theory) 
is a form of emergentist dualism that falls prey to the classical criticism that have been aimed at 
dualism for ages.  
But still, although Libet does not solve the problem of mental causation can he not be said to 
at least address it? Obviously, he is worried about some problem of mental causation, but I would like 
to suggest that it is not Kim’s problem of mental causation. My point is that Libet is primarily 
interested in the phenomenology of intentional action and hence that his notion of intentions is 
primarily a phenomenological notion; it is consciously realizing that one wants to act or, more accurately, 
feeling an urge to act. The notion of intentions involved in the philosophical debate on mental 
causation is not so obviously phenomenal at all. Discussions about mental causation focus on issues 
concerning mereology and the possible relations between ‘layers of the world’ (see also chapter 8 
below) and not on phenomenology. So for example, when reading Kim’s work one finds that 
although he often uses the example of pain as a mental event - asking the question how this mental 
event can be causally efficacious - he is primarily interested in pain as a mental event and not as a 
phenomenological event. Only in his last book (Kim 2005) Kim extensively elaborates on his views 
concerning qualia and ends up defending the view that qualia cannot be reduced to the physical and 
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hence are (at least partly) epiphenomenal (see Kim 2005, chapter 4 and 6). Given Libet’s emphatic 
interest in phenomenology it would be more apt to say that he is interested in another form – and 
thus another problem - of mental causation. Here I am thinking of the problem of phenomenal 
causation, which is the problem of understanding how phenomenology can make a causal difference 
in the world (see e.g. Tye 1995, 18). The latter problem will be discussed in chapter 5 of this book. 
One final remark on the relation between Libet’s work and the problem of mental causation. 
Philosophers thinking about mental causation in the tradition inspired by Kim think about intentions 
as things, events, or processes that are physically realized. This tendency can also be recognized in 
Libet’s approach that at least appears to take an intention to be the kind of thing or event that is a 
causally efficacious factor in determining the course of our actions and as such is to be looked for in 
or ‘near’ the neural causal chain we take to culminate in for example intentional movements of 
wrists. This reification of intentions is by no means mandatory as is for example exemplified by 
another influential approach to our everyday use of mental vocabulary provided by G.E.M. 
Anscombe (1957), according to whom we should think of intentions as linguistic predictions of what 
I or someone else will do in the future.  
A similarly Wittgensteinian approach to the referents of mental vocabulary can be found in 
Dennett’s work (1987, 1991b). According to Dennett intentions are not to be looked for in the head, 
but are to be thought of as pattern-expressing categories we apply when taking the intentional stance 
towards a system. Dennett introduces the intentional stance as follows: 
 
Here is how it works: first you decide to treat the object whose behavior is to be predicted as 
a rational agent; then you figure out what beliefs that agent ought to have, given its place in 
the world and its purpose. Then you figure out what desires it ought to have, on the same 
considerations, and finally you predict that this rational agent will act to further its goals in 
the light of its beliefs. A little practical reasoning from the chosen set of beliefs and desires 
will in most instances yield a decision about what the agent ought to do; that is what you 
predict the agent will do. (Dennett 1987, 17) 
 
People tend to take the intentional stance mainly towards other people, but the intentional stance can 
also be taken – and is in fact often taken - towards many non-human systems such  as chess 
computers, cats and even thermostats. The relevant question in taking the intentional stance towards 
a system is emphatically not whether the system really has intentions, beliefs or desires, rather the 
42 
question is whether taking the stance leads to successful interaction with the system. According to 
Dennett intentions and beliefs are best thought of as abstracta that although operationally valid 
should not be reified (1991b, 28-9).  
Importantly, for my purposes, is that the latter kind of approaches in some sense dissolve the 
problem of mental causation.26 Adopting such an approach simply takes away the tendency to look 
for realizations of intentions in the brain; intentions simply are not the kind of phenomenon to be 
looked for in the soggy grey matter found within the confines of our skulls. Of course, this does not 
necessarily imply that there isn’t anything important going on in our brains when someone is said to 
act intentionally.  
 
3.5 Evaluation of recent work inspired by Libet’s design 
Although here I cannot and will not argue for the in my view overall right-mindedness of anti-
reificationist interpretations of my categories applied in folk psychology such as provided by 
Anscombe and Dennett (this would require another book), I can show what the studies of Libet, 
Haggard, and Lau do teach us about intentional action under such an interpretation. Roughly there 
are two domains of interest for these studies, namely the phenomenology of action and the 
biobehavioral data such as the neural processes involved. As for the phenomenological data provided 
by Libet I have already argued that they are inspired by a naive view of what it is like for people to 
act intentionally and as such are better ignored. Of course, the Libet-experiments do have some 
interesting neurological data on offer, namely the RP that reliably precedes intentional motor actions. 
Libet even attempted to differentiate between a RPI (for pre-planned intentional actions) and RPII 
(spontaneous intentional actions). Haggard and Eimers’ (1999) study  further enhanced our 
knowledge of the neural processes involved in intentional action in another way, namely by showing 
that RP’s in the course of their development in time up to the actual motor action, differentiate 
laterally (the LRP), where the activity in the part of the motor cortex contralateral to the body-part 
used in the action is significantly greater.  
Haggard and Clark’s (2003) study of intentional binding offers new insights into the 
phenomenology of intentional action that can also be understood in separation from the reificationist 
understanding of intentions they do seem to assume. Haggard and Clark found that when subjects 
                                                  
26 The problem of phenomenal causation, however can still be meaningfully posed and answered. This 
provides another reason for clearly separating the problem of mental causation and the problem of 
phenomenal causation. 
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intentionally produced an auditory tone the perceived time of the action shifted forward in time 
towards the intended effect, while the perceived time of the auditory tone shifted backwards in time 
towards the action that produced them. This effect does not rely on dubious verbal reports of the 
absolute onset of conscious intentions. Furthermore, although it may be taken to assume the 
possibility of absolute timing of the onset of an action and its effect, rejection of this possibility still 
allows the data to be informative. After all, relative timing of the structural connection between the 
subjective timing of the relation between onset of the action and onset of the effect might be 
preserved.  
Finally, a note on the fMRI studies by Lau et al on ‘attention to intention’ (Lau et al 2004a). 
Lau et al’s description of their investigation at least suggests a commitment to a phenomenological 
account of intentional action that I have earlier classified as naive. Nevertheless, given a sympathetic 
reading one can interpret the data provided by these studies in separation from this view. Although 
there might indeed be no conscious intentions to be found in the phenomenology of intentional 
action, one might also think of the participants involved in the experiments as more attentively doing 
their task in reaction to the request to pay attention to their intention’s onset. This more general 
heightened degree of attention prima facie equally well accounts for the enhanced activity in the pre-
supplementary motor area coupled to the prefrontal activity. Subjects just tried to live up to their 
interpretation of  intending to their intentions – whatever it was.  
 I hope this short discussion about the relevance of work done by scientists like Libet, 
Haggard et al and Lau et al on intentional action under the non-reificationist interpretation of mental 
phenomena such as intentions shows that these contributions are by no means void of information. 
What they offer is an increasingly differentiated impression of the neural processes involved in 
(intentional) action and - to a lesser extent - its phenomenology.  
 
3.6 Alternative phenomenology-involving approaches 
It seems to me that the studies discussed in section 2.3 and briefly touched upon in the foregoing, 
when subjected to the proper interpretation, point the way to viable further scientific investigation of 
intentional action. Nevertheless, given the current supply of scientific studies, which is of almost 
exclusively biobehavioral orientation, it would not be a bad idea to enrich our investigations with 
more serious phenomenological considerations. One of the important aims in invoking 
phenomenology is to deepen and differentiate our insight into possible structural correlations 
between phenomenological and biobehavioral data.  
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There are several proposals on offer on how to engage in this project, two of which we will 
encounter in chapter 6, namely neurophenomenology and heterophenomenology. Another 
suggestion, called front-loaded phenomenology (FLP), is provided by Shaun Gallagher in his (2003). 
FLP suggests that we take our phenomenological insights into the laboratory and let them inform the 
way we set up our experiments and the formulation of our hypotheses. FLP differs from NP in that 
it does not necessarily require (trained) subjects to report on their phenomology. As Gallagher 
argues, an important consequence of both NP and FLP is that ‘[…] the phenomenology becomes 
part of the analytic framework for interpreting the results, and not just part of the data to be 
analyzed’ (Gallagher 2003, 91). As a practical illustration of FLP Gallagher shows how the 
phenomenological distinction between self-agency (a sense of being the initiator or source of a 
movement, action or thought) and self-ownership (a sense that it is me who is experiencing the 
movement or has the thought) has informed – has been front-loaded into – several experimental 
studies of the neural underpinnings of the sense of agency in a fruitful manner (for example Farrer 
and Frith 2001 and Chaminade and Decety 2002). Gallagher uses the same distinction to criticize 
certain neurocognitive models of schizophrenia (Gallagher 2004). Similarly, but on a negative note, 
the phenomenological insight that we do not often – if ever – experience conscious intentions before 
we act, should prevent us from construing experimental settings in which subjects are asked to report 
the onset of their conscious intentions.  
What are in fact useful phenomenological insights for scientific investigation shall have to be 
worked out by hands-on investigations, but what is truly relevant is that we get rid of our behaviorist 
legacy and the associated idea of scientific investigations as exclusively third-personal, which cannot 
be upheld in scientific study of consciousness. This is not intended to foster an attitude of 
methodical laissez-faire in investigating matters of the mind, but rather to become aware of the extent 
in which our current - supposedly purely objective - scientific investigations are in fact always already 
inspired by our everyday phenomenology and the folk-psychology we apply in its interpretation. I do 
not think this insight should flag the end of a science of the mind, but rather a reinterpretation of the 
phenomena under investigation, how we currently study them, and how we should proceed.  
In conclusion of this analysis of Libet’s work as a case of scientific research into conscious 
intentional action with implicit methodology-implying presuppositions I shall summarize the main 
points made in part I by briefly answering the questions concerning the Libet-experiments posed in 
section 1.2. As for the first question, which was the question what Libet has been investigating, I 
have argued that Libet’s work is only about free will in a rather uninteresting manner and that, 
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although it is related to phenomenal causation, Libet does not provide the necessary conceptual 
machinery to really make sense of his experimental results in terms of this problem. As for the 
relation between Libet’s work and the problem of mental causation. I think we should say that 
although initially there might seem to be an overlap, namely in terms of a common interest in the 
causal role of intentions in intentional action, closer scrutiny brings out the fact that the focus of 
Libet on the one hand, and philosophers involved in the mental causation debate on the other, is 
rather different. Libet uses and seems primarily interested in a phenomenological notion of intention, 
while philosophers involved in the mental causation debate are primarily concerned with ‘layers of 
the world’, supervenience, composition, and mereology. All in all, I propose to understand the Libet-
experiments as a seminal experimental approach not to free will, mental causation, or phenomenal 
causation, but to intentional action. The interesting and daring aspect of Libet’s work is that it also 
explicitly addresses the phenomenology of intentional action.  
This brings me to the second question, which was the question whether we should apply 
Libet’s methods in scientifically investigating intentional action? My answer to this question was, 
respectively, ‘no’ and ‘we should not’. However, this verdict does not render Libet’s data – or the 
data presented by Haggard et al and Lau et al (see section 2.3) for that matter – completely 
meaningless. On the contrary. We do however need to modify our interpretation of this research.  
The third and last question posed in section 1.2 was whether there might be defensible 
alternatives for Libet’s method of scientifically investigating intentional action that also take account 
of the phenomenology involved? I answered this question positively and referred to Gallagher’s FLP 
approach. In chapter 6 I also discuss heterophenomenology and neurophenomenology as general 
proposals on how to draw phenomenology into our scientific research of consciousness. It should be 
added though that these are proposals for scientifically studying consciousness in general and not 
conscious intentional action in particular. How the latter research could be ‘phenomenologized’ is 
something that is still very much work in progress (but see Haggard and Johnson 2003, Banks et al 
2006).  
Libet’s work and the discussions it has inspired provide us with a – probably even the – 
dramatic example that demonstrates the importance of being clear and explicit about the 
presuppositions concerning the nature of conscious intentional action behind experimental 
approaches to the subject. However, as will become clear in part II, being explicit is not enough.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part II: An example of a set of explicit methodology-implying suppositions for 
scientific research into consciousness and conscious intentional action that are 
of the wrong kind 
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Chapter 4 
On projection: some intuitions concerning consciousness 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Part I introduced the Libet-experiments as an example of scientific research with implicit 
methodology-implying presuppositions and gave a general impression of the problems involved, 
methodical as well as methodological. One of the philosophical problems, or rather cluster of 
problems, that looms in the background of Libet’s work is the problem of consciousness. In section 
3.3 I presented Dennett and Kinsbourne’s critique on Libet, which was aimed at the latter’s allegedly 
archaic notion of consciousness which Dennett and Kinsbourne expose as a Cartesian Theater. 
Dennett and Kinsbourne’s replacement for the Theater is what they call the Multiple Drafts Model 
that, besides being better compatible with the way in which we now think that the brain functions, 
also offers an alternative interpretation of the Libet-experiments.  
 The upshot of part I was that, when experimentally investigating consciousness and 
conscious intentional action, it is important to be explicit about one’s suppositions concerning the 
phenomena under investigation. I ended part I by noting that being explicit is not enough. Part II is 
supposed to illustrate the importance of embracing the right suppositions by presenting an example 
of a set of explicit methodology-implying suppositions for scientific research into consciousness and 
conscious intentional action that are of the wrong kind in more than one way. I introduce some 
common intuitions about consciousness and reflect on the role of phenomenology for our 
(scientific) theorizing about consciousness. In the present chapter I enter the field by discussing the 
concept of projection as it is used by Velmans (for example 2000).27  
In section 4.2 and 4.3 I will first give a short introduction into Velmans’ reflexive theory of 
phenomenal consciousness and indicate what role is played in this theory by the concept of 
projection. Projection here basically is the idea that in many cases our experiences are projected from 
our brains into the world outside. Important categories in Velmans’ theory are the observer, the 
                                                  
27 Note that Libet was interested in conscious intentions or willings while, as we will see, Velmans is interested 
in conscious experience as representation of one’s body and environment. These notions of interest have a 
different direction of fit, respectively world-to-mind and mind-to-world (see Searle 1983). This difference in 
direction of fit has no implications for the points I want to make in this project, therefore I shall further 
ignore it.  
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observed and the thing itself. I will argue that Velmans isn’t clear about the reference of the observed 
which sometimes seems to refer to our phenomenal worlds and sometimes to the thing itself. I will 
propose a solution by clearly differentiating between looking and seeing.  
Next, I will show that Velmans’ use of the term projection is ambiguous and differentiate 
between a weak and a strong sense of projection (section 4.4). Since neither the strong nor the weak 
sense of projection can satisfy Velmans’ theoretical demands I will also evaluate an in-between 
conceptualization of projection. Finally (section 4.5), only the weak sense of projection will turn out 
to be intelligible, and therefore Velmans is forced to choose this concept of projection. 
Unfortunately, this weak sense of projection is insufficient for Velmans to uphold his critique of 
dualism and reductionism, which is that both positions systematically misdescribe the 
phenomenology of conscious experience. 
 Although this conclusion is predominantly negative the analysis we are about to embark on 
will provide us with some general insights and theories about consciousness and its phenomenology 
that are relevant for thinking about scientific consciousness research in general (section 4.6). Briefly, 
while Dennett and Kinsbourne provide us with reasons for doubting the possibility of an absolute 
timing of conscious experiences the following will bring out that it might also be better not to give in 
to the temptation of attributing locations to conscious experiences based on phenomenological 
considerations. In general I want to show that describing and interpreting phenomenology is not 
always such a straightforward matter as we might initially think it to be. Velmans’ theory of 
consciousness provides a clear illustration of this insight, because although it explicitly takes 
phenomenological considerations into account it nevertheless misdescribes – or so I will argue – the 
phenomenology of everyday visual perception. 
 
4.2 Velmans’ reflexive theory of consciousness 
In his book Understanding Consciousness Max Velmans tries to find a way of talking about 
consciousness which does justice to all of the aspects that seem to be relevant to this complex 
phenomenon. He introduces his own theory by relating it to the two historically dominating classes 
of theories about consciousness: dualism and reductionism. According to Velmans neither dualism 
nor reductionism gives a correct description of the phenomenology of consciousness. 
 Dualism and reductionism differ in their answers to the question of whether phenomenal 
experiences really are what they seem. According to dualists phenomenal experiences have no 
physical properties such as extension or location and therefore we should conclude that experience is  
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Figure 2: A dualistic model of perception. Taken from Velmans 1990, 81.  
 
an immaterial phenomenon. Figure 2 is a dualistic model of the visual perception of a cat. This 
model shows two fundamental divisions. Firstly, the immaterial experience of the cat in 
consciousness (the perception) is separated from the material world (the cat and the brain). 
Furthermore, the model shows a clear separation between the perceiving subject and perceived  
object. 
Compare this to a reductionist model of perception as is shown in figure 3. Reductionists, 
who abhor immaterial substances, wish to show that phenomenal experiences are in fact nothing 
over and above states of the brain. When looking at this model we can see that the division between 
an immaterial experience in consciousness and the material world of cats and brains has disappeared, 
but the separation of physical objects in the world from the perception of these objects remains. In 
the reductionist model the rigid separation between the perceiving subject and the perceived object 
also remains. Looking at these two models it can be concluded that despite their thorough 
disagreement about the nature of consciousness (material or immaterial), both dualists and 
reductionists would, when asked where their experiences are, roughly point at their heads.28 
                                                  
28 Strictly speaking the dualist should not point at all, because in his opinion one cannot point at phenomenal 
experiences since these are without extension and location. But for the sake of the argument let’s say that the 
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Figure 3: A reductionist model of perception. Taken from Velmans 1990, 81.  
 
Velmans’ alternative is a reflexive model that, purportedly, is compatible with our common 
sense ideas about phenomenal experience, while at the same time being compatible with science. 
Velmans urges us to take a pin and stick it in one of our fingers. Normally this act leads to an intense 
pain experience. Now Velmans asks us where the pain is.29 The reductionist would say that the pain 
is a certain physical state of his brain, while the dualist would say that there is an immaterial pain 
perception in his mind. Velmans on the other hand says the pain is there where we experience it to 
be, it is in the finger.  
Something similar goes for the perception of external objects. Take for example subject S 
who has a visual experience of a cat (see figure 4). There is information coming from the world 
external to S (in this case from a cat), this information is being processed by S’s visual system (the 
neural representation of the cat) which ultimately results in S’s visual experience of a cat. The dualist  
                                                                                                                                                               
typical Cartesian dualist would vaguely point at his head, because the head holds the pineal gland, which is the 
place where the interaction between res extensa and res cogitans is traditionally taken to be.   
29 See Velmans 2000, 108: ‘Suppose you stick a pin in your finger and experience a sharp pain. Within 
philosophy of mind, pain is also regarded as a paradigm case of a conscious, mental event (it is private, 
subjective and so on). But where is the pain?’  
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Figure 4: A reflexive model of perception. Taken from Velmans 1990, 82.  
 
will again place this experience in S’s mind, while the reductionist would point out to S that his visual 
cat experience is really nothing but certain brain processes. According to Velmans’ reflexive model 
however, we should say that the only experience S has of a cat is the cat that S sees; there in front of 
him. When S had to point to his phenomenal cat he would not point at his head, but to the cat as he 
experiences it, namely out there in the world (see Velmans 2000, 109).  
This is the gist of Velmans’ reflexive model which, according to him, constitutes a 
fundamental critique of dualism and reductionism as theories of consciousness. Both dualism and 
reductionism describe experiences as different from the experienced objects, perceived objects are in 
the world while experiences of objects are in the head or the mind. The reflexive model however, 
stipulates that in terms of phenomenology there is no difference between the perceived object and 
the experience of the object: 
 
The reflexive model suggests that in terms of phenomenology there is no actual separation 
between the perceived body and experiences of the body or between the perceived external 
world and the experiences of that world. It goes without saying that when one has a conscious 
thought, there isn’t some additional experience of a thought “in the mind”. But neither is there 
a phenomenal pain “in the mind” (without location and extension) in addition to the pain one 
experiences in the finger if one stabs it with a pin. And there isn’t a phenomenal cat “in the 
mind” in addition to the cat one sees out in the world. (Velmans 2000, 111) 
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4.3 The observer, the observed, and the thing itself 
A salient feature of Velmans’ reflexive model is that ‘[…] the external phenomenal world is viewed as 
part of consciousness rather than apart from it’ (Velmans 1993, 81). This doesn’t mean, however, that 
Velmans accepts only our phenomenal experiences as real. As we have seen in figure 4 ‘[i]n the 
reflexive model, each observation results from a […] [reflexive] interaction of the observer with the 
observed’ (Velmans 1993, 88). The observed is what Velmans calls the thing itself, which ‘[...] may also be 
thought of as a “reference fixer” required to make sense of the fact that we can have multiple 
experiences, concepts or theories of the same thing’ (Velmans 2000, 164/65). Contrary to Immanuel 
Kant’s Ding an sich, Velmans’ thing itself is to a certain degree knowable to us. All this might seem 
pretty straightforward, but further scrutiny of the model leads to problems.  
 For example, when looking at the reflexive model of perception in figure 4 one might ask 
what exactly it is that subject S is looking at. Is S looking at his phenomenal cat (the cat as perceived 
by S) or is he looking at the cat itself? Phenomenally speaking there might be no actual separation 
between the perceived cat and the cat as perceived, but many of us, including Velmans, have the 
strong intuition that there is a world out there (the thing itself) and that is what I am looking at. 
Velmans indeed seems to agree when he writes: ‘When we look at a cat, for example, a cat in the world 
is all that we see’ (Velmans 2000, 133-34). His use of the words ‘all that’ suggests that the object that 
subject S (the observer) is looking at is the cat itself (the observed), while all that he sees is a 
phenomenal cat. When approached in this manner the reflexive model seems to have some linguistic 
difficulties, but maybe these are just difficulties and no real problems. Unfortunately there are more 
questions to be asked.  
 Velmans wants to close the (ontological) gap between physical and psychological 
phenomena. He purports to do this by arguing that physical phenomena are really psychological 
phenomena. According to Velmans we use the term ‘physical’ for a certain class of objects and 
events in our (similar) phenomenal worlds. However, when granting Velmans this move the problem 
is that the reference of ‘the observed’ has changed. In the foregoing I differentiated between looking 
and seeing and read Velmans as saying that subject S (the observer) in figure 4 is looking at the cat 
itself (the observed), while what he sees is a phenomenal cat (a cat in the world). ‘The observed’ 
seemed to refer to the cat itself, which is indeed intuitively appealing. S is not looking at his 
phenomenal cat, but at the cat itself. In the last citation above however, ‘the observed’ seems to refer 
to the phenomenal world instead of to the things themselves. And what to think of this?:  
55 
 
While some contents of consciousness are relatively insubstantial (‘inner experiences’) other 
contents of consciousness are very substantial indeed […] for they are none-other than the 
experienced physical world (Velmans 1990, 83, my italics). 
 
What does Velmans really want? It seems as if he has conflicting interests here: on the one 
hand he wants a description of our phenomenal consciousness that is grounded in our common 
sense way of thinking about it, but on the other hand he wants to close the gap between the physical 
and the psychological. In section 4.5 I go into Velmans’ metaphysics of consciousness (a form of 
dual-aspect monism), but first I want to take a closer look at his notion of projection. Can we make 
sense of it? 
 
4.4 What does projection mean? 
In contrast with dualists and reductionists, who place phenomenal experience roughly in the head, 
Velmans wants to convince his reader that in fact many phenomenal experiences are out in the 
world; they are projected by the brain (roughly) onto the things themselves. I will show that although 
there are contexts in which this might seem consistent at first, further reflection on the projection 
thesis results in serious problems. The fundamental problem is that in everyday life we do not often, 
if ever, really attribute locations to our experiences. In fact, ordinary language seems to be neutral on 
the location of our experiences. 
What reasons does Velmans give to convince us that projection really is an existing process? 
One reason for accepting the reality of the projection of (some) phenomenal experiences is provided 
by the phenomenon of phantom limbs. Some people who have had a limb amputated due to illness 
or accident feel as if the limb is still (partly) there or feel pains or itches at the location where the 
amputated limb used to be. So, people with phantom limbs, although they lack for example their left 
arm, do tell us that they feel pain in their left arm. According to Velmans this is good evidence for 
concluding that the pain is projected to – and thus is located - where it is felt.  
 Another example Velmans’ gives is from the tactile modality. When we take a pencil in our 
hand and push it’s point onto the table top we actually feel the point touching the table where it 
does. We do not feel the pencil touch the table in our hand, but ‘down there’ where the pencil 
touches the tabletop.  
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 There is also some experimental research that is not mentioned by Velmans, but that lends 
itself very well for the application of the concept of projection. I am thinking research conducted by 
Koenderink and colleagues. Koenderink et al investigated depth perception in natural (1995, 1997, 
2000) as well as pictorial space (1996). They thought up a method by which the depth perception of 
different people can be measured and compared objectively. They found that people’s depth 
perception in natural as well as pictorial settings differed significantly. Especially in the case of depth 
perception in pictures applying some concept of projection is very tempting, since in these cases we 
do see depth, although we know that there is in fact no depth out there. Do we project the depth 
into the world, in this case the picture? 
But how exactly should we interpret this projection of phenomenal experiences? Velmans 
draws an analogy with the projection of a hologram (Velmans 2000, 115), but immediately 
emphasizes that this is only an analogy. In an earlier article he writes that we should ‘[n]ote that 
“perceptual projection” is a subjective, psychological effect produced by unconscious cognitive 
processing. Nothing physical is projected from the brain’ (Velmans 1998, footnote 1). However,  
 
Right now, we just don’t know how it [projection, TvdL] is done. Of course, not fully 
understanding how it happens does not alter the fact that it happens – and the evidence for 
perceptual projection is considerable […] the phenomenon is real. (Velmans 2000, 115) 
 
These citations clearly illustrate the problem of interpreting Velmans on this issue.  
Another version of the projection thesis is to be found in work of Hans Dooremalen (2003). 
Dooremalen defends a nonreductive physicalism and uses the concept of projection to say that 
indeed our phenomenal worlds seem to be out there. According to Dooremalen the idea of 
projection captures in a very clear way where in many cases our phenomenal experiences seem to be. 
The use of the word ‘seem’ however, already points to Dooremalen’s opinion that the idea of 
projection should not be taken too literally; it merely seems to be the case that our phenomenal 
experiences are out there, while in reality phenomenal experiences are in the head. The phenomenon 
of phantom limbs shows us that experiences actually are located inside the head. The reasoning is as 
follows. In the broadly physicalist framework adopted by Dooremalen everything that is real is 
realized by physical entities or is a fundamental property. According to Dooremalen phenomenal 
experiences are real and thus physically realized (they are biological properties) and therefore they 
have a location in space, which is the essence of being physical or physically realized. In the case of 
57 
phantom limbs it is very obvious that there is no physical realization base out there, which implies 
that phenomenal experiences must be located in the head. Where else can they be (Dooremalen 
2003, 80-81)? 
Dooremalen thus defends an internalistic position and consequently uses the term 
‘projection’ metaphorically. Dooremalen’s version of the projection thesis seems to be a lot weaker 
than Velmans’ version. Although some of the citations above suggest a more deflationary account of 
the concept of projection, in other places Velmans urges that the phenomenal world is really out 
there where it is experienced.  
 
4.5 The impossibility of an in-between notion of projection 
Let us make a distinction between a weak and a strong concept of projection. The weak concept of 
projection is the notion defended by Dooremalen, which says that our experiences only seem to be 
located at certain places. The strong concept of projection is the idea that our experiences really are 
located there where they seem to be. In my view neither the strong sense nor the weak sense of 
projection can satisfy Velmans’ theoretical demands. The strong sense of projection is not intelligible 
in the light of our current scientific picture of the world and since Velmans sets out to formulate a 
philosophy of mind that is compatible with common sense as well as with science he would not 
accept projection in the strong sense. The weak sense of projection deflates the concept to a matter 
of speech that should not be taken literally; it purports to serve as a useful way of describing where 
our phenomenal experiences often seem to be. However, Velmans does not want to say where our 
phenomenal experiences seem to be, he wants to say where they are, hence he would also reject the 
weak sense of projection.  
This suggests that Velmans needs a third, in-between, interpretation of projection. In the 
remainder of this paragraph I argue that this in-between concept of projection is unworkable. 
Basically, the in-between notion of projection is that phenomenal experiences are indeed projected 
out there (no metaphor), while nothing physical is projected from the brain. Phenomenal experiences 
are out there in their own phenomenal way.  
 Let’s take another look at figure 4. Velmans does not want to be a dualist so apparently there 
is some sense in which the phenomenal cat and it’s neural causes and correlates aren’t two things. 
Simultaneously, in taking seriously Velmans’ non-reductionism and the idea of an in-between notion 
of projection we seem to be forced to conclude that in some sense there are two things in figure 4, 
namely on the one hand the neural causes and correlates of consciousness and on the other the 
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phenomenal cat. At some point in his work Velmans (2000, 247, 261) proposes to distinguish 
between a physical realizer (the neural causes and correlates of consciousness) and a realized (S’s 
phenomenal cat), which are not to be identified with each other. But this will not work, because  
normally realizer base and realized ‘share’ the same location and given the projection thesis there 
must be a sense in which this is not the case.  
Velmans thinks he can reconcile these conflicting intuitions by defending a dual-aspect 
monism: ‘[…] the mind is a psychophysical process that encodes information, developing over time’ 
(Velmans 2000, 250). Interpreting figure 4 in this way one should say that we are looking at a 
(modelled) process of information-encoding of which the neural causes and correlates of 
consciousness are the physical aspect while the phenomenal cat is the phenomenal aspect. Although 
these two aspects are spatially separated and even seem to have some kind of causal relationship they 
are aspects of the same underlying thing or process (monism), namely mind (Velmans 2000, 250). Of 
course the magic word here is ‘aspect’, what does it mean? Can aspects of the same underlying reality 
be said to be separated in space? 
 At this point it is instructive to compare aspects with parts which, like aspects, also stand in 
relation to a certain whole (an object or reality). Parts of the same object or reality can be spatially 
separated. For example, my left arm as well as my right leg are parts of the biological entity that I am. 
These two parts of me also make possible certain causal relations, for example, in moving my right 
leg with my left arm, the movement of my left arm causes the moving of my right leg. According to 
Velmans’ aspects can also be spatially separated which would provide a basis for an in-between-
notion of projection. However, it is highly dubious whether one can intelligible attribute different 
location to aspects of the same thing. This can be brought out by looking at the following 
(admittedly rather long) citation on Spinoza’s dual-aspect monism described as a reaction to 
Descartes’ substance dualism: 
 
There is an important gap in Descartes’ account […]. From the fact that the essence of the 
mind is one thing, having consciousness, and the essence of the body is another, occupying 
space, it does not follow that the mind and the body are two separate entities. What is to rule out 
the possibility that one and the same thing can have both properties, be both a thinking thing 
and at the very same time an extended thing? The essence, that is, the defining characteristic, 
of being a husband is being a married man and the essence of being a parent is having 
offspring, but one and the same person can be both a husband and a parent (and, obviously, 
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can be one without being the other). This gap in Descartes’ reasoning was first pointed out 
by Spinoza, who had been a follower of Descartes. Spinoza realized that “although two 
attributes may be conceived as really distinct,” and here he has in mind thinking and 
extension, “we cannot nevertheless thence conclude that they constitute two beings or two 
different substances.” Then, breaking decisively with Descartes, Spinoza went on to maintain 
that in case of human beings (and, as a matter of fact, for Spinoza, in everything else as well), 
both thinking and space-occupancy were characteristics of one and the same thing. This view 
shall be discussed later under the heading of dual aspect theory. (Shaffer 1968, 35-36)  
 
Spinoza argued for a monistic view of reality which means that there is just one substance. Indirectly 
this says something about what Spinoza was aiming for in calling in the notion of aspects, namely 
that aspects do not come apart; when one has one aspect one also necessarily has the other. To put it 
another way, the physical and the psychological come as a package, one cannot have one without the 
other. In this sense aspects of the same reality or object can be said to be more intimately related – 
entwined might be a better term here - than parts of the same reality or object.  
Since Velmans explicitly mentions Spinoza as his source of inspiration for invoking dual-
aspect monism I gather he means to use the notion of an aspect at least as differing from parts in this 
crucial respect, but this would make statements about aspects of the same thing having separate 
locations unintelligible. Aspects precisely differ from parts in that they do not come apart. The 
monistic reality we are talking about in the context of a dual-aspect monism is not like me (one 
object) who has certain properties (having two arms or two legs) that possibly have certain causal 
relations.  
The analysis in this section shows that there is something wrong with the idea that 
experiences are projected. Except for projection in the weak sense there seems to be no viable notion 
of projection available. The weak sense of projection is to weak to uphold Velmans critique that 
dualism and reductionism do no justice to the phenomenology of consciousness. In the next section 
I argue that even the weak sense of projection is better left behind.  
 
4.6 Experience and location 
The real problem with the notion of projection is that although Velmans presents it as in line with 
commonsensical thinking about conscious experiences, especially when it comes to their locations, 
while in fact it isn’t that common sense at all. Moreover, Velmans’ proposal isn’t in conflict with 
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common sense in that in every day life we think of our experiences as having other locations than 
those assigned by Velmans, rather we do not really think of and talk about the location of our 
experiences in the way Velmans says we do at all.  
Non-philosophers do not think of their experience of a cat as being out there in front of 
them, they think of cats as being in front of them. Furthermore, even in the cases where some kind 
of projection seems to be going on it is in fact not the kind of projection Velmans is after. In the case 
of pain we do not say that it is in the foot, but we say that we feel pain in our foot, and even in cases 
in which we do say that it is ‘in the foot’ we in fact mean that we feel it there. In short, pain is not 
located somewhere in Velmans’ sense of location, rather pain is felt at certain locations.  
The same goes for the case of phantom limbs. When someone feels pain in his phantom limb 
he will not say that his experience of pain is there in the sense of his experience being there, rather he 
will say that he feels pain – or rather experiences pain – there. Also he feels as if his arm is there, 
although he knows it isn’t, but he will probably not – or at least should not - say that his experience 
of his arm is located there where his arm used to be.  
What Velmans has in common with the dualists and the reductionists he criticizes is that he 
reifies our experiences, which makes it very tempting to attribute locations to them. Something 
similar is going on in Libet’s work where experiences are supposed to be some kinds of things, of 
whatever kind, that have an absolute onset. But as we have seen in section 3.4 phenomenal 
experience might not be the kind of phenomenon that has absolute starting points. Similarly, 
experience might not be the kind of phenomenon one can think of as things at certain locations. 
Surely, everyday language and phenomenology does not give us any direct evidence for our 
experiences being such. Nevertheless, Cartesian intuitions might tempt us to think of experiences as 
immaterial objects – strictly having no location, but objects nevertheless – and, similarly, the 
objectifying reductionist attitude in modern science tempts us to attribute locations to our experiences. 
Velmans, despite his good intentions, has not escaped the temptation. 
We should not conclude from this that science can or should never change our ordinary 
language. Indeed, science has influenced the identity of our everyday concepts in several domains. 
Nevertheless, the problems we encountered above resulting from the reification of conscious 
experiences are grave enough to step back and question our implicit assumptions, even more so in 
the case of Velmans who thinks he relies on common sense assumptions, while at least my common 
sense assumptions are rather different.  
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Apparently, our ordinary language does not, at least not directly, allow us to locate 
experiences in space in the way Velmans does. The lesson to take from all this is that 
phenomenology isn’t always that clear cut either and surely seems open to, or can possibly even be 
influenced by, different interpretations. This general insight should also play a role when thinking 
about how to interpret the data generated by one’s scientific investigations of consciousness and the 
way we set up our experiments. 
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Chapter 5 
The causal paradox: the problem of phenomenal causation 
 
5.1 Back to Velmans 
In this chapter I introduce the problem of phenomenal causation by briefly discussing three central 
themes in Velmans’ philosophy of mind, being (1) his conceptualization of the distinction between a 
first-person and a third-person perspective, (2) the causal paradox and (3) his dual-aspect monism. 
My aim is to show that although the problem of mental causation and phenomenal causation are 
closely related they are nevertheless different problems demanding different kinds of answers. 
Arguably, it is the problem of phenomenal causation that Libet was really interested in when 
conducting the studies presented in chapter 2.  
 As for the status of this chapter in the broader context of this project. In chapter 4 I showed 
one way in which Velmans’ suppositions concerning consciousness were of the wrong kind, namely 
in the straightforward sense of going against our everyday phenomenology. In what follows I will 
argue that Velmans’ philosophy of consciousness is also of the wrong kind in another, more 
fundamental sense; it is of the wrong metaphysical kind. The latter insight – if sound - gives us some 
feel for what are the kinds of suppositions worth wanting (because of their meaningfulness) and the 
suppositions that might in fact be just meaningless danglers.  
I will proceed as follows. Firstly, I will show how the causal paradox follows from the 
distinction between the two perspectives (section 5.2). Then, I will discuss some empirical findings 
that Velmans presents in order to bring out the distinction between what he calls conscious and 
nonconscious processes (see Velmans 2000, chapter 9) which inspires the causal paradox (section 
5.3). In section 5.4 I briefly revisit Velmans’ dual-aspect metaphysics and analyze its relation to the 
two perspectives and the causal paradox. Finally, I will argue that Velmans does not really solve the 
causal paradox - something he indeed sets out to do - but only highlights it and that this is due, at 
least in part, to his suggestions being of the wrong metaphysical kind.  
 
5.2 Two Perspectives 
Velmans describes his philosophy of mind as an ontological monism combined with an 
epistemological dualism. In section 5.4 I go into Velmans’ ‘ontology’, but here I first introduce his 
epistemological dualism. This epistemological dualism consists in the distinction between a first- 
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person perspective and the third-person perspective. What exactly this distinction amounts to 
according to Velmans can most easily be explained by means of figure 4 (see section 4.2). 
The figure depicts a subject S that is looking at a cat and consequently has an experience of a 
cat. Velmans would say that what S sees when looking at the cat in the world is a phenomenal cat, 
namely his phenomenal cat. While S is looking at the cat an external observer E is looking at S’s 
brain to see what is happening there. In this case E observes a neural representation of the cat and 
maybe some other neural causes and correlates of phenomenal consciousness. Of course E can also 
look at the cat, which will result in an experience of the cat by E. Velmans would call S’s perspective 
a first-person perspective and E’s perspective a third-person perspective. He develops the distinction 
by means of the idea of symmetries and asymmetries of access: 
 
When S and E (and any other observer suitably placed in space and time) use similar means 
to access information about a given entity or event, we may say that they have symmetrical 
access to the observed. (Velmans 2000, 184) 
 
In the situation depicted in the figure above, S and E have symmetrical access to the cat and to the 
workings of S’s brain.30 Observing S’s brain results in E having a phenomenal experience of the 
events in S’s brain, this phenomenal experience being caused by the brain events themselves. 
Similarly, when S and E look at the cat they will both have a phenomenal experience of a cat, 
respectively a cat as perceived by S and a cat as perceived by E.31 Now for the asymmetries of access: 
 
                                                  
30 Getting S in such a situation that he is able to look at his own brain will of course not be as easy as it is for S 
to look at the cat, but some mirror work will probably do the trick. The point is that in principle S and E have 
the same kind of access to the event or process in question. 
31 Strictly speaking the cat as perceived by S and the cat as perceived by E are not the same phenomenal cats, 
while in the figure these two descriptions seem to refer to the same thing. On the other hand Velmans’ could 
also say that given the fact that S and E are both of the same species - and therefore probably have a very 
similar cognitive make up - their phenomenal representations of the cat itself (i.e. the cats as perceived) are 
probably also very similar, in this way accounting for the way the figure is composed (see Velmans 2000, 177). 
Notwithstanding possible unclarity, I still think that given present purposes the figure is useful to illustrate the 
intuitions driving Velmans’ distinction between two perspectives.  
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In the study of consciousness, however, what the subject observes or experiences is of 
primary interest and, if one compares the information about S available to S with the 
information about S available to E (and other external observers), various forms of asymmetries 
arise. (Velmans 2000, 184) 
 
In other words, S and E have asymmetrical access to the way information is represented in each 
other’s first person phenomenal experiences.32 S’s phenomenal cat (the cat as perceived by S) is not 
available to E, while E’s phenomenal cat (the cat as perceived by E) is not available to S. The only 
way E can get to know anything about the information that S has access to through his first-person 
perspective is via S’s verbal or nonverbal behavior, which is available to E through the third-person 
perspective. Velmans describes this last category of events as publicly accessible. Summarizing this, the 
third-person perspective provides access to the publicly available that many philosophers would call 
the physical world, while the first-person perspective provides access to ones own private phenomenal 
goings-on. 
The causal paradox follows quite directly from his distinction between the first- and the 
third-person perspective. The paradox consists in the fact that:  
 
‘[v]iewed from a first-person perspective, consciousness appears to be necessary for most 
forms of  complex and novel processing. But viewed from a third-person perspective, 
consciousness does not seem to be necessary for any form of processing’ (Velmans 2000, 
219).   
 
 
                                                  
32 In chapter 7 I will argue that conscious experience is transparent in the sense that I don’t have a perspective 
on my experience. Rather, I have a perspective on the world in experiencing. Given this approach I would 
understand ‘asymmetry of access’ as E not knowing what it is (like) for S to be looking at a cat since E is not S 
(and the other way around) and ‘symmetry of access’ as E and S both looking at the same cat. There is no 
room in my account for phenomenal cats as Velmans understands them. Later in this chapter we will find that 
Velmans’ conceptualization of perspectives is part of the reason why he is not able to solve the paradox. For 
now I will stick to Velmans’ terminology for besides the fact that it very forcefully brings out the problem of 
phenomenal causation its also forms a clear contrast class for my own suggestion on how to deal with 
phenomenal causation. 
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5.3 Consciousness and nonconscious processing 
How important is consciousness for doing what we do? Scientific investigations provide evidence for 
the view that consciousness might not be as crucial for many of our activities as we might initially 
expect it to be. One could for example interpret the data generated by the Libet-experiments as an 
illustration of the limited relevance of consciousness for our actions and indeed Velmans refers to 
the Libet-experiments to illustrate the distinction between conscious and nonconscious processing 
that inspires the causal paradox. However, as we have seen there are many reasons for doubting the 
validity of Libet’s methods and the soundness of his conclusions. Therefore, I use this section to 
present other empirical illustrations that Velmans gives of the limits of conscious processing, starting 
with another study conducted by Libet et al. 
In daily practice we seem to be immediately aware of what we attend to. Experiments 
conducted by Libet and colleagues (1979) however, suggest that it takes at least 200msec. for stimuli 
to become conscious after they arrive at the cortical surface. Another finding of Libet et al (1979) 
was that apparently the brain records the time of arrival of, for example, a tactile stimulus at the 
cortical surface using an early evoked potential at the somatosensory cortical surface as a ‘time 
marker’. This time marker seems to be used as a point in time to which timing of the stimulus in 
phenomenal consciousness is later referred ‘backwards in time’ in this way compensating for the 
processing time required to make the stimulus conscious. Interestingly, direct microelectrode 
stimulation of the somatosensory cortex does not evoke such time markers and consequently 
conscious awareness of these stimuli are not subjectively referred backwards in time. This is why it 
can be the case that a subject becomes consciously aware of a tactile stimulus applied to his hand 
before he is consciously aware of the stimulus that is applied directly to his somatosensory cortex, 
while the tactile stimulus was actually applied 200msec. after the cortical stimulus. The experimental 
research of Libet et al has led to a lot of discussion among psychologists as well as philosophers. 
Again, especially the methodical side of the experiments received a lot of attention and is indeed 
controversial. Despite all this discussion it has become broadly accepted that it takes some time for 
stimuli to become conscious. Apparently, substantial work is being done in the brain that we are not 
consciously aware of. 
Another example of psychological research that throws some light on the extent of 
nonconscious processing in brains is inspired by cocktail parties. When you are on such a party the 
conversation you are attending to is the one that you are consciously aware of, while other voices are 
perceived as undifferentiated background noise. However, when someone in the room mentions 
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your name (even if only whispering) your attention is immediately attracted. This suggests that the 
nonattended background noise is also to a certain extent analyzed. Cherry (1953) en Broadbent 
(1958) investigated this phenomenon using a shadowing task. In the shadowing task a subject was 
asked to attend and repeat a message presented through earphones in one ear, while at the same time 
another message was presented to the other, nonattended, ear. After this the subject was asked what 
he could remember of the nonattended message. Cherry and Broadbent found that although subjects 
could not report the meaning of the message in the nonattended ear they could identify certain 
physical features, for example whether the stimulus was a spoken message or a tone and, in case of a 
spoken message, whether the message was given in a male or a female voice.  
The foregoing may seem to suggest that consciousness is necessary for analyzing meaning, 
something that intuitively makes sense. Against this intuition, Corteen and Wood (1972) found that 
subjects that were presented with a word that is semantically related to words, conditioned to electric 
shocks continued to show changed galvanic skin response when those words were presented to the 
nonattended ear. Another study that provides evidence for preconscious semantic analysis is that of 
Groeger (1984a,b, 1988). Groeger found that words that were presented via the nonattended ear 
were of influence to the meaning of stimuli presented via the attended ear. Interestingly, he also 
found there to be a difference between words presented in the nonattended channel that were above 
and below threshold (respectively, consciously or not consciously detectable): 
 
For example, in one experiment subjects were asked to complete the sentence “She looked _ 
in her new coat” with one of two completion words, “smug” or “cosy”. Simultaneous with 
the attended sentence, the word “snug” was presented to the nonselected ear (a) above 
threshold, or (b) below it. With “snug” presented above threshold, subjects tended to choose 
“smug”, which could be explained by subjects’ becoming momentarily aware of the physical 
form of the cue. With “snug” presented below threshold, subjects tended to choose “cosy”, 
indicating semantic analysis of the cue word without accompanying awareness. (Velmans 
2000, 199-200)  
 
Summarizing this we can say that apparently analysis of meaning can take place without reportable 
consciousness. 
Further illustrations of the causal paradox can be found in psychological investigations of 
reading. Many people think of reading as a complex, conscious process. However, Velmans tells us 
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there is evidence that by the time that we become consciously aware of what we are reading most of 
the work has already been done by processes in our brains that we are not consciously aware of. 
Although it is very counter intuitive reading indeed seems to be a largely nonconscious affair. To 
illustrate this point Velmans confronts us with the following sentence: 
 
If we don’t increase the dustmen’s wages, they will refuse to take the refuse. (Velmans 2000, 209) 
 
When reading this sentence the first time the word refuse occurred in your covert speech it was 
(silently) pronounced with the stress on the second syllable. On its second occurrence however, the 
stress was on the first syllable. But how could this be? It is not as if you took some time to 
(consciously) think about how to pronounce the word. So apparently, ‘the syntactic and semantic 
analysis required to determine the appropriate meaning of the word refuse must have taken place prior 
to the allocation of the stress patterns; and this, in turn, must have taken place prior to the phonemic 
images entering awareness’ (Velmans 2000, 209). We are not consciously aware of complex input 
analysis involved when reading (pattern recognition processing, semantic analysis), but only of its 
results. 
 A similar story can be told about the production of overt speech, another phenomenon that 
is widely thought of as a typically conscious process. When speaking we are unaware of, for example, 
the motor commands from the central nervous system to muscles of the tongue and the lips, 
although there is a lot happening in this respect (see Lenneberg 1967). As expected there are indeed 
gaps in the otherwise relatively continuous stream of speech (see Goldman-Eister 1986 and Boomer 
1970). Besides breathing pauses, occurring at the beginnings and ends of major linguistic constituents 
(see Fodor et al 1974), new speech is characterized by hesitation pauses that are associated with 
planning of what one is going to say.  
However, examination of what one experiences during such hesitation pauses reveals that, 
apart from a certain sense of effort, one is not consciously aware of the (brain-) processes that are 
associated with the formulation of ideas, word retrieval from memory or syntactic planning. We do 
not seem to be conscious of what we want to say until we have said it. Velmans summarizes the 
above as follows:  
 
[W]ether we consider conscious forms of input analysis ([…] reading), information 
transformation (verbal thinking) or output (speech production), the conscious experience 
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that we normally associate with such processing follows the processing to which it relates. 
(Velmans 2000, 215) 
 
These examples clearly bring out that several tasks that we would normally associate with 
consciousness, like speaking and reading, are due to largely unconscious processes. When reading 
and speaking we seem only to be phenomenally conscious of the results of a complex nonconscious 
form of processing in our brains, while the shadowing task experiments suggest that even analysis of 
meaning can proceed unconsciously.  
The distinction between nonconscious processing and focal-attentive processing is crucial 
here. Both concepts refer to events in the brain that, as we have seen above, are typically analyzed 
from the third-person perspective. Velmans associates focal-attentive processing with phenomenal 
consciousness, but is careful to warn us not to identify it with phenomenal consciousness. Focal-
attentive processing correlates with or might even be said to cause phenomenal consciousness, but is 
not identical to it. Phenomenal consciousness is accessed from the first-person perspective and 
should be understood from this perspective; collapsing it to a third-person phenomenon is not an 
option. (see Velmans 2000, 194). According to Velmans if we want to know the whole story about 
the mind we should take both the first-person perspective and the third-person perspective seriously.  
 Now we are back at the causal paradox. From the first-person perspective phenomenal 
consciousness seems to be central in our mental goings-on, but at the same time in the third-person 
perspective we find that most processing takes place outside focal-attentive processing, suggesting 
that phenomenal consciousness is an epiphenomenon.  
 
5.4 Velmans’ dual-aspect monism 
Velmans starts out with two perspectives which, as we saw above, can be characterized by the idea of 
asymmetries of access. For a complete account of the mind we should take both perspectives 
seriously, acknowledging perspectival switching in our scientific research and consequently accepting 
mixed perspective explanations. According to many this leaves us with an explanatory gap between 
phenomenal consciousness and the workings of the brain/body of which the causal paradox is a 
descendant. In practice we can cross the explanatory gap using perspectival switching, but 
unfortunately this does not tell us anything about the nature of the gap. Velmans phrases the 
problem as follows: 
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What dwells in the “explanatory” gap? Ontological monism combined with epistemological 
dualism assumes that there must be some thing, event or process that one can know in two 
complementary ways. There must be something that grounds and connects the two views we 
have of it. Let us call this the “nature of mind”. (Velmans 2000, 249)  
 
Now, what can be said about the mind? According to Velmans our conscious experiences 
and their neural correlates encode information, so apparently the mind encodes information. Further, 
we know that processes in the brain and the phenomenal experiences correlated with these processes 
are extended in time, so apparently the mind is a process developing over time. Lastly, we know that 
the mind viewed from a first-person perspective presents itself as phenomenal consciousness, while 
it presents itself as some physical property of the brain when viewed from a third-person perspective. 
Summarizing this: 
 
If first- and third-person perspectives on the mind are complementary and mutually 
irreducible, the nature of mind is revealed as much by how it appears from one perspective as 
from the other. If so, the nature of mind is not either physical or conscious experience, it is at 
once physical and conscious experience. For lack of a better term we may describe this nature 
as psychophysical. If we combine this with the features above, we can say that the mind is 
psychophysical process that encodes information, developing over time. (Velmans 2000, 250) 
 
What could be meant by saying that the mind is psychophysical? Velmans means to say that the mind 
has physical and psychological aspects, but what this means can only be understood by relating it to 
his epistemological dualism. Only here we can ascertain that the mind presents itself as phenomenal 
consciousness in the first-person perspective, while viewed from a third-person perspective it 
appears as physical brain processes. I don’t mean to suggest that our epistemology and our ontology 
can be completely separated – on the contrary - but what Velmans seems to be doing is transposing 
meaningful concepts from his epistemology into his metaphyiscally realist ontology, thereby reducing 
them to (metaphysical) labels that are so abstract that they become robbed of all meaning. In the next 
two sections I will discuss Velmans’ attempt to solve the causal paradox given his ontological 
monism and his epistemological dualism and conclude that at least part of the problem is that his 
suggestions are of the wrong metaphysical kind. 
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5.5 Velmans’ attempt to solve the causal paradox in three steps 
A paradox is an apparent contradiction. Resolving a paradox consists in showing that indeed the 
contradiction is only apparent. So, if Velmans wants to resolve the causal paradox he has to show 
that there is no real contradiction involved there either. In his (2000) he sets out to do this in three 
steps (253).  
Velmans’ first step consists in arguing for the complementarity of the first- and the third-
person perspective. In the psychophysical experiment illustrated in figure 4 we saw that S and E play 
different roles which are interchangeable. E, being an external observer, focuses on what his 
observations (of for example brain states) represent, while S is typically asked to focus on his 
phenomenal experiences. According to Velmans formulating a complete account of the mind 
requires us to take both perspectives seriously, which results in the description of the mind as a 
psychophysical process that encodes information over time. According to Velmans the fact that from 
the first-person perspective of S his phenomenal experiences seem to be causally efficacious, while 
from E’s third-person perspective S’s phenomenal experiences seem causally superfluous presents no 
paradox for ontological monism combined with epistemological dualism:  
 
The information encoded in your experiences and their neural correlates is identical. 
Consequently, first-and third-person accounts of the causal roles of such information need 
not conflict. They may simply be accounts of the same underlying process developing over 
time, viewed in two complementary ways. (Velmans 2000, 254) 
 
That the first- and the third-person perspective – although conceptualized differently - 
should both be taken seriously is something I completely agree with. However, urging that first- and 
third-person accounts need not conflict, while in fact we are being presented with two logically 
contradictory accounts is one bridge too far. Phenomenal experience is causally efficacious or it is 
not. Velmans cannot have it both ways. But of course this is only just the first step in resolving the 
paradox, maybe Velmans can still show us that we are not dealing with a real contradiction here.  
 Velmans’ next step in solving the causal paradox concentrates on the functional differences 
between conscious and nonconscious processing. Section 5.3, in which I examined some empirical 
studies on this issue, already signified that the relation of phenomenal consciousness to brain 
processing is subtle. According to Velmans a process might be said to be ‘conscious’ in the following 
three senses:  
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(1) in the sense that one is conscious of the process; (2) in the sense that the operation of the 
process is accompanied by consciousness (of its results) and; (3) in the sense that consciousness 
enters into or causally influences the process. (Velmans 2000, 255)  
 
As we saw in the first step of solving the causal paradox Velmans denies that phenomenal 
consciousness can have a third-person causal role. By pointing to the empirical studies discussed in 
section 5.3 and distinguishing the three senses in which a process may be said to be conscious he 
argues that theories that do attribute a third-person causal role to phenomenal consciousness 
conflate these distinctions. Such theories commonly make the mistake of concluding that if a process 
is conscious in sense 1 or 2 described above it is also conscious in sense 3.  
Another fallacious strategy according to Velmans is to identify consciousness with a certain 
form of processing such as focal attention, ‘central executive’ or ‘global workspace’, which in his 
view begs the question about the functional role of conscious phenomenology. Velmans himself 
associates phenomenal consciousness with focal-attentive processing, but does not identify the two. 
In his view the distinction between attended and nonattended processing can account for the 
functional differences between conscious and nonconscious processing while it does not require 
first-person phenomenal consciousness to have a third-person causal role. In my view Velmans’ 
distinction between the three different senses in which a process can be conscious is very relevant. 
However, this does not solve the causal paradox, but only makes it more pressing. 
 It is in step three of his attempt to solve the causal paradox that Velmans focuses on the, 
what he calls, causal efficacy of the contents of consciousness. We are told that the contents of 
consciousness are representational, they are of something. In everyday life we take the events we 
experience to be the events that are actually taking place. For example when playing billiards we 
assume that the balls are smooth, colored and cause each other to move by mechanical impact. We 
do not invoke quantum mechanics in order to describe the microstructure of the balls and the forces 
they exert on each other before taking our turn. In other words, taking the contents of consciousness 
seriously is a wise strategy if one wants to be successful in everyday life. However, the experienced 
world is not the world in itself: 
 
Balls as experienced and their perceived interactions are representations of autonomously 
existing entities and their interactions, and conscious representations (of what is happening) 
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can only be formed after the occurrence of the events they represent. […] Just as the 
interactions amongst experienced billiard balls represent causal sequences in the external 
world, but are not the events themselves, experienced interactions between our sensations 
and actions represent causal sequences within our bodies and brains, but are not the events 
themselves. (Velmans 2000, 256-257)  
 
The idea is that the experienced world is not the world itself, but that in everyday life we behave as 
naive realists because this serves us well. Although, sciences like physics, biology or psychology might 
give a very different third-person account of the same events we represent in our first-person 
contents of consciousness it is not the case that third-person accounts are always better then first-
person ones (or the other way around). The value of a representation can only be assessed in the light 
of the purposes for which it is used.  
 Again, all this does not seem to solve the causal paradox, but only makes the question of 
whether or not consciousness is causally efficacious more pressing. Velmans does not say that 
phenomenal consciousness is causally inefficacious, but his treatment of the problem undeniably 
points to this conclusion. What consciousness adds to the world, its function, according to Velmans 
is that through it we ‘realize’ the world, by which he means that in experiencing entities and events 
they become subjectively real (Velmans 2000, 260, 277, 281).33 Without consciousness life would be 
like nothing. 
 
5.6 The wrong kind of metaphysics 
But there is something more going on here, which brings us to my thesis that Velmans’ claims are of 
the wrong metaphysical kind. Although Velmans presents himself as a critical realist his metaphysics 
of mind has a more profound realist flavor in disconnecting the abstract ultimate ontology of the 
mind completely from what it means for us to experience our bodies and environments. In my view 
closer reading bears out that Velmans’ metaphysical vocabulary is robbed of all meaning as a result of 
the wrong kind of metaphysical abstraction. The alternative approach I sketch in chapter 7 and 8 
below is an attempt to evade said metaphysical emptiness by taking seriously the idea that our 
theories about the world – particularly about consciousness – are always our theories about the world 
                                                  
33 To be sure, this notion of realization differs radically from the notions of realization discussed in chapter 8 
below.  
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and that they are thus to be understood in terms of the facts available to us, which is all we have. 
Velmans’ dual-aspect ontology goes beyond the facts in that there are no truthmakers to guarantee its 
meaningfulness. 
 Besides presenting a more precise formulation of the problem of phenomenal causation this 
chapter only provided a first abstract formulation of the thesis that Velmans metaphysics goes 
beyond the facts. A more concrete and precise bearing of the thesis will emerge when reading the 
next two chapters. In those chapters I present a theory on the nature of consciousness that is 
supposed to function as an illustrative contrast class in that is does not go beyond the facts. 
Moreover, as we shall see in chapter 8, this does not mean that we do not need metaphysics, 
however it is not the kind of metaphysics that for example Velmans presents us with.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part III: Consciousness, facts and methodology 
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Chapter 6 
Mind the methodology34 
 
[…] first-person methods are available and can be fruitfully 
brought to bear on a science of consciousness. The proof of 
the pudding is not in a priori arguments, but in actually 
pointing to explicit examples of practical knowledge in case 
studies. (Varela and Shear 1999) 
 
6.1 Conflicting methodologies 
In part I of this book I discussed a case of scientific research into conscious intentional action with 
implicit methodology-implying presuppositions. I argued that because the suppositions were implicit 
the experiments in question did not yield definite results. In part II I presented a set of methodology-
implying suppositions about the nature of consciousness that are deliberately made explicit. As the 
example presented in part II shows, in making our presuppositions about consciousness explicit we 
easily go astray due to (1) the ease with the phenomenology of consciousness is misrepresented, and 
(2) the tendency to ‘go metaphysical’ (i.e. beyond the facts). Therefore, being explicit about one’s 
presupposition is not enough; we also need to make sure that we embrace the right suppositions. In 
this third and last part of this project I want to end on a more positive and constructive note. Firstly, 
in the present chapter, by discussing and comparing two general explicit methodologies for the 
scientific investigation of consciousness that do not – at least not obviously – go beyond the facts. 
Secondly, in chapter 7 and 8, by offering my own explicit methodology-implying suppositions about 
consciousness. 
This chapter is about the relation between heterophenomenology (HP) and 
neurophenomenology (NP). HP and NP are methodologies for studying consciousness.35 To repeat a 
terminological remark made in section 1.2, methodologies are theories of methods and as such 
                                                  
34 This chapter, in a slightly different form, has been accepted for publication in Theory and Psychology (Van de 
Laar 2007b, forthcoming). 
35 That HP and NP are indeed supposed to be methodological proposals appears among others from the title of 
Varela’s 1996 article ‘Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem’ and Dennett’s 
presentation of heterophenomenology as ‘a third-person methodology’ (2003b, 11).  
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describe, explain and valuate methods for (scientific) inquiry in certain contexts. Important for the 
subject of this chapter is that methodologies also fix how we should interpret the raw data generated 
by means of a certain method. Methods I take to be learned belief-forming procedures (Goldman 
2000, 18) that shape inquiry. Examples of methods are deduction and induction (general), but also 
for example Nuclear Magnetic Resonance methods (microbiology) or introspection (psychology). 
I claim that although HP and NP are indeed different methodologies for studying 
consciousness, in practice it will be very hard to decide on the question of which methodology we 
should prefer, since given the research that is currently available both methodologies seem to allow 
for the same range of experiments. Moreover, there seem to be no experiments that can be 
performed in the light of one of the methodologies while not by the other.36 As we will see below HP 
instructs scientists to interpret introspective reports as expressions of beliefs about mental states and 
to suspend judgment concerning the truth values of those beliefs. NP, on the other hand, says that 
scientists should interpret some introspective reports as more than expressions of beliefs, namely as 
descriptions of conscious states, elicited after a process of phenomenological reduction in Husserl’s 
sense (Husserl 1913, Varela 1996, Cogan 2007). Given the fact that HP excludes the validity of 
conclusions drawn by means of NP it seems that we do have to choose between them, nonetheless. 
Could we think of any practical consequences favoring HP over NP or the other way around?  
I claim that for the time being we had better keep both HP and NP in the running. Firstly, 
given current data and theories about the mind there seems to be no prima facie reason to question the 
validity of theses generated by either of the two methodologies. Secondly, since we are still in the 
                                                  
36 This intuition was also voiced - however not in relation to NP - by David Chalmers on his website: ‘Dennett 
“challenges me” to name an experiment that “transcends” the heterophenomenological method. But of course 
both views can accommodate experiments equally: every time I say we’re using a verbal report or introspective 
judgment as a guide to first-person data, he can say we are using it as third-person data, and vice versa. So the 
difference between the views doesn’t lie in the range of experiments ‘compatible’ with them. Rather, it lies in 
the way that experimental results are interpreted. And I think the interpretation I’m giving (on which reports 
are given prima facie credence as a guide to conscious experience) is by far the most common attitude among 
scientists in the field.’ (Chalmers 2003, http://consc.net/responses.html#dennett2, also quoted in Dennett 
2003b, 19) It might be a bit rash to classify Chalmers as a neurophenomenologist, but his intuitions surely are 
more in the spirit of NP than that of HP.  
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process of figuring out in what contexts of investigation we might safely use introspective37 or 
phenomenological reports (and how) we will need HP as the default approach in most contexts. 
However, and thirdly, this does not mean that we should close the door for the legitimacy of using 
introspective or phenomenological reports in the scientific study of consciousness. On the contrary, 
we should stay open to the possibility of extending the range of contexts in which introspective and 
phenomenological reports might be applied, since the non-veridicality of beliefs about one’s 
phenomenology does not follow from that experimental results that are presently available. The 
boundaries of reliable applications of introspective reports in the science of consciousness should 
emerge from trial and error hands-on research (see also Piccinini 2001).  
This chapter has the following structure. In section 6.2 and 6.3 I give brief characterizations 
of HP and NP respectively. It will become clear that HP and NP contain very different ideas about 
what facts are implied by data from introspective or phenomenological reports and what would be 
the right ways of and contexts for generating data from such reports. In section 6.4 I briefly relate 
HP and NP to what I take to be the mainstream cognitive science methodology (Ericsson and Simon 
1993; Piccinini 2001, 2003). Although I think the work of Ericsson and Simon is valuable I keep it in 
the background, because I want to focus on what I take to be two more extreme proposals opposing 
each other on the methodological spectrum. My reason for this is that it better brings out the relation 
between methodology and methods as an issue for the current science of consciousness. My claim is 
that although HP and NP might in principle allow for the same range of experiments there is reason 
to think that HP would not in fact do the research conducted by NP. This (besides other 
considerations) legitimizes NP as a serious player in the science of consciousness. In section 6.5 I 
conclude that we do not have to choose between HP and NP  (or mainstream cognitive science 
methodology for that matter). Although I think that currently NP in practice is not living up to its 
own (Husserlian) phenomenological standards I greatly appreciate its pragmatic orientation.38  
 
 
                                                  
37 Some examples of contexts in which it is not advisable to rely on introspective reports are presented in 
Nisbett and Wilson (1977).  
38 For a similar discussion of the role of phenomenology in the science of consciousness see Velmans (2007). 
Velmans compares HP to his own Critical Phenomenology and concludes that the latter gives a better account 
of the current practice in the science of psychology. Although I accept Velmans’ conclusion in rough outline I 
do not concur with many aspects of his philosophy of mind (see chapter 4 and 5).  
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6.2 Heterophenomenology  
HP is a methodology for studying human consciousness in an objective ‘third person’ way. It was 
proposed by Daniel Dennett (for example 2003b) who dubbed it heterophenomenology, because it is 
about the phenomenology of another person. According to Dennett this method takes the first person 
point of view as seriously as it can scientifically be taken.  
The central tenet of the methodology is its striving for neutrality in our descriptions of the 
data. According to heterophenomenologists the primary data in experimental situations are (1) 
biobehavioral data (which includes neurological data), and (2) uninterpreted utterances (of one sort 
or another) of subjects involved in the experiment. From database (2) the heterophenomenologist 
distils the primary interpreted data by taking the intentional stance (Dennett 1987) towards the 
subject. This amounts to interpreting the utterances of the subject as ‘verbal judgments’ expressing 
beliefs, which will be beliefs about what the subject experiences (see Dennett 2003b, 3).  
Importantly, Dennett proposes to treat subject’s introspective reports as if they were fiction. 
Arguably there are three points encapsulated in the latter suggestion: (1) to remain neutral about what 
beliefs actually are (for example brain states or behavioral patterns), (2) to remain neutral as to what 
subjects’ introspective reports refer to (for example qualia, phenomenal facts or brain states) if they 
refer at all, and (3) to remain neutral as to the truth or falsity of the subjects’ verbal reports (whatever 
they refer to if they refer at all). These three points are what the neutrality of HP consists in and they 
nicely surface in a written discussion between Dennett and David Chalmers in which Dennett states: 
 
I have argued […] that subjects’ beliefs about their subjective experiences are the central data. 
[…] I agree with him [Chalmers] that a correlation or identity – or indeed, the veracity of a 
subject’s  beliefs - “can’t be stipulated at the beginning of the day.” That is the neutrality of 
heterophenomenology. It is Chalmers who is holding out for an opening stipulation in his 
insistence that the Zombic Hunch be granted privileged status. As he says, he “takes it for 
granted that there are first-person data.” I don’t. Not in Chalmers’ charged sense of that 
term. I don’t stipulate at the beginning of the day that our subjective beliefs about our first-
person experiences are “phenomenological” beliefs in a sense that requires them somehow to 
depend on (but not causally depend on) experiences that zombies don’t have! (Dennett 2001, 
section 3) 
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 Within the framework of HP the primary interpreted data are still pretheoretical data in the 
sense that these are the data a theory of consciousness has to account for. What about ineffable 
beliefs? These are simply noted down as more verbal judgments (‘subject reports failure in expressing 
his belief’). Next, it is up to the heterophenomenologist to explain why the belief is ineffable or why 
the subject thinks it has an ineffable belief about its experience. Dennett sums up HP as follows: 
 
You [the subject, TvdL] are not authoritative about what is happening in you, but only about 
what seems to be happening in you, and we [the heterophenomenologists, TvdL] are giving 
you total, dictatorial authority over the account of how it seems to you, about what it is like to 
be you. And if you complain that some parts of how it seems to you are ineffable, we […] will 
grant that too. What better grounds could we have for believing that (1) you don’t describe it, 
and (2) confess that you cannot? Of course you might be lying, but we will give you the 
benefit of the doubt. (Dennett 1991a, 96-7) 
 
Dennett claims that the methodology he proposes is applied by the majority of researchers 
involved in the scientific study of (human) consciousness, be they cognitive psychologists, 
psychophysicists or clinical neuropsychologists. My goal here is not primarily to find out whether or 
not the latter claim is true. Nevertheless, I am of the opinion that the mainstream cognitive science 
methodology is better represented by someone like Goldman (1997, 2000) who does seem to think 
that some introspective reports are in fact about conscious states and does not advise suspension of 
belief in their truth-value (in other words they does not stick with fictions). My goal however is to see 
whether there currently are reasons for rejecting HP or NP as unreliable or invalid across the board. 
 
6.3 Neurophenomenology 
While HP is neutral in the sense that it proposes to take subjects’ reported beliefs about what they 
experience at face value, postponing any conclusions about the actual truth or falsity of these beliefs 
or even on whether subjects experience anything at all (they might all be zombies), NP is neutral in 
another way. The neutrality of NP resides in its striving for presenting consciousness as it is actually 
lived. In order to clarify what this means many neurophenomenologists refer to Husserl’s epoché or 
phenomenological reduction (Husserl 1913). The latter is an attitude that involves suspension of our 
naïve everyday beliefs about the relation between the world and our experience. In his (1996) Varela 
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tries to clarify how the conscious gesture that is at the base of phenomenological reduction can be 
put to use as a way of generating phenomenal data in the form of phenomenal invariants.  
The essence of the neurophenomenological proposal is not to hide consciousness behind 
neurological processes (reductionism) or identifying it with mysterious immaterial ‘stuff’ (dualism) or 
even to eliminate it altogether, but instead to take it as a datum that is relevant for understanding the 
mind.  
This is reflected in what neurophenomenologists take to be the primary data, namely: (1) 
biobehavioral data, and (2) phenomenological data. Neurophenomenologists claim that biobehavioral 
and phenomenal data can mutually constrain (Varela 1996) and enlighten (Gallagher 1997) each 
other. What this comes down to in experimental practice can be illustrated by a study conducted by 
Lutz (2002).  
Lutz presented his subjects with a random-dot pattern. After an auditory signal subjects were 
asked to fuse two little squares that were shown at the bottom of the screen and to remain in this eye 
position for seven seconds. Then the random-dot pattern was changed to a slightly different dot 
pattern with binocular disparities (autostereogram). Now subjects were able to see a 3D illusory 
geometric shape and were instructed to press a button as soon as the shape had completely emerged. 
The button-press ended the trial. After every trial subjects gave a brief verbal report of their 
experience using phenomenal invariants found and stabilized during preceding training sessions in 
which the task at hand was extensively trained.  
The invariants found were used to divide the individual trials into three so-called 
‘phenomenological clusters’: steady readiness, fragmented readiness, and unreadiness, which was 
either spontaneous or self-induced. These clusters were formulated because the degree of 
preparation felt by the subjects and the quality of their perception appeared as a common factor 
through the set of all subjects. During every trial the subjects’ electrical brain activity was measured 
by means of EEG. The first and third person data that were generated in this way provide the 
possibility of a joint analysis, which illustrates the idea, and according to Lutz the relevance, of 
mutual enlightenment of the two databases. 
 Let’s take a look at the results. It was found that preparatory states as reported by the 
subjects modulated the behavioral response and the brain processes that followed. The reaction 
times were longer when the subjects reported to be less prepared and also the brain activity was 
modulated in amplitude, in function of the reported degree of preparation. Separate study of each 
subject and each phenomenal cluster revealed different dynamical trajectories that are stable-specific 
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to each cluster during the brain responses. The topographical pattern of large-scale synchrony during 
the motor response in the prepared and the unprepared condition was similar, although occurring 
respectively at 300msec. and 600msec., which in turn was in synchrony with the reaction times 
(associated with the button presses). Lutz claims that such highly contextual patterns of synchrony 
surfaced precisely because first person data of trained subjects, as expressed in the phenomenological 
clusters, was used. In mainstream brain imaging studies this type of qualitative first-person data is 
mostly omitted which, in this case, would imply that the variability in timing of brain responses gets 
chalked up as noise. In contrast, application of the neurophenomenological method, with its 
acceptation of first person methods and joint-analysis, does make the variability intelligible; the first 
and third person data mutually illuminate each other. 
 Lutz (2002) also refers to another study of Rodriguez et al (1999) that is clearly analogues to 
the study discussed above. Rodriguez et al showed their subjects Mooney figures, which are 
perceived as meaningless black-and-white forms when upside-down but as faces when upright. 
Subjects were asked to press certain buttons indicating whether they perceived a face or not. During 
the trials electrical activity was recorded at the scalp surface (EEG). It turned out that the upright 
presentation of the Mooney face first evoked brain activity phase-locked to the stimulus around 50-
100msec., which, after an interval of 100-150msec. was followed by a global pattern of long-distance 
synchronization involving parieto-occipital and fronto-temporal electrodes. Because the latter pattern 
was absent when subjects were presented with upside-down Mooney figures and hence did not 
perceive a face it was interpreted as subserving the Gestalt perception. At around 500msec. this first 
interval of coherence was interrupted by a period of decrease of synchronization (phase-scattering) 
compared to a preceding baseline, which in turn was followed by another period of synchronization 
at around 700msec. The second period of synchronization correlated with the motor response 
regardless of whether a face was perceived or not.  
These are interesting results, but, according to Lutz, had this study been conducted with the 
neurophenomenological method, even more interesting regularities might have reached the surface. 
Since the Mooney face study (like most EEG studies) relies on averaging techniques across trails and 
often across subjects, highly variable EEG signals could not be taken into account. In this study the 
two intra-individual patterns of synchronous oscillations varied quite significantly in frequency, 
latency and spatial distribution from trial to trial. It is believed that this variability is a function of the 
subject’s cognitive ‘context’ which is defined by factors like attentive state, spontaneous thought-
processes or strategies to carry out the task. Again, it seems to be the case that use of first person 
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methodologies, such as proposed by neurophenomenologists, could provide a route to collecting 
further data that can make sense of the variability in brain neural responses which usually gets 
defined as noise. 
 
6.4 To choose or not to choose  
In the literature HP and NP are often presented as conflicting methodologies. For example: 
 
[…] it is hard to see how phenomenality can be studied satisfactorily without ever accessing it 
directly […] This is of course not to deny that interesting generalizations about consciousness 
can be reached on the basis of behavioral data. But the whole point and difficulty is that we 
need more than behavioral data: we need phenomenological data. […] heterophenomenology 
is not phenomenological [as opposed to NP, TvdL]. (Roy et al 1999, 23) 
 
Within this proposal [HP in contrast to NP, TvdL] there is no place for the autonomous 
investigation of human experience, that is, for the conceptual and reflective examination of 
human experience as it is lived, independent of scientific accounts of the brain. (Thompson 
et al 1999, 161)39  
 
Although HP and NP are indeed different methodologies it turns out that it is very hard - if not 
impossible - to think up experiments that are in principle accepted by HP or NP exclusively.  
Take for example the Lutz’s study discussed in section 6.3. Although a 
heterophenomenologist might not be inclined to actually perform experiments such as Lutz’s there 
seems to be no reason why heterophenomenologists could not do it. The heterophenomenologist 
could always describe the data Lutz generated in terms of subject’s sincere judgments (expressing 
beliefs) correlating with phases of synchronization found in the EEG measurements, without taking 
                                                  
39 Roy et al and Thompson et al indeed want to make a scientific contribution. In the introductory chapter of 
their (1999) Roy et al say the following about the papers contained in the book: ‘[…] each of them offers a 
possible way of introducing the general project of integrating Husserlian phenomenology into contemporary 
cognitive sciences.’ Thompson et al write: ‘By drawing on [the phenomenological tradition, TvdL], we hope to 
show the importance of phenomenological reflection and conceptual clarification for empirical research’ 
(1999, 161).  
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seriously the ontology of phenomenal facts suggested by the subject’s verbal reports as a 
neurophenomenologist would.  
Now one could argue that experiments which rely heavily on Husserlian phenomenological 
reduction beg the question against HP in that the theoretical framework backing it up involves 
aspects that are rejected by Dennett such as the blurring of the subject-object distinction.40 However, 
in the case of Lutz’s work there is no such heavy reliance and the same goes for other currently 
available studies that are taken to be neurophenomenological (for example Varela 1999) or akin to 
this methodology41. In these studies phenomenological reduction is applied in a rather broad manner 
which amounts to training sessions which invite subjects to carefully explore possible variations in 
their cognitive context during specific tasks. These training sessions, which might be thought to bias 
the participating subjects are also not necessarily a problem for HP: 
 
The policy of training subjects, in spite of its uneven history in the early days of psychology, 
may yet yield some valuable wrinkles. For instance, it might in some circumstances heighten 
the powers of subjects to articulate or otherwise manifest their subjectivity to investigators. 
(Dennett 2003b, 21) 
 
In other words: HP and NP are different methodologies, but could in principle allow for the same 
methods. What is in fact at stake here is a disagreement about how to interpret the relevant raw data.  
In a way this already surfaced in section 6.2 where part of a discussion between Dennett and 
Chalmers on the neutrality of HP was cited, but Chalmers is not the only philosopher troubled by 
Dennett’s methodological agnosticism. Alvin Goldman for one writes: 
 
The objection lodged in my paper [Goldman 1997, TvdL] to heterophenomenology is that 
                                                  
40 In his Consciousness Explained Dennett claims that Husserl’s phenomenology has failed: ‘Like other attempts 
to strip away interpretation and reveal the basic facts of consciousness to rigorous observation, such as the 
Impressionistic movements in the arts and the Introspectionistic psychologists of Wundt, Titchener, and 
others, Phenomenology has failed to find a single settled method that everyone could agree upon.’ (1991a, 44)  
41 Here I am primarily thinking of Gallagher’s ‘front-loaded’ phenomenology (Gallagher 2003, 2004), which 
suggests allowing insights developed in phenomenological analyses to inform the way experiments are set up. 
Within this approach the subjects may be naïve about the phenomenology of their experience and might not 
even be required to report on it. See also section 3.6.   
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what cognitive scientists actually do in this territory is not to practice agnosticism. Instead, 
they rely substantially on subjects’ introspective beliefs (or reports). So my claim is that the 
heterophenomenological method is not an accurate description of what cognitive scientists 
(of consciousness) standardly do. Of course, you can say (and perhaps intended to say, but if 
so it wasn’t entirely clear) that this is what scientists should do, not what they do do.42 
(Goldman as cited in Dennett 2003b, 16)  
 
To which Dennett answers as follows: 
 
I certainly would play the role of reformer if it were necessary, but Goldman is simply mistaken; 
the adoption of agnosticism is so firmly built into practice these days that it goes without saying, 
which is perhaps why he missed it. (Dennett 2003b, 16) 
 
It seems to me that this dispute between Dennett and Goldman comes down to a fruitless yes-or-no-
situation in which both philosophers can do nothing more than throw examples of concrete 
experimental research at each other.43 So, what should we do?  
For one thing, we should collect more data and try to gain practical knowledge by applying 
introspective or phenomenological reports, instead of focusing on a priori argumentation on the so-
called first-person/third-person split. This may sound question begging, even more so given the fact 
that I have just spent a whole chapter (chapter 5) on conceptual problems concerning the nature of 
consciousness, but it has to do with the pragmatic orientation that I appreciate so much in defenders 
of NP (see the motto of this chapter) and that is also nicely expressed by for example Polger and 
Sufka (2005), who claim that: 
 
The identification of water and H2O is convincing because we know quite a bit about the 
general framework from which it derives, that of molecular chemistry. The identification of 
sensations and brain processes remains somewhat mysterious because the mechanistic 
                                                  
42 Goldman speaks of ‘the heterophenomenological method’, however in my view he means (and should have 
said) ‘heterophenomenological methodology’.  
43 See for example Dennett’s discussion of the controversy about mental imagery in his (2003b, 16-17) and 
Goldman’s reaction to this in his (2004, 11-14). 
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explanations and background theories are still under development. […] this is a mundane fact 
about the status of neuroscientific theories rather than a special fact about conscious 
experiences. (Polger and Sufka 2005, 344-45)  
 
This is what I mean when I say that we have to collect more data. I expect that in conducting 
experimental studies and given the right methodology we will get to the point at which we feel we 
understand consciousness. 
Obviously, one of the central problems facing the scientific study of consciousness is that it 
almost inevitably involves subjects, verbally or otherwise, reporting on their state of mind (whether 
there is a fact of the matter about this or not), which brings with it several methodical problems, and 
problems concerning interpretation of raw data. As we saw, the conflict between 
neurophenomenologists and heterophenomenologists is mainly based on the latter. It is very natural 
to take data from verbal reports44 as a guide to conscious states (phenomenality), which is what 
neurophenomenologists propose. Other people such as Goldman (2004), Ericsson and Simon (1993) 
and Piccinini (2001, 2003) - who I take to represent the mainstream cognitive science methodology - 
propose to take data from introspection as a valid guide to high-level mental states (rather than 
conscious states). And finally there are heterophenomenologists who defend by far the most 
skeptical view that we should take introspection to be a guide to a subject’s beliefs about his mind 
and impute to these a fictional status.  
These three interpretations of introspective data assume different ontologies and come with 
different ideas about the appropriate way of generating data from verbal reports. 
Neurophenomenologists propose to take reports literally and assume the existence of phenomenal 
facts. Goldman and Piccinini are more modest in settling for the less controversial assumption that 
there are mental states (rather than conscious states) and proposing a process of rigorous encoding in 
order to turn raw data into final data (Ericsson and Simon 1993). Finally, heterophenomenologists 
only assume beliefs about ‘experiences’ and grant the latter a fictional status. Neither of these 
interpretations can be rejected as invalid on the basis of data that is currently available.  
Of course one might claim, like Dennett, that neurophenomenologists are over-interpreting 
                                                  
44 Although some neurophenomenologists have argued that introspection differs from their phenomenological 
approach (for example Marbach 1993, 15; Varela 1996, 338) I see no reason why this would be the case, at 
least not as far as currently available examples of neurophenomenological research are concerned (for example 
Lutz 2002). Arguments for this view can be found in Bayne (2004).  
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the data, but heuristically neurophenomenologists’ postulation of conscious states as distinct from 
subject’s beliefs about these states seems very sensible. When subjects report that they experience X 
(for example seeing a ripe tomato) and that it is like so-and-so for them to be experiencing X (it 
looks red), why not just assume that their belief is indeed about X and that it is like so-and-so for 
them to be seeing X? The fact that Dennett is not prepared to (or cannot) answer the question of 
what his subjects’ beliefs are about when they say that it is like this for them to be seeing X apart 
from saying that the subject apparently ‘judges’ X to be the case and that it is like so-and-so, and 
particularly his further suggestion that there might not be a fact of the matter as to the so-and-so 
involved in these beliefs, to many people is very unsatisfying. 45 Of course this, on its own, does not 
imply that Dennett is wrong.  
The reason why many philosophers criticize Dennett’s HP is that although he preaches 
neutrality and claims that HP ‘opens the door to a wide spectrum of theories’ (Dennett 2003b, 12) he 
simultaneously seems to close the door in principle for the scientific legitimacy of approaches to 
consciousness in the spirit of NP. Dennett’s inclination of banning the latter to the realm of the 
unscientific has to do with the fact that neurophenomenologists interpret data from introspective 
reports as phenomenal data, while Dennett claims that the maximal set of primary data we can 
scientifically acquire are subjects’ beliefs about (apparent) ‘experiences’ (Dennett 2003b, 13). Given the 
truth of the latter conclusions reached by means of NP would not be valid.  
Dennett’s main reason for defending this position is to avoid spurious data (the qualia of 
‘Quining Qualia’, see Dennett 1988). But can this really justify the heterophenomenologist’s 
skepticism across the board, even in the light of our deep-seated commonsense conviction that there 
really is a fact of the matter as to what we consciously experience? Neurophenomenologists think 
not. But again, the question of what is supposed to be the right interpretation cannot easily be settled 
given the data that is currently available. All we can do now, or so I claim, is collect more data that 
might further clarify our concept of consciousness and over time favor one of the proposed 
interpretations, while all the time being maximally explicit about our methodology.  
In the next section I will make some remarks about the general dynamics of methods, data 
and interpretation in scientific inquiry and how this applies to the discussion between HP and NP.  
 
                                                  
45 See Dennett 2005, 75: ‘The “magic” of consciousness, like stage magic, defies explanation only so long as 
we take it at face value. Once we appreciate all the nonmysterious ways in which the brain can create benign 
“user-illusions”, we can begin to imagine how the brain creates consciousness.’ 
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6.5 A general dynamics of inquiry 
Inquiry never starts from scratch, which means that interpretation of (new) data always involves 
theory based on earlier inquiry. This implies that inquiry without interpretation is inconceivable. 
Thus, interpretation is not so much a problem as it is a necessary requirement for inquiry.  
Does it make sense to talk about relatively raw data given the idea that data and interpretation 
are in fact inseparably intertwined? It seems like it does. Although Copernicus and Ptolemy had 
different theories about the earth and its relation to the sun and the stars and hence gave different 
interpretations of what they took to be the relevant data, we now surely agree about what the 
relatively raw data they were interpreting are.  
Scientists generate data using certain methods and their interpretation of this data is colored 
by theories based on the outcome of earlier inquiry. When the data corroborate the theory new 
experiments are advanced to further test the theory. If the data cannot be interpreted by means of 
the currently favored theory another interpretation is advanced. Then this new interpretation is 
subjected to experimental testing possibly using other methods.  
In practice scientists often differ in their interpretation of the (relatively raw) data, especially 
when they are working in new fields of inquiry such as consciousness or quantum mechanics. The 
dynamics of scientific inquiry is aimed at reaching an equilibrium between the available data and their 
interpretation by means of a co-existence of different possible interpretations (methodologies) 
offered by the scientists.46 This co-existence increases scientists’ mutual awareness of the implicit and 
explicit theories applied when interpreting certain data. Ideally, in the course of time one 
interpretation will come out as the most satisfying. Obviously, for this dynamics to work it is crucial 
that when interpreting data scientists strive to be as explicit as possible about the theories they apply 
and try to avoid implicit assumptions.  
In the science of consciousness we are far from obtaining hard data (data obtained through 
uncontroversial – unbiased - procedures). Furthermore, there are still many co-existing 
interpretations of the soft data that have been acquired. Heterophenomenologists and 
neurophenomenologists advance such conflicting interpretations and the resulting discussion is 
indeed relevant. I argued that what should be done now is apply the methodologies and collect more 
data that might favor one of the proposed interpretations. It might turn out that 
neurophenomenologists indeed over-interpreted the data and that the ontology associated with their 
                                                  
46 See also Lakatos (1978). 
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interpretation (one including phenomenal facts) was too rich or not scientifically defensible. On the 
other hand we might also come to agree that the alleged over-interpretation provides heuristics that 
inspire doing certain experiments that might not be performed by heterophenomenologists but that 
nevertheless yield relevant data that justify the neurophenomenological interpretation that would 
otherwise have been kept from us.  
However, some might now take me to be begging the question against Dennett. It could be 
argued that what is in fact at stake here is an instrumentalism-realism controversy in which Dennett 
represents the instrumentalist position. Given this perspective, Dennett is taken to claim that the 
alleged phenomenal facts figuring in phenomenal reports help us to make sense of ourselves and 
each other while in fact they have no referent – they are illusory - and consequently do not issue in 
an ontology. Construing the debate between HP and NP as a choice between instrumentalism and 
realism would make it impossible to solve the debate on the basis of more data. No matter how 
much data we would inject into the discussion, the debate would always continue. In my view this 
construal of the relation between heterophenomenological and neurophenomenological 
interpretations in terms of instrumentalism and realism is not very fruitful and, moreover, does not 
do justice to our scientific practice. It is not like scientists studying consciousness will wait until 
philosophers have solved the instrumentalism-realism debate before they get to work, and rightly so. 
What happens in practice is roughly like the general picture I have sketched above and often things 
are probably far more messy and opportunistic. It seems to me that the ontologies assumed by 
scientists follow quite directly from their current favorite theory in a manner described by Fine’s 
natural ontological attitude (Fine 1986). These ontologies may turn out to be quite plastic as theories 
evolve or are replaced by new theories. And, again, rightly so, for it is the only way in which we will 
get ahead.  
When we temporarily forget about the debate over realism and instrumentalism and shift our 
attention to experimental research we get another picture of the discussion between HP and NP. In 
this picture the heterophenomenologist chooses to remain neutral as to the reality of phenomenal 
facts in this way implicitly allowing for elimination of phenomenal facts, while the 
neurophenomenologist explicitly assumes the existence of phenomenal facts and starts his research 
from there. Both these approaches are legitimate as long as the practitioners are explicit about it and 
prepared to critically compare their interpretation to other interpretations.  
I have already hinted at what kind of practical differences favoring the 
neurophenomenological interpretation (in certain contexts) might accrue from experimental 
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consciousness research. We saw that although heterophenomenologists would not do the kind of 
studies neurophenomenologists conduct they could do so if they really wanted to. However, would 
they in fact ever get to it? Although possible in principle this seems far from likely since it would 
imply that the heterophenomenologist would get involved in what traditionally are taken to be 
phenomenological practices that are wholly counter to his behaviorist orientation. This prospect of 
practical divergence between HP and NP justifies the hope that in the course of empirical 
investigation one of the proposed interpretations will be favored.  
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Chapter 7 
The Facts of Consciousness 
 
What I am here referring to is the common, but un-Peircean 
assumption that one can explain what reality is – can give a 
definition of “reality” – without making any necessary 
reference to how we come to know it. (I. Farber 2005, ‘Peirce 
on reality, truth and the convergence of inquiry in the limit’, 
footnote 6)   
 
7.1 Some desiderata concerning a theory of consciousness  
At this point it should have become clear that we - that is, the scientific community - do not agree on 
what exactly consciousness is supposed to be. This puts us in the awkward position that we are not 
sure of what a science of consciousness should be about. Nevertheless, in order to be able to do 
science we need methods that are appropriate for the subject under investigation and in order to 
decide on what would be the right methods we obviously need at least a provisional 
conceptualization of the phenomenon to be investigated. In this chapter I attempt to minimalize my  
assumptions concerning consciousness without eliminating them, while simultaneously showing that 
even such a minimal set of suppositions is substantial enough to have methodological implications 
(for example to reject HP as a sufficient methodology for investigating consciousness). In other 
words, I will attempt to formulate a minimal theory on the nature of consciousness.  
 There are some desiderata many philosophers think a theory on the nature of consciousness 
should live up to in order to be convincing. I will focus on three of them: 
 
1. A theory of consciousness should allow there to be a fact of the matter as to what someone 
experiences or should at least say something about the source of this very common belief.47  
2. A theory of consciousness should be compatible with a naturalistic picture of the world. 
                                                  
47 Fact of the matter is here primarily used to express the intuition that the phenomenology of consciousness 
is in many respects determinate, but this does not exhaust its meaning. I discuss the notion of fact involved 
here more extensively below.  
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3. A theory of consciousness should allow consciousness to be causally efficacious (in other 
words, consciousness is not an epiphenomenon).  
 
The first desideratum might, from an everyday perspective (a non-philosopher’s perspective, 
say my mother’s) appear to be on the verge of triviality and as such redundant. Isn’t it entirely clear 
that as soon as we can be said to be conscious there is always a fact of the matter as to what we 
experience? When the dentist is drilling your tooth and you tell him that it hurts there is definitely a 
fact of the matter as to what you experience, namely that it is painful. Of course, you could 
misinterpret or wrongly describe your experiences, as might be the case when the dentist 
anaesthetized your jaw before he started drilling. In the latter case you might describe the felt 
vibration in your jaw in combination with your fear of the dentist as painful. Although you would be 
wrong, there is arguably still a fact of the matter as to what you actually experience.48 
Notwithstanding its prima facie triviality some philosophers can be taken to reject the first 
desideratum. For example according to Dennett consciousness is a user-illusion generated by our 
brains (Dennett 2005, 75) where ‘illusion’ seems to stand for ‘contrary-to-fact’ or ‘just-seeming-to-be-
the-case’. 
The second desideratum - the desideratum of naturalism – seeks to keep consciousness in the 
realm of the natural in contrast with the realm of the supernatural, where it has often been taken to 
reside. The realm of the supernatural should be associated with talk of souls, spirits and afterlife that 
are often found in religious and mystic approaches to human nature. Current virtually everyone in 
the philosophy of mind community agrees that we should be naturalists in the negative sense of 
rejecting the supernatural. (Outside this small community the supernatural orientation, implicitly or 
explicitly, reigns supreme). Notwithstanding this agreement there is a lot of discussion about how the 
natural should be positively characterized. I shall briefly give my own version of the concept to guide 
our thinking.  
In general, one can distinguish between methodological naturalism - the view that the best 
methods for inquiry in the social sciences and philosophy are modeled on those of the natural 
sciences – and ontological naturalism – the view that the natural is that which is recognized by the 
natural sciences (Kim and Sosa 1995, 343). The naturalism of desideratum two is primarily an 
ontological naturalism. Naturalism about consciousness can be exemplified in the thesis that the facts 
                                                  
48 I borrowed this example from Goldman 2000, 14. 
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of experience (B-facts) are determined by facts concerning body, brain and environment (A-facts). 
‘Determination’ here means that whenever in our world certain B-facts are actual they cannot change 
without certain changes in the A-facts. This thesis is minimal in that it does not imply anything 
concerning the nature of the determination relation, which could be characterized as realization (Kim 
1998), constitution49 (Baker 1997), identity (Clark 1997, 2005), but also (naturalistic) dualism 
(Chalmers 1996). The thesis is also silent on whether the relation of the A-facts to the B-facts is one-
one, many-one, or one-many.  
Naturalism is often associated with physicalism – the view that all facts are physical facts. 
Although the theory on the nature of consciousness expounded below might be compatible with 
some versions of physicalism this is not necessarily implied. In my opinion physicalism is a virtually 
redundant concept in the current debate on consciousness and can hardly be taken to mean more 
than monism, which is the idea that our world is a ‘seamless’ world.50 There is a little more on this in 
section 7.7.  
The third desideratum should warrant that consciousness does not end up being 
characterized as an epiphenomenon. It is your fear – a (conscious) emotion – that makes you flee for 
the dentist, while it is your pain – a (conscious) feeling – that makes you run back to the dentist 
urging him to rid you of your toothache after all. It is a fact that there once were people to whom it 
seemed undeniable that witches made their babies cry just like it now seems undeniable to many of 
us that certain conscious events are the causes of our behavior. Today many of us readily give up on 
the witches – witch-talk is just plain wrong – but few can seriously give up on the idea that 
consciousness is causally efficacious (and has a function, in other words, is not a spandrel).  
To this short list I add two other desiderata that are derived from the analyses in the previous 
chapters: 
 
4. A theory of consciousness should be phenomenologically accurate. 
5. A theory of consciousness should not go beyond the facts.  
 
In what follows I further specify these five fairly general desiderata in the light of the theory of 
consciousness to be constructed. The ingredients of my proposal are mainly provided by work of 
                                                  
49 Constitution is only compatible with global supervenience. 
50 For critical approaches of physicalism see for example Crane and Mellor 1991, Montero 2001.  
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Tim Crane (2003) and Thomas Clark (1997, 2005). I use the work of Crane, because his notion of 
subjective facts accounts for desideratum (1) and (4). I use Clark’s functional identity thesis to 
account for desideratum (2) and (3). My specific interest in Clark’s theory is due to the fact that 
although he explicitly takes several pages from Dennett - which in my opinion is a good idea - he can 
be interpreted as not succumbing to Dennett’s interpretationist account of consciousness (Dennett 
1991a, 2005).  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. I briefly introduce Crane’s notion of subjective 
facts (section 7.2) and Clark’s functional identity thesis (section 7.3). Next, I attempt to merge 
Crane’s subjective facts with Clark’s functional identity thesis (section 7.4). Clark’s theory allows for 
embedding the notion of subjective facts in a broader theoretical context, but this will not work 
without some terminological tuning on my part. Importantly, I argue that the theory resulting from 
this merger lives up to demand (5) posed above.  
The main obstacle in reconciling Clark’s view with Crane’s notion of subjective facts is 
showing that the latter are not in conflict with Clark’s firm rejection of the idea that we have 
categorically private, subject-specific, first-person unsharable knowledge concerning facts about our 
experiences. If this reconciliation can be achieved we have a minimal – in the sense of allowing for 
further clarification by means of scientific investigation – theory on the nature of consciousness.  
Section 7.5 is an attempt to say something sensible about the explanatory gap between 
biobehavioral and phenomenal approaches to consciousness in the light of the merger between 
subjective facts and the functional identity thesis. I defend the view that the feeling that there is an 
explanatory gap is misplaced. In section 7.6 I further refine the functional identity thesis, as I 
understand it, by giving some reasons for the thinking that phenomenal experience is functionally 
identical to biological functions. Finally, section 7.7 wraps things up by summarizing how the proposal 
on the nature of consciousness lives up to the five desiderata posed above. 
 
7.2 Subjective facts 
One of the desiderata a theory of consciousness should live up to is that it should allow for a fact of 
the matter as to what someone experiences or should at least say something about the source of this 
very common believe. In this section I introduce Crane’s notion of subjective facts in order to clarify 
what kind of facts are involved when we are talking about consciousness. 
 Crane defines subjective facts as ‘[…] those facts the learning of which requires that one has certain 
kinds of experience, or occupies a certain position in the world’ (Crane 2003, 78, italics in original). Subjective 
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facts stand in opposition to objective facts which are defined as ‘[…] facts the learning of which does not 
require you to have a certain kind of experience or occupy a certain position in the world’ (Crane 2003, 78, italics in 
original). Crane clarifies the distinction between subjective and objective facts by means of Frank 
Jackson’s (1982) knowledge argument. Crane’s central claim is that although many people take the 
knowledge argument to be an argument against physicalism – understood as the view that all facts 
are physical facts – the argument’s target actually is the view that all facts are objective facts in the 
sense specified above.  
Let’s take look at the knowledge argument and discuss Crane’s analysis of it in terms of 
subjective facts. Leading lady in the thought experiment that constitutes the knowledge argument is 
Mary the super scientist who is in the unfortunate position of living in a black and white room where 
she has been completely shut of from any color experience since birth and investigates color 
perception on a diet of shades of grey (for example by reading books and investigating subjects via 
black and white computer screens). At some point in her life Mary knows all the physical facts about 
color, its physics, its physiology, psychology; the whole package. Then she is let out of her room and 
confronted with a ripe tomato. The question the thought experiment forces upon us is whether Mary 
now learns a new fact, namely what it is like to see red. If this question is answered positively, which 
to many people seems a very natural thing to do, the conclusion should be that not all facts are 
physical facts (Mary already knew all the physical facts when still in the room), and thus that we have 
to give up on physicalism understood as the view that all the facts are physical facts. In short, the 
essence of the knowledge argument is (Crane 2003, 70): 
 
1. In the room, Mary knows all the physical facts about color. 
2. Having left the room Mary learns something new about color. 
3. Therefore: not all facts are physical facts.  
 
The knowledge argument has been intensively discussed and criticized. For example Lewis 
(1990), Nemirow (1990), and Mellor (1993) defend the view that Mary does not learn new facts but 
gains new abilities (the ability hypothesis). Another, more general, strategy for questioning the 
validity of the knowledge argument is provided by Paul Churchland (1989) and has become known 
as the argument from acquaintance. The kernel of his critique is that although acquaintance 
knowledge might not be reducible to propositional knowledge it might nevertheless be about the 
same physical properties that Mary already knew when in the black and white room (for example 
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certain neural properties). A lot can be said and has been said about these critiques, but I prefer not 
to elaborate on them here and instead concentrate on Crane’s positive view about what would be the 
right analysis of the knowledge argument and the role subjective facts play in it. 
In order to get a good grip on what the knowledge argument actually shows Crane suggests 
that we first clarify what conception of ‘fact’ the knowledge argument presupposes. According to 
Crane the knowledge argument assumes that facts are objects of propositional knowledge. ‘[A] state 
of propositional knowledge is one described in claims of the form “X knows that p” where X is a 
knower and “p” is replaced by a sentence’ (Crane 2003, 75). This notion of facts implies the very 
natural idea that a new piece of propositional knowledge is knowledge of new information or, in 
other words, a new fact.  
 Does this notion of facts beg any questions against the physicalist? According to Crane this is 
not the case. Of course it is open to the physicalist to deny that the new propositional knowledge 
Mary gains when leaving the room concerns knowledge of non-physical facts, but this does not harm 
the thesis that Mary gains new knowledge. This shows that actually we do not need to agree on a 
particular theory about facts to make the knowledge argument work as long as we agree on the 
uncontroversial notion of objects of propositional knowledge.51 
At this point some physicalists might be tempted to introduce the distinction between a fine-
grained notion of information (or facts) according to which facts are individuated on the level of 
sense, and a coarse-grained notion of information according to which facts are individuated on the 
level of reference (for example Van Gulick 1997, 562-3). The coarse-grained notion opens up the 
possibility of arguing that Mary only gains another ‘mode of access’ (see the argument of 
acquaintance mentioned earlier) to facts she already knew when in her room, but only at the cost of 
accepting that propositional knowledge gets individuated in an exclusively coarse-grained manner. 
However, the latter is not the case, so this is a conclusion physicalists cannot afford. Let me elaborate 
on that. 
 Given the coarse-grained notion the relevant fact to which Mary gains a new mode of access 
is a brain – namely her own - being in state B. In this interpretation ‘seeing red’ and ‘being in brain 
state B’ express the same fact. Although this might be convincing at first sight Crane reminds us that 
                                                  
51 Crane here relies on Mellor’s notion of facts, which is indeed a rather minimal notion. In section 7.4 it will 
turn out that the notion of fact isn’t entirely uncontroversial after all, but these considerations are strongly 
related to the notion of phenomenal facts that I will introduce below, so for now I will just restrict myself to 
Crane’s story. 
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the point of this argument is supposed to be that the knowledge argument’s second premise (‘having 
left the room Mary learns something new about color’) is false and that in fact Mary does not learn 
anything new. However, the conclusion that Mary does not learn anything new clashes with the 
purpose of the distinction between sense and reference as originally suggested by Frege (1891, 1892). 
Physicalists making the mode-of-access-move invoke Frege’s distinction between sense and reference 
(of course without the Platonic appendix). Nevertheless, Frege’s original intent with the distinction 
between sense and reference was allowing for the discovery that Hesperus is Phosphorus, in other 
words allowing for the idea that when we learned that Hesperus is Phosphorus we learned a new 
fact. Now, the physicalist could say that the Hesperus/Phosphorus-case differs from the Mary-case 
in some principled way, however given that they introduced the parallel this would be rather 
surprising. So Crane concludes the following: 
 
[T]he relevant question is whether anything is learned when someone acquires the belief that 
Hesperus is Phosphorus, whether there is any new knowledge at all. And if there is a sense in 
which the fact learned is a new fact […] then there is new knowledge. This surely cannot be 
denied. Note that if you deny this, you have to deny at the very least that there is new 
knowledge in the following sense: the knowledge that the two modes of presentation are 
modes of presentation of the same thing. But this makes it impossible to even state what the 
ancients learned [when discovering that Hesperus is Phosphorus, TvdL]. (Crane 2003, 74-5)  
 
 Crane uses the work of Hugh Mellor to further clarify his own notion of subjective facts. A 
central theme in the work of Mellor is his objectivism. Objectivism is to be understood as the view 
that ‘reality as such is how it is regardless of the way we represent it’ (Crane 2003, 68). According to 
Mellor a very common source of philosophical confusion is the confusion of reality itself with our 
subjective representations of it. In an attempt to avoid such problems he introduced the distinction 
between ‘fact’ and ‘factum’ (Mellor 1995). Crane describes facts rather cryptically as ‘the shadows’ of 
truths, in this way expressing the idea that if it is true that p than it is a fact that p. Facta on the other 
hand are the truthmakers for truth, they are objective objects, properties, events, or what have you 
(anything our empirical investigations require) in the world.52  
                                                  
52 Mellor emphatically argues that his distinction between facts and facta does not presuppose a specific theory 
of truth (Mellor 1995, 112). Since there is no space here to go into the subject of truth I will for the moment 
just accept this claim without further ado. 
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We can use the Hesperus/Phosphorus case to clarify the distinction. Someone might tell us 
that Phosphorus shines in the evening and someone else might tell us that Hesperus shines in the 
morning. Both people express a fact. Nevertheless, we now know that among the facta involved in 
this scenario is just one planet referred to by one of these people as Hesperus and by the other as 
Phosphorus, namely Venus. According to Crane we should accept some such distinction as Mellor 
suggests. Later in this section I will say more about distinction between facts and facta and how it is 
applied by Crane.  
 Now that we have an initial clarification of the notion of fact and the role it plays in the 
knowledge argument we will take a closer look at the actual scope of the argument. As mentioned at 
the beginning of this section Crane does not take the knowledge argument to refute any serious 
forms of physicalism, but he takes it as an argument for the existence of subjective facts. Crane 
writes: 
 
The point [of the knowledge argument, TvdL] is not that the kind of knowledge she [Mary, 
TvdL] gains in the black-and-white room is physical knowledge; rather the point is that it is 
the sort of knowledge that can be stated in some form or another: it is ‘book-learning’. As 
David Lewis puts it, the ‘intuitive starting point wasn’t just that physics lessons couldn’t help 
the inexperienced to know what it is like. It was that lessons couldn’t help’ (Lewis 1990: 511; 
see also Mellor 199353). (Crane 2003, 77) 
 
If one takes physicalism to be the view that all facts are physical facts – as the knowledge argument 
does – then physicalism is indeed within the reach of the argument’s influence. However, the 
argument’s actual target is broader, namely that not all facts are objective or ‘book-learning’ facts 
(facts the learning of which do not require you to have a certain kind of experience or occupy a 
certain position in the world); there are also subjective facts (those facts the learning of which 
requires that one has certain kinds of experience, or occupies a certain position in the world). It is a 
subjective fact that Mary learns when she herself sees a ripe tomato for the first time. She expresses 
                                                  
53 In his 2003 Crane at this point refers to Mellor ‘1991c’ , which is supposed to be ‘Nothing like experience’, 
in D.H. Mellor (ed.) Matters of Metaphysics (see the references in Crane 2003, 83). However, Mellor’s paper 
‘Nothing like experience’ is not to be found in Matters of Metaphysics, but did appear in Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, Vol. 93, 1-16. 
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this knowledge by saying something like ‘Aha, so this is what tomatos look like’. I will call this kind 
of subjective facts ‘phenomenal facts’. 
 Another example of knowledge where subjective facts – but not phenomenal facts - are 
involved is indexical knowledge. For example when you are lost and use a map to determine your 
location you might after some time exclaim something like ‘I am here’ while pointing somewhere on 
the map. You have then learned a subjective fact (assuming that the map is reliable). Nobody 
disputes that in this example you learn something new, and also nobody would be tempted to argue 
that there are any non-physical/non-objective objects or properties involved. According to Crane the 
same goes for the Mary case: Mary does indeed learn subjective facts (new pieces of information or 
new objects of propositional knowledge), but this does not imply that there are non-physical/non-
objective facta involved. When analysing the Hesperus/Phosphorus case in terms of the distinction 
between facts and facta we already saw that facts and facta do not always stand in one-on-one 
correspondence. 
 All this does not imply that Crane wants to defend a form of physicalism. In an influential 
article (written in collaboration with Mellor) he severely criticized physicalism (Crane and Mellor 
1991). The point is that since - according to Crane - the knowledge argument is about kinds of 
knowledge, namely knowledge of subjective facts and knowledge of objective facts, it is neutral 
towards versions of physicalism that do allow for subjective facts. There is no reason why 
physicalism could not allow for subjective facts, because physicalism is primarily a view about what 
there is (in the sense of the truthmakers) and only indirectly about knowledge.  
 All good and well - a physicalist might say - but what about the truthmakers of subjective 
facts? Are there perhaps subjective facta corresponding to the alleged subjective facts and what is 
their nature? Crane answers as follows: 
 
[A] subjective factum is what has to exist in order for a subjective fact to be learned. […] So 
what needs to be the case for Mary to learn that red looks like this? An obvious part of the 
answer is: a visual experience of red. Mary’s visual experience of red is to exist if she is to 
learn that red looks like this. Now if a subjective factum is an experience, then no-one should 
deny the existence of subjective facta; for the issue is not about the existence of experiences. 
Experiences are subjective in the sense that they depend on the existence of experiencing 
subjects […] for example Mary […]. (Crane 2003, 79) 
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No physicalist would deny the existence of experiences or experiencing subjects, so it seems that the 
truthmakers for subjective facts are in the clear as far as physicalism is concerned. Subjective facts are 
even compatible with the intention of Mellor’s objectivism if only we allow for the idea that there are 
facts about our subjectivity understood as facts about an experiencing subject. 
 In my view Crane’s notion of subjective facts lives up to the desideratum that a theory of 
consciousness should allow there to be a fact of the matter as to what we experience. Subjective facts 
are facts about how subjects represent external (and internal) reality54; they are facts about our 
subjectivity. Nevertheless, as a theory on the nature of consciousness it is still somewhat meagre. 
Therefore, I devote the next section to Thomas Clark’s functional identity thesis as a supplement to 
Crane’s theory. In order to make this combination of theories work it will be necessary now and then 
to add something to or adjust some aspects of the theories in question.  
 
7.3 The functional identity thesis 
There are two things I want Clark’s theory of consciousness to do in the context of this project. 
Firstly, I want to incorporate it into my own account of consciousness in order to be able to live up 
to the second and the third desideratum propounded in section 7.1. The second desideratum was 
that a theory of consciousness should be compatible with a naturalistic view of the world and the 
third desideratum was that a theory of consciousness should allow for a function of consciousness. 
Secondly, I want to bring out the compatibility of Clark’s theory (or at least a version of it) with 
Crane’s theory of subjective facts.  
The analysis in the previous section mainly focussed on Crane’s attempts to show that the 
knowledge argument does not necessarily refute all forms of physicalism as long as physicalism 
allows for subjective facts, which in his view is a possibility. However, I also pointed out that Crane 
himself probably would not go for physicalism given the severe critique on this class of positions in 
the (1991) paper he wrote together with Mellor. This left us with the question what positive position 
Crane himself might defend besides the rather meagre thesis that consciousness involves subjective 
facts. I think Clark’s theory can help in embedding the notion of subjective facts in a broader 
theoretical context, which is my aim in this chapter.  
Clark’s functional identity thesis is primarily an attempt to deal with the alleged explanatory 
gap between function and experience, which Chalmers describes as follows: 
                                                  
54 Or rather, what it is for subjects to be representing external and internal reality (see section 7.3). 
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For any physical [neural/cognitive, TvdL] process there will be an unanswered question: Why 
should this process give rise to experience? Given any such process, it is conceptually 
coherent that it would be instantiated in the absence of experience. It follows that no mere 
account of the physical process will tell us why experience arises. The emergence of 
experience goes beyond what can be derived from physical theory. (Chalmers 1997, 18) 
 
This problem has become (in)famous as the ‘hard problem of consciousness’ (Chalmers 1996). 
According to Clark it is indeed logically possible that there be certain physical, functional processes 
in absence of the experiences normally associated with them, but only on the assumption that they 
are not identical. However, as the label ‘functional identity thesis’ suggests, the latter is precisely what 
is being denied: 
 
The basic functional identity thesis is that qualitative experiences are what it is to be a set of 
multi-modal, discriminative, representational processes which deploy information for the 
control of behavior. (Clark 1997, 51)  
 
 Before unpacking this thesis further I should first say something about a critical point that 
Chalmers raises in his reaction to Clark’s suggestion (Chalmers 1997, 388). According to Clark the 
explanatory gap is mainly a consequence of assuming beforehand that consciousness and the physical 
are distinct, which in his view is exactly what Chalmers does when talking of consciousness as ‘arising 
from’ physical processes. If on the other hand one’s starting point is an identity thesis no explanatory 
gap necessarily appears, since identities do not require nor allow for explanations.  
Chalmers, in turn, rightly argues that the identity thesis defended by Clark is primitive, in 
other words, it amounts to no more than postulating a brute fact. This, according to Chalmers, is not 
very convincing even more so when one realizes that such a view relies on a very strong notion of a 
posteriori metaphysical necessity. Chalmer’s alternative suggestion is to trade the primitive identity 
thesis for primitive laws that express the systematic regularities between physical processes and 
phenomenological data. The alleged advantage of this position - called ‘naturalistic dualism’ – is that 
it does not pretend to be able to explain consciousness exclusively in physical terms and instead takes 
the phenomenal data to be ineliminable and irreducible. As Chalmers has put it: ‘naturalistic dualism 
takes consciousness seriously’ (Chalmers 1996, xi).  
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The obvious countermove Clark would now make is referring to the principle of parsimony 
and advertise his own theory in the light of this principle and furthermore point out that contrary to 
Chalmers’ dualism his own theory evades epiphenomenalism. Moreover, he would argue that he also 
takes consciousness seriously, since he is actually offering the functional identity thesis to account for 
the very phenomenon. And, finally, that he does not defend the claim that we can explain 
consciousness in exclusively physical terminology, at least not yet, but just that all that is involved in 
the ontology of conscious processes is physical in nature: 
 
Of course, the meaning of the terms ‘phenomenal consciousness’ and ‘qualia’ is not (presently) 
identical to the meaning of the expression ‘neurally instantiated representational states’ and its 
functionalist and physicalist cousins. (Clark 1997, 57) 
 
How seriously can one take a phenomenon?55  
Now for the theory itself. Clark unfolds his thesis by relating it to some properties 
traditionally attributed to consciousness (or qualia56), such as privacy, ineffability and intrinsicality. 
Let’s go into these in turn, starting with privacy. Talk of the privacy of consciousness expresses the 
idea that only I myself can for example feel the pain that I feel at this very moment or taste the 
coffee that I have just taken a sip of. You don’t feel my pain, and you didn’t experience the coffee as 
I just did. To feel pain you must inflict damage to your own body, to taste the coffee you shall have 
to take a sip yourself. This intuition of privacy can easily be accounted for by the functional identity 
thesis, since the thesis boils down to the idea that I am my pain, while you are your pain. Similarly with 
the coffeetasting: I as a subject partially consist of the coffee-experience, while you consist of another 
coffee-experience.  
                                                  
55 In fact I think that it should be taken even more seriously than the ‘presently’ clause in the citation could be 
taken to suggest. It is my view that the meanings of the words in question will never coincide. However, I do 
not hold this against Clark at this stage, since as will become clear, Clark’s position turns out to be ambiguous 
on this issue.  
56 I myself am not a big fan of the term qualia and would rather talk in terms of phenomenal facts (the latter I 
take to be the reason why people started talking about qualia). In what follows I will use the term qualia, 
because Clark does. However, it will turn out that there are good reasons for claiming that Clark’s use of the 
term qualia eventually coincides with my notion of phenomenal facts. 
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 Before going into Clark’s view on the intrinsicality and ineffability of consciousness I should 
say something more about what Clark takes qualia to be. According to Clark: 
 
Most, if not all, qualia are occurrently determinate, stable, non-conceptual values, within the 
various modes of conscious sensation. By this I mean simply that, for instance, each colour 
quale has a particular place in the phenomenal structure of my colour experience as defined 
by its relations to other hues. (Clark 2005, 41)  
 
On the basis of Clark’s representational characterization of qualia is what he calls the ‘informational 
hypothesis’ which says that: 
 
[…] sensory qualia are representational contents embodied by world-responsive, neurally-
instantiated, multi-dimensional representational phase or state spaces that feed information 
into higher-level perceptual representations […] [which in turn, TvdL] constitutes 
information fed to the sorts of categorizing, higher-level belief systems that constitute 
concept-based cognition. (Clark 2005, 41-2)  
 
In discussing the theory’s implications for the alleged ineffability and intrinsicality of 
consciousness Clark introduces the idea of the transparency of consciousness (see also Moore 1965, 
Tye 1990, Harman 1990 and Metzinger 2003), which is nicely explained by Tye as follows: 
 
[E]xperience itself is transparent. Why? The answer, I suggest, is that my experience has no 
introspectible features that distinguish it from other experiences over and above those 
implicated in its content. So, the specific phenomenal character of my experience – itself 
something that is introspectibly accessible – is identical with, or constrained within, its overall 
intentional content. (Tye 1990, 338)  
 
Transparency in turn does away with the often heard claim that we can ‘access’ our own 
consciousness or even are directly acquainted with it. Clark formulates it as follows: 
 
[A]s subjects we are constituted by and identical to cognitive processes which themselves 
instantiate qualia, hence qualia are what it is for us to be these processes. Under this proposal we 
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can’t, finally, say what it’s like to have qualia since we don’t have a first person perspective on 
them: we don’t ‘have’ them at all, neither do they ‘appear’ to us, nor are we ‘directly 
acquainted’ with them. We, as subjects, exist as them. (Clark 1997, 51)   
 
The crucial point at issue is that according to Clark - contrary to what he takes for example 
Thomas Nagel (1974) to be suggesting when talking of consciousness in terms of ‘what it is like to 
be’ - subjects do not witness an inner life or have direct epistemic ‘access’ to such a thing. We 
observe the world rather than our experiences. In fact, I am not so sure whether the view that we 
observe our own experiences can indeed be attributed to Nagel. Neither do I really see why the 
formulation ‘what it is like to be’ would be so much more suggestive of the thesis that we observe 
our experiences than Clark’s formulation in terms of ‘what is is for us to be’. Nevertheless, I 
wholeheartedly agree with the claim that we in fact do not have a perspective on our own experience.  
Does the functional identity thesis account for the intrinsicality traditionally associated with 
qualia? In order to decide on this we should specify what intrinsicality is supposed to be. Clark goes 
with Dennett (1988, 630-31) in mapping the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction on the relational/non-
relational distinction. Now, obviously in Clark’s theory qualia are not supposed to be intrinsic 
according to this definition. The mere fact that qualia are what it is to be a set of representational 
processes is enough to exclude intrinsicality.  
Nevertheless, Clark’s theory does provide reasons for why it seems to us that qualia are 
intrinsic properties. This can partially be explained by the fact that humans (as other conscious 
animals) have limited discriminatory power; our senses only allow us to categorize our environment 
up to a certain amount of detail. In other words: sensory perception has a finite resolution. At this 
discriminatory limit there is no further phenomenal structure as for example is the case when looking 
at Malevich’s Black Square from up close. Such atomic and homogeneous elements of experience 
might seduce one into thinking in terms of intrinsic bits of phenomenology, while forgetting that in 
everyday life qualia are taken as or associated with characteristics of things and events in a complex 
environment.  
The non-composability of elements of experience one encounters at the limits of our sensory 
capabilities can also be taken to promote the idea of qualia as unanalyzable which partially explains 
their ineffability understood as the impossibility of describing one’s exact experience to others while 
the other is unacquainted with this particular experience.  
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Furthermore, given the transparency of consciousness we cannot observe the way in which 
we accomplish the sensory ‘work’ of representing the world. In fact, in everyday life we don’t need 
this information, which is probably why evolution ‘decided’ to keep us representationally blind to it 
(Clark 2005, 46). It is only when we get involved in philosophy of mind that we suffer from this 
specific blindness issuing in the countless thought-experiments pumping the intuition that qualia are 
causally redundant and intrinsic. However: 
 
Since I don’t have an observational perspective on the informational goings-on of experience, 
my blue will necessarily seem arbitrary with respect to its informational function and it will 
necessarily seem intrinsic, that is, non-relational and sui generis. (Clark 2005, 46)   
 
 Luckily, thought experiments are not the only tools we have at our disposal in trying to 
understand consciousness. Work in cognitive (neuro)science might at least partially make up for our 
blindness. I have presented Clark’s functional identity thesis and have shown how it deals with some 
properties traditionally associated with consciousness. In the next sections I merge Clark’s theory 
with Crane’s notion of subjective facts. 
 
7.4 Merging the theories 
Is Clark’s functional identity theory compatible with Crane’s notion of subjective facts? I think that, 
as stated in its present form, this is rather hard to decide, but I will argue that some version of it is. 
This requires some terminological tuning on my part. The main obstacle in reconciling Clark’s view 
with Crane’s notion of subjective facts is its apparent incompatibility with Clark’s firm rejection of 
the idea that we have categorically private, subject-specific, first-person unsharable knowledge 
concerning facts about our experiences. I submit however, that although the rejection of the latter is 
firm Clark’s position is unstable on the issue of phenomenal facts.  
In the foregoing we saw that according to Clark we have no epistemic relation to our qualia 
at least not in the sense that we can observe our qualia; consciousness is transparent. The 
transparency of consciousness is what drives the notorious ineffability of qualia. Take the following 
citation: 
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Put another way, it’s to say that the demonstrative ‘this’, when referring to the way blue looks 
to me, refers strictly to informational content about the world, not to my experience, content that 
gets misconstrued as a private fact accessible only to the subject. (Clark 2005, 44)  
 
Clark wonders why we should say that a purported fact like ‘my blue looks like this’ is indeed a fact 
when it delivers no informational content apart from a story about which place this particular hue 
value has on the continuum of blues that an individual can distinguish. Clark concludes that the only 
knowledge we gain when looking at a blue chair is that the chair is blue; no knowledge about our 
experience.  
I take it that Crane would dispute this claim. After all, a story about the place a particular hue 
value has on the (phenomenological) continuum of blues that an individual can distinguish might be 
informational content that does not interest us very much in our everyday lives, but we should 
indeed be very interested in it when we are doing philosophy of mind or cognitive (neuro)science. As 
Crane emphasizes, it is further information, namely about our subjectivity. In my view Clark should, 
and could, accept this without giving up on the central intuition of the functional identity thesis.  
Importantly, Clark emphasizes that although he rejects the claim that ‘what-it-is-like-for-me-
blue’ is a private fact – in the traditional sense of categorically unsharable - he does not deny that 
blue looks a particular way to people. Also Clark does not deny that people can only feel their pain 
and not others’. He even writes: 
 
If, as I and other functionalists and representationalists suppose, there is no extra-functional 
or non-representational private aspect of the phenomenal to account for, as Dennett has long 
maintained, we’re home free, but, I would add, without having quined [my italics, TvdL] – that 
is, eliminated – qualia (Dennett, 1990). Once we have quined the seemings of private first-
person facts about experience presented to a non-experiential observer, there’s no reason that 
qualia, conceived of as the reported basic particulars of experience, can’t persist in our 
theories as non-conceptual representations in good standing, with a relatively clear-cut neural, 
functional, and behavioral basis. (Clark 2005, 56-7)  
 
This is where Clark’s position could be taken to meet Crane’s subjective facts and my notion of 
phenomenal facts. Another clue in favour of a reading accepting of a notion of phenomenal facts can 
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be found in the citation on page fourteen of the (2005) paper where Clark articulates his notion of 
qualia by means of phenomenal structure.  
The instability of Clark’s view on this issue of phenomenal facts surfaces again in his analysis 
of the knowledge argument: 
 
Mary doesn’t come into possession of a new private fact about experience. Rather, she 
experiences (and learns to recognize and report) what it’s like [my italics, TvdL] to instantiate a 
non-conceptual representation of a certain complex property of normal human 
environments; it’s a new (for her) representational take on the world, on a set of third-person 
facts that she, a well-trained neuroscientist, already knew via high-level conceptual 
representations. Crucially, there is no private phenomenal fact about red to be entailed by 
third-person scientific facts, which is why Mary couldn’t know in advance about that (non-
existent) fact. (Clark 2005, 49) 
  
The main problem I have with Clark’s analysis of the knowledge argument as quoted above is that it 
seems to reduce his position to a combination of the argument of acquaintance and the ability 
hypothesis both of which were referred to in section 7.2. On the latter analysis Mary does not learn 
any new facts. However, as I have tried to show, there are also good reasons to think that this is not 
Clark’s position. Also take note of the what-it-is-like phrase in the last citation. To bring this out we 
need to pay careful attention to what Clark means by ‘fact’.  
 In the last citation what-it-is-likeness and non-conceptual representation stand against high-
level conceptual representations Mary already has when in the room. We saw earlier in this section 
that Clark wonders why we should say that a purported fact like ‘my blue looks like this’ is indeed a 
fact when it delivers no informational content apart from a story about which place this particular 
hue value has on the continuum of blues that an individual can distinguish. While Crane would claim 
that the latter is indeed new information, namely information about an individual’s subjectivity, thus 
involving new facts expressed by sentences such as ‘Aha, a tomato looks like this (to me)’, Clark 
hesitates to speak of facts here. The reason for this, I take it, is that traditionally facts are associated 
with the domain of the conceptual and not with the domain of the non-conceptual. It is the latter  
domain where phenomenal facts are intuitively taken to resign.  
This throws an interesting light on Crane’s definition of facts as objects of propositional 
knowledge, since in transferring this characterization to phenomenal facts the latter also become 
110 
objects of propositional knowledge. This move might to some – for example Clark – appear 
paradoxical in that it drags phenomenal facts from the domain of the non-conceptual (according to 
Clark they are non-conceptual values, see above and Clark 2005, 41) into the domain of the 
conceptual (they are objects of propositional knowledge) by means of applying demonstratives. Clark 
seems not prepared to take this step and hence claims that although we indeed use demonstratives in 
referring to the way blue looks to one, the only facts involved are facts about the world.57  
However, this is precisely  where the tension in Clark’s position arises, since he also uses the 
idea of a phenomenological structure, whose meaningful application strongly suggests that there is 
also some fact of the matter as to the identity of this structure; it should at least be determinate. 
Crane can accommodate this intuition, but at the cost of using demonstratives in an uncommon 
manner, which brings in problems of its own. One of the problems is that Crane’s use of 
demonstratives reminds one of McDowell’s (1994) view on demonstrative concepts and non-
conceptual representational content, which has been heavily criticized and in my view for good 
reasons (see for example Wright 2003). I am not sure whether Crane would go with McDowell on 
this one, but I don’t think that he necessarily has to. I do not go into this discussion here and 
fortunately I don’t have to either, since the aim of this chapter is to formulate a coherent minimal 
theory on the nature of consciousness. Providing the latter given the materials I decided to work with 
and desiderata set out in section 7.1, primarily demand taking a stance on the tension in Clark’s 
theory. 
 So Clark has to choose: either he gives up on the idea of phenomenological structure and 
really ends up defending the view that - as Wittgenstein might have put it - there is really nothing in 
the box, or he goes with Crane in accepting subjective facts together with all the other clauses of the 
functional identity thesis, but at the cost of applying demonstratives in a manner blurring the dividing 
line between the conceptual and non-conceptual. I propose to opt for the latter since it is the only 
way the resulting theory will be able to live up to desideratum number one stated at the beginning of 
this paper, namely that a theory of consciousness should allow there to be a fact of the matter as to 
what someone experiences. 
 This results in the following picture. If one construes the Mary case as Crane does we can 
just accept Clark’s point that the informational content gained by Mary is information about the 
tomato. However, as a scientist of perception Mary would also be very interested to learn – indirectly - 
                                                  
57 To be sure, Clark speaks of ‘informational content’, but in his terminology this coincides with the facts.  
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that she gains this information in a particular way, which is in some way related to her own biological 
make up and that of her congeners, but not to, say, the biological make up of frogs. When 
encountering a red tomato Mary would say ‘Aha, this is what a ripe tomato looks like to me’, rather 
than ‘Aha, this is what red looks like’, which is the way it is often quite misleadingly put (see also 
Crane 2003, 71). These are Crane’s subjective  facts.  
 What about the demonstrative knowledge such as we for example express when looking at a 
ripe tomato and saying: ‘A ripe tomato looks like this to me’? According to Crane this kind of 
assertions involve subjective facts. But aren’t subjective facts private facts? Indeed, but only in the 
sense also acknowledged by Clark, so not as ‘categorically private data about experiences as objects’, 
but as me being ‘the only person who now instantiates this instance of representing a particular fact 
about the world in this particular non-conceptual mode’ (Clark 2005, 49).  
Clark tries to embrace the same points by means of his notion of an agent perspective, which 
he presents as an alternative to the traditional Nagelian first-person perspective that according to him 
does allow for a perspective on one’s own experience. The agent perspective is an attempt to hold on 
to the intuition that we have a unique perspective on the world and a unique connection to our own 
bodies (Clark 2005, 39) and is articulated as: ‘a unique set of third-person, objective facts that I 
represent about the world as a particular instance of human consciousness’ (Clark 2005, 48). The 
latter part of this sentence clearly reflects the what-it-is-to-be-part of the functional identity thesis.  
Again, I am not sure how to interpret this apparent striving for objectification of subjectivity. 
I take it that Clark’s point is that although knowledge through experience and book-learning 
knowledge involve apparently incompatible modes of presentation this is only so for us, while in fact 
this incompatibility is only apparent. How this can be matched with Clark’s remarks on phenomenal 
structure I do not understand. Moreover, it seems to me that taking away the modes-of-presentation-
dimension58 would make Clark’s theory incomplete as an account consciousness. In fact, if one – like 
Clark – already accepts something like modes of presentation and defends a notion of phenomenal 
structure, then what would keep one from just accepting phenomenal facts?  
Importantly, the ‘certain-way-of-learning-fact’ does not introduce fundamentally new kinds 
of facta into the world, which is what Clark wants to emphasize when in his analysis of the knowledge 
                                                  
58 I do not here mean to suggest that my notion of facts coincides with the notion of modes of presentation. 
For one thing, facts in my frame of thinking constitute one’s ontology. One could of course also choose to say 
that modes of presentation are part of one’s ontology, but this surely is not the way Frege originally intended 
it.  
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argument he says that Mary gains a new (for her) representational take on the world, on a set of 
third-person facts that she, a well-trained neuroscientist, already knew via high-level conceptual 
representations. However, as I pointed out earlier we should take care not to interpret this as a mere 
assent to the argument of acquaintance, which would greatly impoverish the potential of Clark’s 
position. In my view adding the notion of subjective facts and the distinction between facts and facta 
to the functional identity thesis results in a far more convincing view, be it Clark’s view or not. 
 
7.5 The explanatory gap 
Does the functional identity thesis couched in the terminology of facts and facta leave anything 
philosophically deep to explain about consciousness? My guess is that it does not. The bad news 
pertaining to this guess is that it will remain a guess, an inference to the best explanation. The good 
news however, is that despite the fact that we are guessing, the functional identity thesis in 
combination with the facts/facta terminology allows us to make more explicit - in a philosophically 
coherent manner - what it is that we are doing in our scientific investigations and why we are doing 
it. 
 How can subjective facts have the same truthmakers as particular objective facts and why is 
this the case? What underlies – if anything – this truthmaking relation? Given the functional identity 
thesis, the objective fact of instantiating (embodying) particular functional representational processes 
has the same truthmakers (facta) as particular subjective facts. Furthermore, since we are dealing with 
an identity claim, the thesis is that the objective facts and the subjective facts involved are in some 
way identical. Subjective facts are identical to objective facts in respect of having identical 
truthmakers. However, at the same time they are supposed to be different facts in some particular 
sense. Let me explain. 
First some more on the identity claim. Speaking of identity of facts calls for an identity 
criterion for facts, which is provided by Mellor (1995 112-3), who bases his criterion on Davidson’s 
(1980, essay 8, 179) criterion of identity for events. According to Mellor: 
 
[Davidson’s] thesis […] applies just as well to facts – or at least to those facts that have, and 
therefore are, causes and effects. For of any such facts D and D’ we can say […] that D=D’ 
if D and D’ have all the same causes and effects; i.e. that D=D’ if for no ‘C’ or ‘E’ does 
replacing ‘D’ by ‘D’’ make a true causal ‘D because C’ or ‘E because D’ false or a false one 
true. (Mellor 1995, 113)  
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Again, if the subjective facts are in this way identical to the objective facts, than in what sense 
might we speak of subjective facts as further facts? This has to do with the nature of ourselves as 
phenomenal epistemic engines59, which is reflected in the way our language works. Sentences 
conveying propositions involving objective facts that have the same truthmakers as particular 
subjective facts acquire different meanings when the words expressing the objective facts in question 
are replaced by words expressing subjective facts having the same truthmakers. Take for example the 
following sentences: 
 
1. I see a ripe tomato. 
2. This is what a ripe tomato looks like (to me). 
3. I currently embody multi-modal, discriminative, representational processes which deploy 
information for the control of behavior in this case my future actions pertaining to the piece of 
vegetable in front of me.  
 
These sentences all have quite different meanings. Particularly sentences two and three express very 
different things. We can appreciate this when we realize that the proposition expressed by sentence 
two is in some way necessarily – although most of the time tacitly - enclosed in the proposition 
expressed by the first sentence. Importantly, the proposition expressed by three is not necessarily 
enclosed in two (nor in one). Sentence one is concerned with phenomenal facts – via two - but the 
third sentence exclusively involves objective facts.  
The functional identity thesis tells us that the phenomenal facts involved in sentence one 
(implicitly) and two (explicitly) and the objective facts involved in three are in some way identical (on 
pain of epiphenomenalism). Although the sentences are certainly not semantically equivalent, we 
might say - assuming that the truth of the functional identity thesis - that the propositions expressed 
by sentence two and three together are approximately extensionally equivalent to the proposition 
expressed by sentence two.60  
                                                  
59 I borrow the term epistemic engines from Paul Churchland (1979) with the fundamental difference that, 
according to Churchland, we are precisely not phenomenal epistemic engines. 
60 Approximately, since I think seeing tomatoes – as seeing things in general – also fundamentally involves 
action connotations. See for example Gallese and Lakoff 2005 for one attempt to work out this intuition.  
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This immediately brings to the fore that the meanings of our words - roughly the identity of 
our concepts - are very closely tied to our (possibly idiosyncratic) contexts of investigation. After all, 
it is only because we discover (if so at all) that subjective facts might have the same truthmakers as 
objective facts like those expressed in sentence three that we think we can conceive of for example 
(philosophical) zombies or (philosophical) inverted spectra. It is because we are the epistemic engines 
that we are – namely phenomenal epistemic engines – and the consequences this has for our language 
that we encounter (time and time again) this apparent anomaly of further facts.   
Now are subjective facts further facts or not? Yes, they are, simply and exclusively in the 
sense of reflecting our nature as phenomenal epistemic engines. We will not get rid of them, since 
they are literally a part of us. This is how we conceptualize our environments. The annoying gap this 
seems to leave is that it is hardly intelligible that phenomenal facts are identical to objective facts in 
respect of having identical truthmakers. This has to do with the transparency of consciousness: we 
don’t look at phenomenal facts, instead they are what it is like for us to be seeing the world. 
Consciousness is a means to an end, through which we are directed at the world.  
 But still, isn’t all this just terminological juggling, an attempt to sweep the gap under the 
carpet (or rather, putting a carpet over it)? After all, doesn’t saying that the fact that there is water in 
the glass is identical to the fact that there is H2O in the glass in respect of having identical 
truthmakers still sound far more intelligible than saying that certain phenomenal facts are identical to 
certain objective facts in respect of having the same truthmakers? In both cases the relation of 
identity is captured by the identical truthmakers. But is this all that can be said about identity? In the 
water=H2O case we might want to add that we claim that water is identical to H2O, because we 
found out that concrete samples of water (say in glass) consist of H2O. This mereological move, 
however, cannot be intelligibly made in the case of consciousness. The reason that the mereological 
move does not work in the case of consciousness is that it involves phenomenal facts in a way that 
saying water=H2O does not.  
So now the question becomes whether we are allowed to say that for the case of 
consciousness the identity relation is exhaustively captured by the claim that the subjective facts and 
the objective facts have identical truthmakers, although in the case of water and H2O we feel that we 
understand what underlies the truthmaking relation, while in the case of consciousness we feel there 
is more to explain?  
I submit that it is. In the case of consciousness we are dealing with a what-it-is-like-to-be 
identity relation, which is obviously different from the identity relation between water and H2O in 
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that the former fundamentally involves a phenomenal agent perspective. The difference between 
these two relations of identity are exhaustively stated by saying that in both cases the facts have 
identical truthmakers, but in the case of water and H2O we can satisfy our mereological intuition, 
while in the case of consciousness we can’t. We might call the former notion of identity ‘mereological 
identity’ and the latter form ‘phenomenal agent identity’. One could argue that this distinction is ad 
hoc, which in some sense it is. One could also argue, as I do, that the world simply forces us to take 
note of the distinction. 
In short, when it comes to the explanatory gap one can go three ways. Firstly, one can opt for 
Colin McGinn’s (1989) position and claim that there is something more to be understood (thus 
accept the gap), which we will never understand (in principle) due to our cognitive limitations, but 
which can be understood by (a philosophical) God. Alternatively, one could go with Nagel (1974) in 
accepting that there currently is an explanatory gap, but that we might indeed close it in the future. 
Finally, one could also accept my claim that once all the facts are in and all the facta are decided upon 
there is nothing more to know - not for us, not God, not for anybody – that fills the alleged gap.  
If the latter is indeed the case, then if one accepts my version of the functional identity thesis, 
even though we might feel that there is a gap when saying that subjective facts are identical to 
objective facts, strictly speaking there is nothing more to explain, since there is nothing more to know in 
principle. If so, then there is really no explanation to be had to fill the felt gap. This, in my view, comes 
down to the claim that, although we feel that there is a gap – which is entirely understandable given 
our nature as phenomenal epistemic engines and the way our language works - this feeling is 
misplaced.  
 
7.6 Refining the thesis  
In the present section I shall further refine the functional identity thesis on some points in a way that 
might go beyond Clark (insofar as I have not already gone beyond Clark in merging his thesis with 
the notion of phenomenal facts). In the foregoing I have sketched a picture in which conscious 
experiences are supposed to be felt causal role states61 that are extensionally identical to their 
biobehavioral (probably neural) realizers, which will probably turn out to be species- or even 
individual- and context-specific. To some the identity thesis might appear too strong a relation 
between phenomenal experience and its realizers. After all, there might be causal role states that are 
                                                  
61 Thanks to Marc Slors for suggesting this piece of terminology. 
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not phenomenal62 and this might seem to contradict the symmetrical relation of the identity relation. 
Furthermore, the question seems to rise why it is the case that certain causal role states are 
phenomenal and others are not.  
 Given my view on the explanatory gap as presented in section 7.5 it should be clear that I do 
not think that there is an answer to be had to the latter question. Which causal role states are 
phenomenal – insofar as they are expressible - is simply given at the start of one’s investigations. 
Given the functional identity thesis the realizers in question are just to be accepted with the ‘natural 
piety’ of the investigator (Alexander 1920, Book II, 46-7). Although I do not think I have to answer 
the why-question I do think we can already severely cut down the live options when it comes to 
choosing probable candidates for the realizers of felt causal role states to be scientifically 
investigated.  
 First of all, panpsychism – here understood as the view that phenomenal consciousness 
pervades all the parts of the world or that the universe as a whole is to be taken as an organism with 
a phenomenal mind - to me seems out of the question. I see no reason for thinking that my printer 
or the thermostat in my house, although ‘embodying’ functional processes, are conscious in any way. 
Phenomenal consciousness is to be associated with embodied agents, more precisely with what it is 
like to be such an agent embodying certain functions. Moreover, I am of the opinion that at least for 
now we can exclude non-biological agents such as computers and robots as candidates for 
embodying phenomenal causal role states. My hypothesis would be that phenomenal functions are 
biological functions solely realized in humans and other animals. In other words, if one would 
succeed in building a system that embodies the functions we embody my bet is that one would have 
in fact built a human being using the stuff humans are made of and not chips, beer cans or 
paperclips. 
 The latter is a rather bold claim and might be taken to be unnecessarily chauvinist in the light 
of considerations concerning multiple realization, associated with the early days of functionalism. I 
must admit that I do not have any knock-down arguments for this thesis, so I will just lay my cards 
on the table and state why I think it is the right way of looking at things and why it matters for those 
scientifically investigating consciousness.  
                                                  
62 See section 5.3 for some examples, but also think of human-like functions performed by computers or 
robots (like for example face recognition or wine-tasting) that many people intuitively think of as taking place 
in darkness as far as phenomenality is concerned. 
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 In his Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein writes: ‘My attitude towards him [another human 
being, TvdL] is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul’ (1958, part II, 
178). Wittgenstein here expresses the idea that taking an attitude towards someone or something as 
being a sentient, psychological agent is not primarily a matter of having certain beliefs about the 
other agent, but is rather something that happens to you. In other words, one cannot choose to take 
on the attitude, the attitude just presents itself.63 It is primarily this kind of insight that fuels my 
‘chauvinism’ concerning consciousness.  
For example, although I might talk about – or even to - my computer as if it ‘has a hard time’ 
or ‘gets tired’ (when I keep 17 documents running and simultaneously have it process an mp3 file), or 
say that it ‘has a bad day’ and ‘does not want to cooperate’ (while encouragingly tapping it to ‘get it 
thinking faster’), I will show no scruples when ‘it erases’ all my hard day’s work in a crash. On the 
contrary, I will just throw the machine out of the window (see also Slors 1996). Moreover, I’m sure 
that when push comes to shove, I’d rather throw Data64 from the Enterprise into a Black Hole than 
my human roommate (and not because I like the latter and dislike Data). 
 The latter considerations might sound a little mundane at first, but when really giving it 
second thought I think most people showing the behavior I just described would account for their 
actions by saying that to them it is just not a live option that computers can feel or even that Data 
from Star Trek has any feelings at all. Underlying all this is something like Wittgenstein’s ‘attitude 
towards a soul’.  
Of course, wanting to be a credible philosopher, I have to accept the future possibility of 
being confronted with a machine, an android or even a Martian that does undeniably and with no 
holds barred invoke in me the attitude towards a soul and at that point I will have to answer the 
question whether or not I think the agent before me has conscious experience. And so I will, but for 
now I have not been given any convincing cases of possibly sentient agents besides fellow humans 
                                                  
63 Recently this particular attitude has been associated with the finding of mirror neurons (see Rizzolatti et al 
1996, Gallese and Goldman 1998, Gallagher 2004, and Goldman 2006).  
64 Data is a character that appears in the Star Trek: The Next Generation television series that is about the 
fictional adventures of the crew of the star ship USS-Enterprise. Data is an android (a robot made to resemble 
a human in both appearance and behavior) who serves as the second officer and chief operations officer 
aboard the star ships. In the series Data is unable to feel emotions until he is provided with an ‘emotion chip’. 
For more about Data see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Star_Trek/Data.  
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and other animals, so I propose to concentrate on the latter species first and leave the ‘paper cases’ 
for later.65  
 A good illustration of how I think an agents phenomenology is knit up with its biological 
embodiment is provided by the James-Lange theory of emotion. William James describes the kernel 
of the idea as follows (I quote in full, because I think the examples mentioned are significant): 
 
My thesis on the contrary is that the bodily changes follow directly the PERCEPTION of the exciting 
fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion. Common sense says, we lose 
our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a 
rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of 
sequence is incorrect, that the one mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that 
the bodily manifestations must first be interposed between, and that the more rational 
statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we 
tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the 
case may be. Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be purely 
cognitive in form, pale, colourless, destitute of emotional warmth. We might then see the 
bear, and judge it best to run, receive the insult and deem it right to strike, but we could not 
actually feel afraid or angry. (James 1884, 189-90)  
 
Fear, anger and sadness are not states I think I would easily attribute to a computer, nor to an 
android like Data for that matter and the main reason for my thinking this is that these systems do 
not share our embodiment. Androids don’t cry (at least not as we do) or feel sad; they don’t have the 
bodily states for it. In the words of James, their perception is ‘purely cognitive in form’.  
 A final remark concerning the differentiation between phenomenally consciousness causal 
roles and nonphenomenal causal roles. I do not want to suggest that we are here dealing with an all-
or-nothing distinction. In my view phenomenal consciousness comes in many (biological) forms and 
                                                  
65 I am aware of the fact that intuitions concerning possible future cases vary greatly (surprisingly not only 
among philosophers). Even when it comes to the question whether or not non-human animals enjoy 
phenomenal experience we cannot reach agreement. When recently discussing this issue with Nicholas 
Humphrey he told me that he thinks that there are good reasons for thinking that fish do not feel pain and not 
only no ‘human’ pain. Personally I have no doubts that fish feel pain; my mirror neurons are firing like crazy 
when I see them struggling on the land.  
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gradations – also within individuals of the same species - some of which do not even lend themselves 
for the kind of demonstrative pointing I have outlined following Crane. Taking into account 
evolution’s slow pace a gradual view of consciousness also seems more realistic, for otherwise we 
would have to claim that somewhere in the course of selection of our species ‘the light’ switched on 
with full power. Go find a causal realizer for that!66  
 Of course, what has been said in this section is mainly table-thumping, but it does give us 
some initial cues on what we might expect a science of consciousness or intentional action to deliver. 
The functional identity thesis tells us a very general story about what consciousness might be and 
thus provides us with an explicit set of presuppositions that we can use to guide, and account for, 
our scientific investigations of consciousness and intentional action. On the other hand, it might also 
set some boundaries. For example, will we ever in fact find the causal realizers of the felt causal roles 
we are interested in? Will we ever even be able to individuate the phenomenal facts in such a way 
that the descriptions can be used to identify the realizers? The last question in particular might seem 
pressing, since in the foregoing demonstratives were supposed to be the kind of linguistic tool we use 
to ‘express’ phenomenal facts.  
At this point, we should not forget that we normally do not talk that much about 
phenomenal facts, on the contrary, most of the time we just talk about the world (consciousness is 
transparent), its colors and its smells, and take for granted that our fellow humans talk about the 
same world. When pressed we would bet that others mostly experience the world as we do and 
hence their phenomenal facts – would they be asked to ‘express’ them – are also similar (unless the 
other person is for example color blind or otherwise disabled). Our shared and relatively uniform 
interaction with the world provides the foothold we need to get our investigations going.  
Of course one could easily go sceptical on this one, after all, what guarantees that your 
phenomenal facts and my phenomenal facts are similar in similar situations? However, taking this 
approach would be tantamount to giving up on the possibility of a science of consciousness and does 
not mesh very well with the fact that we are already scientifically investigating consciousness. Also 
should one choose to embrace the functional identity thesis an answer readily presents itself, namely 
functional similarity. Color blindness seems to be a good case in point, since it is ultimately 
                                                  
66 In his book The Mind in the Cave David-Lewis Williams presents two spectra of possible states of 
consciousness: one that varies from alert to somnolent states and another that leads from alert states to 
hallucinatory states (see Williams 2002, 121-26). I do not think the spectra suggested by Williams are 
imperative, but they do bring about a feel for the wide variety of possible states of consciousness.  
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discovered through functional differences. A science of consciousness is possible, but it does require 
temporarily inhibiting some sceptical considerations one might have.  
 Nevertheless, in scientifically investigating conscious and intentional action it seems to me 
that, at least for now, we have no choice but to restrict ourselves to language-users and possibly later 
extrapolate what we have learned to other species that are nearby in terms of embodiment. We 
should, however, not expect too ever get to know what it is like to be a bat. Also within our own 
species the identification of causal realizers will probably progress in piecemeal and partial fashion 
and may never be completed. This is not to be regarded a bad thing, as long as we are doing good 
science, by which I mean science that knows what it is doing and why it asks the questions it does.  
 
7.7 Conclusion 
I have argued for the compatibility of (a version of) the functional identity thesis with the notion of 
phenomenal facts. In combination these provide a minimal theory on the nature of consciousness 
that allows for further scientific investigation of the phenomenon and it provides a suggestion as to 
what exactly we are doing in the science of consciousness.  
Importantly – and relatedly – the theory presented here lives up to the five desiderata posed 
in section 7.1. Contrary to interpretationist theories of consciousness, like for example Dennett’s 
(1991a), it allows that there is a fact of the matter as to what we experience in a rather 
straightforward way, namely by the postulation of phenomenal facts conceived of as a species of 
subjective facts. The theory also lives up to the desideratum of naturalism in that although it accepts 
phenomenal facts it does not imply either facta falling outside the natural realm or a rejection of 
monism (or even physicalism for that matter; more on this below). Also, given the identity-thesis of 
the functional identity thesis, which says that the truthmakers of phenomenal facts are certain 
information-bearing, behavior-controlling functions instantiated in biological entities the theory lives 
up to the third desideratum of avoiding epiphenomenalism. And finally, the theory lives up to the 
fifth desideratum in that it does not go beyond the facts that are, directly or indirectly, available to us. 
Given the truth of functional identity thesis, understanding consciousness does not require that we 
venture into a kind of metaphysics that is so much abstracted from the facts of our world that it 
seriously runs the risk of being meaningless. 
At this point I should refer back to section 4.6 where I made some comments on 
consciousness and its location in reaction to Velmans’ theory of projection. There I argued that 
closer scrutiny of the concept of projection showed that it does not in fact live up to our purported 
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ordinary thinking and talking about the locations of conscious experience. Rather, it seems to be the 
case that our language is neutral on where conscious experiences – if anywhere – are located. In the 
present chapter I have argued for a position that, if true, forces us to acknowledge that conscious 
experiencing is located somewhere, most probably in the brain.67 The counter-intuitiveness of 
assigning a location to phenomenal experience given the fact that our everyday language and thought 
are neutral on the topic is an important factor causing people’s intuition that there is an explanatory 
gap between biobehavioral facts and phenomenal facts. I can do nothing much to take away this 
intuition of gappiness, although I do hope that the notion of ‘what-it-is-to-be’ takes away some of 
the anxiety. What is left of the intuition will have to fade away under pressure of our ongoing 
empirical investigations.    
One final issue before we embark on some speculative metaphysics (of the right kind) in 
chapter 8. In section 7.1 I referred to the question of physicalism. One might rightly wonder whether 
if the theory provided in this chapter, while being compatible with certain forms of physicalism, is 
indeed supposed to be a form of physicalism. So, is the theory provided here a physicalist theory? It 
depends. If one means by physicalism that there are only objective facts, then the theory presented 
here is not a form of physicalism since it also involves subjective facts. If one just means by 
physicalism ‘no dualism’, but rather ‘monism’ then the theory presented here is physicalist, provided 
that one uses ‘physical’ as an umbrella-term for biobehavioral facts.  
 
                                                  
67 Which is in – or rather part of - a body, which in turn is in and co-evolved with a, partially, social 
environment (see also Thompson and Varela 2001). My point in adding this is that, although the view on 
phenomenal consciousness as presently stated might seem logically to allow for brains in vats I do not endorse 
even this logical possibility. Apart from considerations concerning the (a posteriori) necessary embodiment 
and embeddedness of (phenomenal) minds such as ours, I would also argue against the logical possibility of 
brains in vats by referring to necessary embeddedness in social/linguistic environments, which are a necessary 
requirement to for the specific phenomenology of our individual conscious lives. Phenomenal facts always 
come as understood in a certain way, where this understanding is not necessarily propositional. These brief 
remarks obviously do not suffice to cover this issue, but further elaboration will have to wait until another 
occasion. For the time being, promising approaches to this set of problems seem to me to be presented by 
Bermúdez (1998) and Noë (2002).  
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Chapter 8 
Dynamical systems theory as an approach to phenomenal consciousness68 
 
8.1 The generalization argument  
In the previous chapter I formulated a minimal theory on the nature of consciousness by merging 
Crane’s work on subjective facts with Clark’s functional identity thesis. The resulting set of 
suppositions, although very general, have methodological implications and as such can guide us in 
setting up our scientific investigations of consciousness. In the present chapter I shall present a 
possible way of further fleshing out the functional identity thesis by offering some speculations about 
the kind of processes possibly realizing conscious experience. This will result in a dynamical systems 
approach to phenomenal consciousness (DST/PC for short).  
My primary aim in this chapter is to illustrate what kind of metaphysical work needs to be 
done to really make one’s suppositions concerning the nature of consciousness explicit when opting 
for DST/PC. As we shall see, this kind of metaphysical work differs from the kind of metaphysics 
offered by for example Velmans (see chapter 4 and 5). Additionally, DST/PC provides us with a 
possible solution to the problem of phenomenal causation and more detailed methodological 
implications than are suggested by the general form of the functional identity thesis presented in 
chapter 7.  
 Properly formulating a general version of DST/PC (section 8.9) requires quite a lot of 
preliminary work that will take up section 8.1 to 8.8. My starting point will be Kim’s approach to the 
problem of mental causation and some of its problems. The next step is to formulate an alternative 
for Kim’s model of mental causation, which I shall eventually reject in order to build DST/PC on its 
remains. Since the road will be long I must ask the reader to bear with me.  
Before giving an outline of this chapter let me first position dynamical systems theory as an 
approach to mental causation (DST/MC) in relation to Kim’s views on mental causation which we 
already encountered in section 3.4. Doing this is important, because although DST/MC can plausibly 
be interpreted as providing an alternative for Kim’s account of mental causation, clarifying in what 
sense it is indeed an alternative is a rather complex matter, mainly having to do with discussions 
concerning Kim’s notion of realization. In short, I argue that DST/MC involves a notion of 
                                                  
68 Large parts of this chapter, albeit in a rather different form, have been accepted for publication in The Journal 
for General Philosophy of Science (Van de Laar 2007a, forthcoming). 
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realization that is not Kim’s notion of realization and that can be used to evade certain problems that 
have been associated with Kim’s solution to the problem of mental causation. The problem I am 
thinking of is the generalization problem. 
 Kim’s solution to the problem of mental causation is to reduce the mental to the physical by 
means of functional reduction. The idea is that this approach will provide us with species- or maybe 
even individual-specific type-identities between mental states and physical states. The point of the 
generalization argument is that although there seems to be a problem of mental causation when we 
are confronted with the argument of causal exclusion, the latter – if true – should be taken to 
generalize to examples of higher-level causation other than mental causation. If Kim would accept 
this, it would imply that he is to defend the view that tectonic plates, nor physiological processes or 
molecules, in fact none of the entities and properties characterized by the special sciences refer to 
properties that are causally efficacious. It seems that accepting Kim’s view implies accepting that all 
the higher-level causal powers drain away to the microproperties postulated by physics (Block 2003). 
According to Kim’s critics this counterintuitive consequence of Kim’s position shows that there is 
something wrong with the causal exclusion argument. After all, although we might be tempted to 
doubt the possibility of mental causation we will not easily question the reality of the causal powers 
of tectonic plates or canon balls.  
Kim recognizes the problem and proposes a way out. He describes the relation between the 
mental and the physical as a relation between second-order properties (for example the instantiation 
of mental state M at time t) and first-order properties (for example the instantiation of physical state 
P at time t) where ‘orders’ are supposed to be contrasted with ‘levels’ in that the former is used to 
relate properties that are at the same level and of the same individual (in the case of mental states that 
individual could for example be you or me). A second-order property is the property of having a 
particular (first-order) property. It is in the latter sense that Kim claims that mental (second-order) 
properties are realized by physical (first-order) properties, thus saving mental causation. Talk of 
levels, on the other hand, is appropriately associated with for example the relation between the 
property of being water and the property of consisting of H2O molecules, which, in Kim’s book, is 
not a relation of realization and does track an interlevel hierarchy from macro- to microproperties. 
According to Kim being water is a micro-based macroproperty, where micro-based macroproperties 
are defined as follows: 
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P is a micro-based property just in case P is the property of being completely decomposable into 
nonoverlapping proper parts, a1, a2, ... , an, such that P1(a1), P2(a2), ... , Pn(an), and R(a1, ..., an). 
(Kim 2005, 84)  
 
The idea is that although the macroproperties postulated by the special sciences are micro-based 
properties they do have their own causal powers in the sense that those powers are not had by the 
properties of the micro-constituents in questions (see Kim 2005, 85). For example: 
 
Being a water molecule [...] is the property of having two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen 
atom in a such-and-such bonding relationship [R(a1, ..., an), TvdL]. A micro-based property 
therefore is constituted by micro-constituents – that is, by the micro-parts of the object that 
has it and the properties and relations characterizing these parts. But we should be clear that 
such properties are macroproperties, not microproperties. (Kim 2005, 84)69  
 
This proposal strictly demarcates mental-physical cases from micro-macro cases in such a way that 
we can have both mental causation (by functional reduction) and higher-level properties with causal 
powers. But is it convincing? 
According to the philosopher Carl Gillett there is something wrong with Kim’s notion of 
realization, which he dubs ‘flat realization’ to contrast it with his own notion of realization, which he 
calls ‘dimensioned realization’.70 I discuss Gillett’s model in detail in section 8.8, but for now it is only 
important to know that Gillett’s notion of dimensioned realization evades the generalization 
problem, while simultaneously resisting another unwanted implication of Kim’s model. The 
implication alluded to is that given the fact that Kim reserves his notion of (flat) realization for the 
mental-physical cases, he is forced to accept that all the micro-based macroproperties of the macro-
micro case involve unrealized powers. Within Kim’s model these unrealized powers, had by higher-
level properties, are not to be reduced to the powers of their micro-constituents, on pain of causal 
drainage, but this makes them fundamental powers, danglers outside the web of microphysical 
                                                  
69 The ‘trick’ being pulled here is that Kim uses a notion of levels that is tied to objects (see also Block 2003 
141). 
70 For other critical comments on Kim’s answer to the generalization argument see for example Noordhof 
(1999) and Bontly (2002). 
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properties and powers (Gillett, unpublished manuscript). According to Gillett, if we want to escape 
this conclusion we should accept his alternative notion of dimensioned realization. 
In my view Gillett makes an important point here that is not only helpful in thinking about 
the problem of mental causation as posed by Kim, but also when thinking about how properties 
postulated by the special science in general relate to each other and their realizers at the microlevel 
described by physics. In my view Gillett’s dimensioned model of realization nicely matches up with 
the metaphysical needs of DST/MC and the combination of the two provides an alternative for, or 
at least a supplement to, Kim’s model. However, the resulting model can also be used to speculate 
about the kind of processes realizing conscious experience. I’ll get back to this in section 8.9, let’s 
first take a closer look at DST/MC. 
 
8.2 Dynamical systems theory and mental causation 
Recently several authors71 offered a DST approach to mental causation that can be taken as an 
alternative for models of mental causation in the line of Kim (for example 1998, 2005). To 
recapitulate, Kim characterized the relation between the mental and the physical in terms of 
supervenience and realization. Supervenience here means that once the physical facts (brain-facts) are 
in place the mental facts (for example intentions) are also fixed. In other words: once the physical 
facts are in place there is no room for the mental facts to vary. In order to comply with the principle 
of causal closure Kim adds to this supervenience thesis that the mental is nothing over and above the 
physical; the physical realizes the mental. He reduces the mental to the physical, thereby placing 
intentions back in the unfolding of the physical chain of events. For many this is not a satisfying 
account of mental causation, since it seems to rob intentions of their causal efficacy by attributing the 
real causal work exclusively to the physical micro-realizers (Block 2003) or, alternatively, leaves us 
with a host of higher-level fundamental powers dangling outside the web of microphysical properties 
and powers (Gillett, unpublished manuscript).  
Some advocates of the dynamical approach to cognition provide a model of mental causation 
that might initially seem more attractive. They claim that some dynamical systems exhibit a form of 
global to local determination or downward causation in that the large-scale, global activity of the 
system governs or constrains local interactions. This form of downward causation is the key to the 
                                                  
71 For example J.A.S. Kelso (1995), A. Juarrero (1999), W. Freeman (1999), and F. Varela and E. Thompson 
(2001).  
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DST/MC. The thesis, roughly, is that the (chaotic) activity of the thousands of neurons that make up 
the complex dynamical system that is the brain, all the time and in many ways, turn into global, large-
scale pattern-formation that is associated with mental activity, such as having intentions. It is the 
relation between the neural activity at the micro-level and the overall macro-activity that can allegedly 
be described using DST.   
In what follows I want to evaluate DST/MC and offer some speculations about the possible 
form of realizers of consciousness that can be drawn from the DST/MC discussion. My strategy is 
the following. In section 8.3 I first give a brief presentation of the aspects of DST that are relevant 
for understanding DST/MC. In section 8.4 I will look at a first application of DST modeling, namely 
the Lotka-Volterra model. In section 8.5 I take a look at how DST can be used to describe 
convection patterns in liquids, a phenomenon also known as ‘Rayleigh-Bénard instability’. The latter 
will bring out the intuitions underlying the dynamicist notion of downward causation that is also 
applied in DST/MC. Section 8.6 is an attempt to interpret the DST account of convection patterns, 
which will pose problems regarding the nature of the allegedly downward causal relations involved. 
These problems will also turn up when one attempts to interpret the DST account of mental 
causation as will be discussed in section 8.8.  
By then it will have become clear that DST/MC lacks a clear metaphysical embedding, which 
I consider to be the source of the interpretational problems concerning the notion of downward 
causation discussed in section 8.6 and 8.7. Given the general and formal nature of DST models they 
are, to a high measure, neutral towards the causal relations involved in the real-world phenomena 
being modeled. Nonetheless, the DST/MC cannot do without a clear metaphysics, since what we are 
interested in here are precisely the causal relations involved. My claim is that we need to fill in the 
blanks left by the dynamical models.  
In section 8.8 I discuss the metaphysical framework provided by Carl Gillett (2002a/b/c) in 
order to get a better grip on the metaphysics of DST/MC. This will enable me to clarify the notion 
of downward causation invoked by some DST apologists. The main claim defended here is that 
because the informal terminology associated with DST is often tendentious and imprecise we should 
be very careful in our interpretations of DST analyses, especially when causal relations are involved 
as is the case with the problem of mental causation.  
 Finally, in section 8.9 I shall distill some speculations concerning the possible form of the 
realizers of consciousness from DST/MC. These speculations allow for a more detailed solution to 
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the problem of phenomenal causation, given the functional identity thesis as developed in the 
previous chapter. 
 
8.3 A brief presentation of DST 
So what exactly is a dynamical system? According to Clayton (1997, 1) ‘[a] dynamical system is a set 
of functions (rules, equations) that specify how variables change over time.’ Importantly this points 
to the fact that a dynamical system is first of all a mathematical entity. Now, what about dynamical 
systems theory? Chris Eliasmith’s Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind tells us that DST is:  
 
[a]n area of mathematics used to describe the behavior of complex systems by employing 
differential and difference equations. Recently this approach has been advanced by some as 
the best way to describe human cognition.72 
 
I would first like to draw attention to the distinction between mathematical dynamical 
systems and natural dynamical systems that is implicitly introduced in the above lemma. Applying 
DST to cognition introduces non-mathematical dynamical systems. It proposes to call real-world 
phenomena ‘dynamic systems’ when they can be described in the language of DST. I emphasize this 
distinction, because although the development of DST is probably best understood as two-sided – 
the mathematics developed in dialogue with the real-world phenomena – in what follows I will take a 
look at the extent in which DST successfully describes real-world phenomena. The distinction is 
made explicit in Van Gelder’s Dynamicist Hypothesis as applied to cognition: ‘[n]atural cognitive 
systems are certain kinds of dynamical systems, and are best understood from the perspective of 
dynamics.’ (Port and Van Gelder 1995, 4)  
 The best way to introduce DST is by looking at concrete examples of dynamical systems. So 
in the following I discuss the Logistic Map in order to characterize some central features of 
dynamical systems. As pointed out earlier a dynamical system is first of all a function or a set of 
functions. In case of the Logistic Map we are dealing with the following entity: xt+1 = Axt (1-xt). 
Specifying the initial conditions, for example x1=0.5 en A=3, and inserting the outcome (xt+1) in the  
next round (iterating the function) will produce a certain time series (trajectory) that can be made 
graphic as a curve in a diagram.73  
                                                  
72 See http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/dynamicsystems.html.  
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Obviously, given initial conditions, the course of the time series is deterministic, every step in 
the series necessarily follows from the preceding step. The interesting thing is that, depending on 
these initial conditions, the Logistic Map shows radically different kinds of behavior. For example, 
when choosing 0<A<1, solutions will soon approach 0. When 1<A<2 solutions will stabilize on a 
single value (a one-point attractor74), which is also what happens when 2<A<3, however, in the latter 
case the solutions will first oscillate around that value for some time. When A>3 we encounter our 
first bifurcation (or period doubling): solutions will oscillate between two values forever (a two-point 
attractor). As if this isn’t enough, from approximately A=3.57 the Logistic Map displays what in DST 
is called ‘chaotic behavior’ (an N-point attractor), which is behavior that has a very large number of 
attractors and is extremely sensitive to initial conditions.75 The latter means that a very small change 
in x1 can lead to dramatic differences in the chaotic time series. To put sugar on top: in between the 
periods of chaotic behavior there are short periods of non-chaotic behavior (see the vertical white 
streaks in figure 5). The succession of bifurcations as a result of the varying of A can be visually 
summarized by a Bifurcation diagram. 
Through the Logistic Map we encounter some important properties of dynamical systems. 
Firstly, dynamical systems display complex (nonlinear) behavior. Secondly, dynamical systems develop 
through time in a deterministic manner. And lastly, dynamical systems often display periods of chaos. Let 
me stress the fact that ‘chaos’ is a technical term here, it signifies a N-point attractor and extreme 
sensitivity to initial conditions. It does not imply indeterminism or chance; once the initial conditions 
are set the time series follows necessarily. Having a rough idea about what a dynamical system is we 
are now ready to look at a concrete example of how DST can be applied. 
                                                                                                                                                               
73 For example: x1 = 3 × 0.5 × 0.5 = 0.75 → x2 = 3 × 0.75 × 0.25 = 0.5625 → x3 = 3 × 0.5625 × 0.4375 = 
0.7383 → x4 = 3 × 0.7383 × 0.2617 = 0.5796 → x5 = 3 × 0.5796 × 0.4204 = 0.7310 etc. 
74 An attractor is the status a dynamic system eventually ‘settles down to’. 
75 For more illustrations I refer to Clayton (1997, 3-8). 
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Figure 5: Bifurcation diagram (the horizontal axis plots the values of A while the vertical axis plots the 
asymptotic values of xt) 
 
8.4 The neutrality of DST: the Lotka-Volterra model 
The Lotka-Volterra model is a very simple model of predator/prey interactions and is not very 
realistic, since it does not even take into account factors like competition among predators and prey 
or even saturation of the predators. There are ways to modify the model and make it more realistic, 
but we do not need to go into such detail here. My aim in discussing a dynamical characterization of 
the interactions in a predator/prey population is to illustrate the neutrality of the DST language by 
means of an analysis of the causal interactions we discern in connection with the Lotka-Volterra 
model and how they differ from for example the causal interactions we are going to discuss in 
connection with different interpretations of the DST analysis of Rayleigh-Bénard instability (see 
section 8.5).  
The Lotka-Volterra model consists of two coupled differential equations that can be 
expressed using the following notation: 
 
dH/dt = rH – aHP 
dP/dt = bHP – mHP 
 
The model has two variables (P and H) and several parameters: H = density of prey, P = density of 
predators, r = intrinsic rate of prey population increase, a = predation rate coefficient, b = 
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reproduction rate of predators per 1 prey eaten, m = predator mortality rate. If we specify the 
parameters for a certain context and attributing values to P and H (initial conditions) we can watch 
the system unfold over time (t). This will result in the kind of trajectories (1 to 4) as depicted in  
figure 6. 
The figure illustrates the general dynamics of the interaction between predators and prey 
given an ecosystem that is defined by the parameters exemplified above. When we start with a low 
density of predators relative to the density of prey, the latter will increase since much prey will 
survive and get a chance to breed. The increasing density of prey also provides more food for the 
predators, which, as a consequence, will increase in number. This increase in the number of 
predators creates a hazardous environment for the prey, who, at some point, will be harassed so 
often that they do not get a chance to breed and hence will decrease their number. In turn, the 
decrease in the density of the prey will ultimately result in a shortage of food for predators, which 
will cause starvation in the predator population. Now we have come round full circle and we are 
back at the point where there is a low density of predators relative to the density of prey. This ‘circle’ 
will repeat itself unless a parameter changes or extra predators/prey are added to the population or, 
conversely, taken out of the system. 
Now what kinds of causal relations can we discern in the dynamics of the predator/prey population? 
Obviously, this is a beautiful example of reciprocal causation: given certain background conditions 
the amount of predators determines the amount of prey and the other way around. Is there anything 
more we can we say about the nature of these alleged causal relations between the two species?  
 A distinction between ‘passive’ and ‘active’ might be relevant here, because it brings to the 
fore certain asymmetries between the ways in which predator and prey determine each others’ 
numbers. The predators mainly influence the number of prey by eating them; the more prey becomes 
dinner, the less prey there will be left. The eating of prey involves predators that actively intervene in 
the lifes of other (prey) animals in a causal manner. On the other hand, the fact that the density of 
prey decreases eventually leads to starvation of the predators. In this way, given the Lotka-Volterra 
model the number of prey determines the number of predators, but the prey plays an exclusively 
passive role in this process. Not many people would be inclined to label the latter form of 
determination ‘causal’.  
A similar story can be told for two other factors involved in the dynamics under scrutiny. The 
fact that the number of predators increases, passively determines the number of prey; the density of 
prey will increase as a result of the predators’ starvation. This time the predators play the passive role 
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Figure 6: Possible Lotka-Volterra trajectories (taken from Clayton 1997, 15) 
 
devoid of causality76, while the prey has an active role that surely involves causality in that they breed 
and in this way provide new food-supplies for the predators.  
 Is there any downward causation going on in this dynamic system? To me this does not seem 
to be the case. Even if one does not accept the distinction between active and passive it is entirely 
clear that the Lotka-Volterra model and the real-world causal relations it describes are completely 
transparent. It will not take people much time to agree on what is (causally) going on between the 
predators and the prey and how this results in the dynamics encapsulated in the Lotka-Volterra 
model. I do not think any form of downward causation will be part of this agreement.        
As will become clear in the next section, the kinds of causal relations involved in interacting 
predator/prey populations are different form causal goings-on in pattern forming liquids - conceived 
as a dynamical system - which in turn differ from for example those in laser beams, which can also 
be analysed by means of DST models. The point is that what exactly these causal relations are does 
not follow directly from the DST formalism. This is a crucial insight when DST is applied in a theory 
of mental causation, because in that case the nature of the causal relations is precisely what we are 
interested in.  
 
 
                                                  
76 Unless of course one chooses to characterize ‘starving’ and ‘dying’ as active. 
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8.5 Rayleigh-Bénard instability 
Now we will take a look at an example of the Rayleigh-Bénard instability as discussed by S. Kelso 
(1995, 6-9), because this phenomenon lends itself very well for introducing the intuitions underlying 
the dynamicist notion of downward causation. 
 Take some cooking oil, put it in a pan and heat it from below. The oil consists of molecules 
among which the heat is dissipated as random micro-motion. In the open system we have now 
created the temperature gradient drives the motion and as it reaches a certain threshold an instability 
will occur as suddenly convection rolls will emerge in the fluid (see figure 7). In Kelso’s words: 
 
The liquid begins to move as a coordinated whole, no longer randomly, but in an orderly 
rolling motion [a dynamic pattern]. The reason for the onset of this motion is that the cooler 
liquid at the top of the oil layer is more dense and tends to fall, whereas the warmer, less 
dense oil tends to rise […] resulting [in] a collective […] effect, which arises without any 
external instructions [i.e. is self-organizing]. (Kelso 1995, 7) 
 
In DST the temperature gradient in this system is called a control parameter. Kelso labels the amplitude 
of the convection rolls the order parameter, which describes the overall ordered, coordinated pattern 
that sucks in all molecules making up the oil. The concept of an order parameter reflects the slaving 
principle of synergetics77: 
 
[F]rom random initial conditions a specific form of motion is favored. It is this coherent 
pattern that can be described by the order parameter, and it is the order parameter dynamics 
that characterizes how patterns form and evolve in time. (Kelso 1995, 8) 
 
In other words, according to some authors the macro-movements of the convection rolls ‘enslave’  
                                                  
77 The physicist Hermann Haken (1978) has suggested the label of synergetics for the field that studies the 
collective patterns emerging from many interacting components, as they are found in chemical reactions, 
crystal formations or lasers. A more general definition is to be found on the web pages of Synergetics on the Web 
(http://www.grunch.net/synergetics/): ‘The integration of geometry and philosophy in a single conceptual 
system providing a common language and accounting for both the physical and metaphysical.’ 
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Figure 7: Model of Rayleigh-Bénard convection rolls 
 
the micro-movements of the individual molecules that make up the oil. The relation between the 
macro-movements and the micro-movements is often described as a relation of circular causality. 
This notion makes explicit the idea that on the one hand the individual molecules create the pattern 
(the Bénard cells) described by the order parameter, while on the other hand the macro-pattern 
downwardly governs or constrains the behavior of these molecules. Circular causality is often taken 
to be a typical feature of many self-organizing systems.  
The fact that some authors display enthusiasm as to the idea of downward causation in 
connection with the DST approach in my view is partly connected with, and is reinforced by, the 
tendentious language that is often applied in describing real-world phenomena as dynamical systems. 
Terms like ‘constraining’, ‘governing’, ‘enslaving’ and even ‘self-organization’ as applied to higher-
order levels or systems as wholes easily suggest - and sometimes probably are even inserted to imply 
- a downward influence of the higher-levels on the micro-level constituents.  
The terms just mentioned are also easily interpreted as implying a certain form of active 
involvement on the part of the higher-levels or the systems as a whole. Especially the latter 
interpretational dimension makes it very tempting to apply DST to mental causation for it seems to 
offer an attractive alternative to accounts of mental causation in the line of Kim. This makes it all the 
more crucial that DST applications come with a clear metaphysics. 
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8.6 Analysis of Rayleigh-Bénard instability 
In section 8.5 I introduced a dynamicist’s take on convection patterns. The key concept in this story 
is circular causality. It is difficult to get a good grip on the idea of circular causation, but since 
DST/MC hinges heavily on this notion I will try to analyze it below. Let’s take a closer look at what 
exactly is going on in the phenomenon of Rayleigh-Bénard instability. 
 
8.6.1 Interlevel determination 
Firstly, the dynamicist’s account of convection rolls assumes some kind of layered worldview. The 
levels here are the micro-level of individual molecules and the macro-level of convection patterns. 
The levels express part-whole relations that are conceived of as levels of organization; the individual 
molecules realize the Bénard cells. Talk of circular causality combined with levels invites exemplifying 
the former notion in terms of upward and downward causation, which is indeed what often happens 
(for example Thompson and Varela, 2001). The notion of downward causation has always provoked 
considerable debate in philosophy and since it is this notion that the dynamicist needs most in order 
to give a satisfying account of mental causation we need to be very careful in our application of it.  
In the context of Rayleigh-Bénard instability it is not immediately clear what meaning is to be 
attributed to ‘upward’ and ‘downward’. Given our current definition of levels ‘upward’ and 
‘downward’ cannot be taken literally. There is no real vertical or diagonal relation between parts and 
wholes. Also, to most people, the idea of vertical causation (upward or downward) in general seems 
counterintuitive. All causation seems to be horizontal. So, ‘upward’ and ‘downward’ in the context of 
convection patterns must be interpreted metaphorically. This was also the view of for example Mario 
Bunge as he expressed it in 1979: 
 
[Wholes cannot act on their parts since a level of organization] is not a thing, but a set and 
therefore a concept […] levels cannot act on one another. In particular the higher levels 
cannot command or even obey the lower ones. All talk of interlevel action is elliptical or 
metaphorical, not literal. (Bunge 1979, 13-14) 
 
Although probably everyone agrees that we should not take ‘upward’ and ‘downward’ literally here, 
not everybody agrees with Bunge’s claim that there cannot be any real downward determination. 
According to Alicia Juarrero: 
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Complex adaptive systems have proven Bunge wrong: their interlevel relationships, however 
tangled, are real, not just epistemological. The emergence of relatively autonomous levels of 
organization carries with it the emergence of relatively autonomous qualities; quantitative 
changes produce qualitative changes (Bohm, 1971). Once a transition point is passed, new 
modes of being emerge, in particular new modes of causality. (Juarrero 1999, 129) 
 
In complex systems such as Bénard cells there indeed seems to be some kind of upward and 
downward influence. The point is that this influence should not be taken in terms of efficient 
causation. However, this is the only notion of causation that is currently being accepted by most 
philosophers and scientists. Some dynamicists think this ought to change. In fact, Juarrero’s (1999) 
book is to be read as a plea for the widening of our ideas about causation: 
 
It is true, of course, that wholes do not act on their components forcefully; but neither are 
wholes other than or external to the components that make them up. And to claim that they 
do not causally affect their components at all begs the question by assuming that all cause 
must be billiard ball-like to be causally efficacious at all. (Juarrero 1999, 129)  
 
In her book Juarrero illustrates that starting from the four causes of Aristotle and going to the 
present via Descartes and Newton we find that our ideas about causation have been narrowed down 
to efficient causation, which is indeed the common sense notion of the day. Some defenders of the 
DST approach of mental causation argue that phenomena like convection patterns force us to relax 
our curtailed ideas about causation and push us into the direction of what might be called a causal 
pluralism. The fact that the causal notions applied by dynamicists do not comply with our common 
sense notion of causation (which I take to be efficient causation) partly explains why it is so difficult 
to get a grip on the concept of circular causality.  
 
8.6.2 Formal causation 
Let’s recapitulate the dynamicist’s account of the causal relations involved in the Rayleigh-Bénard 
phenomenon. The story starts with the individual behavior of a great number of molecules. At some 
point, when a certain temperature has been reached, the individual molecules suddenly start behaving 
in concert, thereby establishing an emergent system that we perceive as convection patterns. The 
relation of the individual molecules’ behavior to the emergent organization can be described as 
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bottom-up ‘enabling constraints’; the individual molecules make the macro-pattern possible. At this 
point the individual molecules’ degrees of freedom are significantly lowered, since the molecules are 
now part of a system, which as a whole, has its own properties, possibilities and potentials. In other 
words, the emergent level is qualitatively different from the lower ones. The influence of the 
emergent level of organization (the convection patterns) on the individual molecules can be 
understood as top-down selective constraints: 
 
By making its components interdependent, thereby constraining their behavioral variability, 
the system preserves and enhances its cohesion and integrity, its organization and identity. As 
a whole it also prunes inefficient components. [Top-down selective constraints, TvdL] […] 
are thus in the service of the whole. They are, also therefore, the ongoing, structuring 
mechanism whereby Aristotle’s formal and final causes are implemented. (Juarrero 1999, 143) 
 
Juarrero characterizes the downward constraints of the whole on its parts as ‘formal 
causation’; it is what makes the phenomenon being described the kind of phenomenon it is and no 
other. It is that which grants it relative autonomy from its environment. So what about the concept 
of formal causation? Is it entirely clear what it means? The following quote might be clarifying: 
 
The higher-level’s organization is the change in probability of the lower-level events. Top-
down causes cause by changing the prior probability of the component’s behavior […]. 
(Juarrero 1999, 146) 
 
Apparently, Juarrero is not thinking about a ‘push-pull-transference-of-energy-kind-of-causation’ 
(also known as efficient causation) between levels. The top-down formal causing of the whole 
consists in changing the prior probability of the constituent’s behavior. For example, once molecules 
realizing a certain fluid substance such as oil are placed in certain circumstances such as ‘in a pan’ and 
‘heated from below’ they will engage in certain coordinated behavior. The systematic behavior of the 
constituents phenomenologically manifests itself as convection patterns. Once the molecules are 
entrained by the overall dynamics of the pattern their behavior’s degrees of freedom are reduced 
relative to a situation in which the individual molecules are ‘free-floating’. In other words, the fact 
that a molecule is captured in a certain pattern of coordinated behavior changes the prior probability 
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distribution of its behavioral options into another – conditional – probability distribution of 
behavior.  
 The question that pops up is whether this characterization of top-down formal causation is 
really required to explain the relation between the levels in case of convection patterns. Do we really 
want to use terminology that postulates a causal interaction between levels, while in fact the causality 
comes down to a change in probability distribution of behavior of components? More importantly: 
are we forced to do this in order to explain phenomena like convection patterns? I will return to this 
matter in section 8.8. First I will introduce the DST approach to mental causation.  
 
8.7 Intentional dynamics: rhythm and chaos 
What have convection rolls got to do with mental causation? The relation is to be found in the tool 
used to describe the two phenomena, namely DST. I’ll use an experiment conducted by Kelso et al 
(1981, 1995) as a stepping stone for introducing the DST approach to intentional action. I will first 
just present the experiment and than make some critical remarks.  
In the experiment subjects were asked to move their index fingers in synchrony (in-phase) or 
syncopation (anti-phase) with the accelerating beat78 of a metronome (control parameter). Position of 
the fingers and activity in the relevant muscles was measured. As appears from the experiments there 
is a certain frequency of movement (the critical period) around which subjects spontaneously switch 
(transition phase) from anti-phase movement to in-phase movement (point attractors). Interestingly, 
this switching does not take place when subjects start the trial with in-phase movement (the system is 
dissipative). Given this Kelso suggests that the anti-phase pattern is inherently less stable than the in-
phase pattern implying that it should be easier to switch from the former to the latter than from the 
latter to the former, since the coordination dynamics under scrutiny already has an intrinsic tendency 
for one of the two stable patterns. This intuition was empirically confirmed by some experiments by 
Kelso et al (1988, 1995) and Scholz and Kelso (1990):  
 
[A]ll subjects were able to intentionally maintain the anti-phase pattern, as well as 
intentionally switch from the in-phase to the anti-phase pattern even at frequencies well 
                                                  
78 The oscillation frequency was increased every few seconds from 1,25 Hz to 3,50 Hz in small steps. 
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beyond each subject’s spontaneous transition frequency. Thus, the system is able to 
intentionally sustain a pattern that is intrinsically unstable. (Kelso 1995, 150)  
 
As appears from the citation Kelso interprets these results as implying that intentions in some way 
parameterize the coordination dynamics of the system. Evidence for this hypothesis can also be 
found in research with epileptics who sometimes seem to be able to intentionally affect certain 
electrical conditions that would normally lead to a seizure (see for example Le Van Quen et al 1997, 
Schmid-Schonbein 1998) or intentional perceptual reversals of ambiguous figures (Kelso 1995).  
 But how does this work? How can intentions exercise influence? We find a hint in the 
following citation: 
 
The key point [...] is that once the relevant pattern variables and their dynamics are identified, 
it is possible to talk rigorously about what it is that is changed (or indeed is changeable) by 
specific parametric influences such as an intention. Such specific information is expressed in 
terms of the same order parameters or collective variables that characterize observed 
spontaneous coordination tendencies. Intentions, in other words, are written in the words of 
the very order parameters that characterize the coordination activity of the nervous system. 
(Kelso 1995, 146) 
 
The thesis is that the (chaotic) activity of the thousands of neurons that make up the complex 
dynamical system that is the brain often results in global, large-scale pattern-formation that is 
associated with certain kinds of mental activity. It is the relation between the neural activity at the 
micro-level and the overall macro-activity that can be described using DST. The global activity, again, 
would ideally be described by an order parameter and is the result of local to global determination or 
‘upward causation’. However, there allegedly also is some form of global to local determination or 
‘downward causation’ in that large-scale, global activity of the system governs or constrains local 
interactions (Varela and Thompson 2001, 418). And again, it is the exact nature of the downward 
component of the circular causality relation between micro- and macro-level that I am interested in, 
since it is supposed to play a central role in mental causation.  
 Are there indeed such large-scale, global patterns of synchronization to be found in the 
‘behavior’ of the brain? Kelso and Fuchs (1995) provide us with some data. They recorded brain 
activity over the left side of the brain using an array of thirty-seven superconducting quantum 
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interference devices (SQUIDs). They found that the recorded neural activity could be mapped onto 
the behavioral changes (anti-phase to in-phase) and modeled their data using a three-dimensional 
system typical of the Šil’nikov class of chaotic forms. The lesson to be learned here, according to 
Kelso and Fuchs, is that the brain is an intrinsically chaotic system that also exhibits (relatively) low-
dimensional dynamical behavior:  
 
If the brain is intrinsically chaotic, possessing, by definition, an infinite number of unstable 
periodic orbits, it has the capacity to match an equally unpredictable environment. Being 
chaotic at rest allows the brain to access into any of these unstable orbits to satisfy functional 
requirements. Thus, when a cognitive, emotional or environmental demand is made on the 
organism, an appropriate orbit or sequence of orbits is selected and then stabilized through a 
kind of chaotic synchronization mechanism. (Kelso 1995, 284) 
 
 What is being claimed is that the brain is a dynamical system of interconnected neurons that 
exemplifies certain behavior which is the mind. The dynamical higher-order patterns – some of 
which are to be associated with (conscious) mental activity – constrain the behavior of their lower- 
level constituents (neurons). Now, where exactly do intentions fit in? Firstly, as Kelso points out, 
when we have a satisfying dynamical model of a certain behavioral pattern of the brain we have a 
clearer idea of what it is that is changing and what can be changed, since we have decided on what 
are the variables and parameters constituting and governing the system. In the case of the rhythm 
experiment that I discussed above this means we gain a clearer understanding of what can and 
cannot be intended: 
 
[I]ntentions should be constrained by properties of existing coordination tendencies or 
patterns, in particular, their relative stability. For example, I may want to produce an 
antiphase pattern of coordination between my hands, say at ten cycles per second, but the 
unstable nature of that pattern at that rate limits my intention. (Kelso 1995, 146)  
 
Thus, the way the system is configured puts constrains on what can be intended.  
Furthermore, Kelso adds, intentions are written in the words of the very order parameters 
that characterize the coordination activity of the nervous system. Although at first sight this might 
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appear to be a rather cryptic claim I think it should be taken quite literally: intentions are supposed to 
be one of the parametric influences governing the system. In the ideal case of an intentional action 
the intentional influence would be modeled by the current order parameter79 being the parameter 
that is dominant with regard to the trajectory of the system at that time. Of course Kelso did not 
present us with a model in which such a parameter that is associated with intentional influence 
appears, however this indeed seems to be what we are supposed to be looking for in future research.  
One of the main differences between traditional theories of mental causation (Kim’s model) 
and the DST approach to mental causation is that the traditional accounts characterize intentions as 
triggering causes while in the dynamicist account intentions figure as controlling, constraining factors 
that act spread out over time. In this model an intention is one of the parameters influencing (brain) 
behavior and if it plays the role of order parameter it dominantly determines the course of the 
trajectory through the state space of the neural dynamics of the brain leading to the intended 
behavior. The intention is a higher-order neural pattern that downwardly constrains the behavior of 
its constituents (the neurons).  
As we saw Juarrero characterizes the downward component of circular causation as formal 
causation and argues that this form of causation aptly describes the processes relevant for mental 
causation. This dynamicist theory of intentional action is attractive, because although on the one 
hand the intention is determined (bottom-up) by micro-neural activity in the brain it also has a 
determining influence of its own, namely in the form of (top-down) constraining of the micro-neural 
activity. At first sight, this seems to save intentions from an epiphenomenal status and provides us 
with a more satisfying notion of mental causation than the one encountered in Kim’s model in which 
mental properties run the risk of coming out as epiphenomena as a result of the generalization of the 
causal exclusion reasoning.  
This is the rough picture of the DST model of mental causation, and it is a rough picture 
indeed. The general reasoning departs from certain natural phenomena – like convection patterns – 
that can be modeled DST. Then – via the Dynamical Hypothesis (see section 8.3) – we get to an 
intuitive description of what might be going on in our brains when we act intentionally. The resulting 
                                                  
79 To counter the critique that given the complexity of the human brain it is very hard to imagine that an 
intention can be coupled with a single parameter a dynamicist might invoke so-called ‘lumped parameters’ that 
represent several real-world variables by only one lumped model variable (see Eliasmith 1995, 62). It is very 
doubtful whether this lumped-parameter-strategy will really work out in practice, given the seemingly endless 
set of variables relevant in brain processes.   
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qualitative dynamical account cries out for more quantitative data as to what is really going on in our 
brains, but the data is scarce. My main interest here is to make sense of the theoretical picture of 
mental causation provided by dynamicists such as Juarrero, Freeman and Kelso, and to scrutinize its 
consistency. In order to do that we need to do metaphysics. 
 
8.8 Adding metaphysics  
The main problem with the DST approach to mental causation is that it lacks a clear metaphysical 
embedding, which makes it very hard to get a firm grip on notions such as ‘circular causation’ and 
especially the downward aspect of this alleged phenomenon, described by Juarrero as ‘formal 
causation’. My claim is that given its general and formal nature the DST models are neutral towards 
possible causal relations involved in the real-world phenomena being modeled. Nevertheless, 
explaining mental causation precisely demands that we say something about the causal relations 
involved. Therefore, in the next sections I will discuss Carl Gillett’s metaphysical framework, which 
seems to provide the kind of metaphysics defenders of the DST approach to mental causation 
presuppose.  
 
8.8.1 Dimensioned realization  
Claiming that we need the notion of circular causality, which contains the idea of downward 
causation as specified in section 8.6 and 8.7, in order to understand certain phenomena like 
convection patterns and mental causation, suggests that we cannot explain these phenomena bottom-
up in principle. It suggests that given all there is to know about the lower-level properties and laws 
we can still not explain (all) the higher-level phenomena. Furthermore, this is not so because we are 
cognitively closed to explanations of the phenomena under scrutiny, but because we need to enrich 
our metaphysics. This enriched metaphysics adds realized individuals, properties and powers to the 
microlevel realizers and their powers. This is indeed what dynamicists claim, see for example: 
 
Because the rules the [self-organizing] network follows describe dynamic and stochastic 
interactions, they capture relational properties that, pace, followers of Newton, cannot be 
reduced to microlevel descriptions of primary qualities. (Juarrero 1999, 125)  
 
Returning to the convection patterns this implies that the powers of Bénard cells cannot be 
reductively explained in terms of the powers contributed by the individual molecules that realize 
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them. In the case of mental causation it implies that we cannot reduce the powers of the higher-order 
neural pattern to powers of individual neurons. In both cases, according to the dynamicist, we need 
system-talk and some form of downward causation. If the dynamicist is right this would surely be in 
conflict with what Carl Gillett (for example 2002a) calls the ‘Standard’ or ‘Flat’ view of realization, 
which he associates with people like Kim (1993, 1998) and Shoemaker (2001).80 
 The flat view as characterized by Gillett stands for a physicalist metaphysics in which all that 
is required in order to cover the facts holding of higher-level individuals and their properties and 
powers are the powers contributed by properties of the individuals at the microlevel. In other words 
all we need is the bottom-up relation of realization. The view basically consists of the following claims: 
 
[Physicalism] All individuals are constituted by, or identical to, physical individuals [the 
individuals of microphysics], and all properties are realized by, or identical to, physical 
properties [the properties of microphysics]. (Gillett 2002b, 99)  
 
A property instance X realizes a property instance Y only if X and Y are instantiated in the 
same individual. (Gillett 2002a, 317)81 
 
[Causal Inheritance Principle] A property instance X realizes a property instance Y only if the 
causal powers individuative of the instance of Y match causal powers contributed by the 
instance of X (and where X may contribute powers not individuative of Y). (Gillett 2002a, 
318)82 
 
If these claims are true for all properties it would render downward causation, in whatever form, 
                                                  
80 ‘I shall refer to this budding consensus as the “Standard” or also the “Flat” view, since it assumes cases of 
realization vary in only one ontological dimension, involving different properties, but not distinct powers or 
individuals.’ (Gillett 2002a, 317) 
81 See for example Kim (1998, 82): ‘It is evident that a second-order property and its realizers are at the same level […] 
they are properties of the very same objects’ (emphasis in original). Shoemaker (1999, 297) makes a similar claim. 
82 Original by Kim as applied to mental properties: ‘If mental property M is realized in a system at t in virtue of 
physical realization base P, the causal powers of this instance of M are identical with the causal powers of P.’ 
(Kim 1993, 326)  
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metaphysically redundant. Combine the foregoing with the principle of causal exclusion and we are 
confronted with a notorious choice concerning the causal efficacy of mental properties:  
 
[Principle of Causal Exclusion] No event can be given more than one complete and independent 
causal explanation. (Kim 1993, 239)  
 
Given all this we might choose to defend the unique and distinctive (ontological) status of mental 
properties and thereby taking them to be epiphenomena83 or accept the realization thesis, thereby 
saving mental causation, but accepting that mental events are identical to certain physical events (the 
realizers). This is a tough choice and DST/MC is presented precisely as a way to escape this choice.  
We can also apply the causal inheritance principle to the case of the Bénard cells. There the 
thesis would be that the causal powers of a Bénard cell are identical to (Kim’s reading of ‘inherited 
from’) the collection of causal powers of the molecules that make up the cell. Again, no downward 
causation. But, are the causal powers of a Bénard cell really identical to the causal powers of the 
individual molecules (the realizers) taken together? Although, the Bénard cells ‘inherit’ their causal 
powers from the powers of their constituents, this doesn’t necessarily imply identity of these powers. 
For example in the case of the Bénard cells it seems that, in an interesting sense, the powers of the 
whole are simply not had by the realizers, the individual molecules, nor their collection.  
Gillett tries to articulate this claim by means of his example of the hardness ‘H’ of a cut 
diamond ‘s’: 
 
Let us assume s* […] has as constituents carbon atoms s1-sn, where particular carbon atoms 
                                                  
83 Kim points out the following concerning his application of this term: ‘It should be clear that by saying that 
two events are related in an epiphenomenal causal relation I do not mean to suggest that the events 
themselves are “epiphenomena”. The standard current use of this term comes from discussions of 
epiphenomenalism as a theory of the mind-body relation, and to call an event an “epiphenomenon” in this 
context is taken to mean that though it is a causal effect of other events, it has no causal potency of its own: it 
can be the cause of no other event, being the absolute terminal link of a causal chain. It is dubious that this 
notion of an epiphenomenon makes sense – for example, it is doubtful how such events could be known to 
exist. In this paper I use the modifier “epiphenomenal” in “epiphenomenal causation” to qualify the causal 
relation, not the events standing in that relation.’ (Kim 1993, 94)  
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have specific properties/relations including those of being bonded, B1, B2, B3...etc., and 
aligned, A1, A2, A3...etc., with other carbon atoms in a very particular way. […] Amongst the 
causal powers of the diamond’s hardness is that, call it ‘C*’, of causing scratches in glass. 
Whilst amongst the causal powers of the bonds and relations of alignment of any particular 
carbon atom is the power, CD, of causing a contiguous carbon atom to remain in a small 
range of its present position in certain directions, relative to other carbon atoms, even under 
high temperatures and forces. (Gillett 2002a, 318-19) 
 
Following Shoemaker (1980) in assuming a causal theory of properties, which says that properties are 
individuated by the powers they contribute to individuals, Gillett points out that the sciences explain 
H by referring to s1-sn, B1-Bn and A1-An, while C* is explained by, additionally, referring to CD. This 
view implies that although H is realized by s1-sn, B1-Bn and A1-An, H is not identical to s1-sn, B1-Bn 
and A1-An, since H is instantiated in the diamond, while for example B2 and A3 are instantiated in 
some carbon atom. As for the powers, obviously H contributes C* which is comprised by CD, but C* 
is not identical to CD, since C* contributes powers to s*, while CD contributes the power to cause a 
certain carbon atom to stay in a tight relative spatial range. Hence, Leibniz’s Law does not apply.  
The reason the standard view cannot deal with this kind of scientific explanation is that the 
latter violates the principle of flat realization and the causal inheritance principle. In the case of the 
diamond’s hardness H the realizer and realized properties are instantiated in different individuals, 
therefore the causal powers contributed by s1-sn, A1-An and B1-Bn do not match with the causal 
powers contributed by H.84 None of the relations of bonding or alignment of the carbon atoms 
actually contributes C* to s*, because those relations are instantiated in carbon atoms and not in s* 
(Gillett 2002a, 321).  
To cover cases of scientific explanation of for example the hardness of diamonds Gillett thus  
offers a dimensioned view of realization to replace the flat account of the standard view: 
 
[Dimensioned realization] Property/relation instance(s) F1-Fn realize an instance of a 
property G, in an individual s, if and only if s has powers that are individuative of an instance of 
                                                  
84 For a similar argument against structural properties in the sense of Armstrong (1978) see Gillett (2002, 320) 
and below. A structural property according to Armstrong is a property P of individual s which is constituted  
by the properties F1-Fn of constituents a1-an, and these constituents, in relation R to each other.  
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G in virtue of the powers contributed by F1-Fn to s or s’s constituent(s), but not vice versa. 
(Gillett 2002a, 322) 
 
Importantly, Gillett’s realization thesis differs from the flat thesis in that it allows for realization 
relations to hold between properties instantiated in different individuals. Another interesting aspect 
of the dimensioned realization thesis is that it seems to allow for a form of emergence that does not 
imply recourse to the souls, entelechies or élan vital so abhorred by proponents of the standard view 
(see Kim 1993, 356).  
In the following I will analyse Gillett’s thesis of emergence and how it relates to the 
dynamicist’s thesis of downward causation in complex systems applied as a theory of mental 
causation. I argue that Gillett’s notion of strong emergence is the same form of emergence that is 
assumed in the DST models of mental causation discussed above.  
 
8.8.2 Emergence and downward causation  
Gillett gives the following criterion for emergence: 
 
(Strong Criterion) A property instance X, in an individual s, is Strongly emergent only if (A) X 
is a realized property instance and (B) X is causally efficacious. (Gillett 2002b, 102) 
 
Strong emergence involves higher causal efficacy something the flat view does not allow. The reason 
that the flat view does not allow higher-order causal efficacy is that, given its flatness, all realized 
properties merely inherit their causal powers from their microphysical realizers. Only the 
microphysical properties contribute powers and hence these are the only powerful properties.  
 According to Gillett the foregoing argumentation, besides adhering to a flawed thesis of 
realization, conflates the implications of physicalism and the closely related, but distinct, thesis of the 
Completeness of Physics (CoP). CoP states:  
 
All microphysical events are determined, in so far as they are determined, by prior 
microphysical events and the laws of physics. (Gillett 2002b, 111)  
 
Gillett claims that although the dimensioned view of realization is indeed inspired by and compatible 
with physicalism, it does neither imply nor need CoP. He argues that the first steps towards a 
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coherent physicalist conception of downward determination is getting rid of the mentioned 
conflation and reject CoP. Let’s take a closer look at the arguments. 
Gillett takes CoP to imply that ‘(a) the microphysical properties are homogeneous in their 
contributions of causal powers and (b) such contributions of powers are determined, in so far as they 
are determined, only by other microphysical properties’ (Gillett 2002b, 112). According to Gillett 
CoP is in conflict with Shoemaker’s (1980) claim that many properties only contribute their powers 
‘conditionally’. Shoemaker’s thesis of conditional powers can be illustrated by means of the property 
of being knife-shaped. When this property is instantiated in an individual that is made of steel it 
contributes causal powers such that the individual cuts flesh. On the other hand, combining the 
property of being knife-shaped with the property of being made of wax does not result in an 
individual that cuts flesh. Apparently, there are properties (like being knife-shaped) that only 
contribute causal powers to individuals (like cutting flesh) under the condition that certain other 
properties are instantiated (like being made of steel).  
In analogy with the knife-example Gillett claims that the fact that certain higher-level 
properties are realized partly determines the powers contributed by the realizer properties. This is no 
causal determination, since there is no time lapse between determiner and determinable (it is 
instantaneous) and no transfer of energy. What we have here is the ‘downward’ version of what 
Gillett calls ‘ontological determination’.85 According to Gillett this model of conditional contribution 
of powers is in conflict with CoP, because it violates both (a) and (b). Contra (a) it turns out that 
microphysical properties are heterogeneous in their contributions of causal powers, and contra (b) 
apparently contribution of powers is not only determined by microphysical properties, but also by 
whether or not certain higher-level properties are instantiated which ontologically (and ‘downwardly’) 
determines what powers the microproperties contribute.  
 To get the point right Gillett formalizes it as follows: 
 
Let us […] assume that the ontologically fundamental microphysical properties/relations, 
‘P1’, ‘P2’, ‘P3’... ‘Pn’, instantiated in microphysical individuals ‘a1’, ‘a2’, ‘a3’ etc., realize an 
instance of a property ‘H’ in ‘s’, where s is constituted by a1, a2, a3, etc. The particular 
situation I want to consider is one in which P1, a microphysical realizer of H, contributes one 
of its causal powers to individuals only conditionally upon realizing an instance of H. Let us call 
                                                  
85 The upward version is the determination relation implied by realization. 
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this conditional power ‘C*’ and take it to be the power to cause some microphysical effect 
‘Pz’. Thus we are assuming that C* is slightly different from the causal power P1 contributes 
when not realizing H. In such a situation, P1 is thus individuated by one conditional power 
which instances of P1 contribute only when realizing H. (Gillett 2002c, 102) 
 
This formalization seems to map quite nicely onto the case of the convection patterns in which a1, 
a2, a3 etc. are individual molecules, P1, P2, P3 … Pn are the properties/relations of/between the 
individual molecules, s is the emerging dynamical pattern and H is for example the amplitude of the 
convection rolls. As we saw, when convection patterns are formed, the individual molecules’ 
behavior is said to be ‘constrained’ by the overall dynamic pattern that is instantiated. In the 
formalization this is expressed by the assumption that C* is slightly different from the causal power 
contributed by P1 when not realizing H.86 
Interestingly, Gillett emphatically points out that the downward determination relation 
between H and P1 is not causal, but ontological, which I take to be evidence for the thesis that the 
concept of ontological determination expresses the same relation as Juarrero tries to express by her 
notion of formal causation. The fact that Gillett chooses to reserve the label ‘causation’ for efficient 
causation here seems irrelevant for the discussion. Prima facie the metaphysical model Gillett offers 
seems nicely to complement the DST analysis of for example convection patterns in providing a 
much needed metaphysics of the situation. But we are not there yet. We need to do some more work 
on clarifying Gillett’s notion of strong emergence and how it relates to DST/MC. I will turn to this 
in the next section.  
 
8.8.3 U-underivable laws 
Gillett’s notion of strong emergence is closely tied to what he calls U-underivable Laws. Let us take a 
closer look at what these laws are about. We have seen Gillett’s reasons for claiming that CoP cannot 
be upheld in the case he presents. At the same time physicalism stays firmly in place. Although H 
partially determines the powers contributed by P1 there are no new ‘dangling’ individuals, properties 
or powers around: a1, a2, a3 etc. constitute s, P1, P2, P3 … Pn realize H, and conditional power C* 
                                                  
86 Some readers might doubt the claim that there are in fact powers like C* in the case of convection patterns. 
However, the fact that Rayleigh-Bénard instability has industrial applications, for example in the cooling of 
nuclear plants and the heating of buildings (it does ‘work’ in the technical sense of physics), guarantees that 
there are indeed powers individuative of higher-level properties of Bénard cells.  
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is still contributed by P1. Nevertheless, on Gillett’s account H is causally efficacious (it has the power 
to cause Pz) indirectly, by non-causally determining the powers contributed by the microphysical 
properties that realize them. So physicalism holds, while CoP fails: all properties are realized by, or 
identical to, physical properties, but not all microphysical events are exclusively determined by prior 
microphysical events and the laws of physics. 
 This brings us to the issue of laws, for if CoP really fails than we are bound for a situation in 
which we need more than the set of statements comprising the laws of (micro-) physics to explain 
the causal efficacy of higher-level phenomena.87 If properties like H ontologically determine the 
powers contributed by for example P1 this surely implies that there are laws that cannot be read off 
from the Microphysical Base Set. Gillett characterizes such underivable laws as follows: 
 
A law L is U-underivable if and only if (i) L directly refers to some realized property H, and (ii) 
L is not entailed by any combination of: the laws governing microphysical properties in 
aggregates simpler than those instantiating H; statements about lower-level background 
conditions; the compositional principles applying to simpler aggregates than those 
instantiating H; any analytic statements or statements of other necessary truths; and any 
statements about the identity, realization or constitution, of any entity by microphysical 
entities. (Gillett 2002c, 105) 
 
Gillett means U-underivable laws to be ultimately underivable: it is not because of our possibly 
inadequate cognitive capacities that these laws cannot be derived, but because they are neither 
mentioned in nor entailed by the Microphysical Base Set in principle.  
In Gillett’s analysis the fact that the powers contributed by P1 when realizing H in s differ 
from the powers P1 contributes when not realizing H rules out that s and its microconstituents are 
exclusively governed by the statements from the Microphysical Base Set. We need to add something 
like law (LE) that says: ‘[f]or all aggregates, in an aggregate in which an instance of P1 realizes 
property H, this instance of P1 causes Pz’ (Gillett 2002c, 107). LE is an U-underivable law that 
                                                  
87 Gillett places this set of statements in what he calls the ‘Microphysical Base Set’. The Microphysical Base Set 
also includes directly referring statements detailing the background physical facts, and compositional principles 
applying to the aggregation of microphysical entities (Gillett 2002c, 106). In what follows I will apply the term 
in the same way.  
 
150 
brutely and fundamentally indexes the contribution of one of P1’s powers to its realization of 
property H.  
Contrary to the metaphysical reductionism of the standard view that allows only 
microphysical entities as fundamentally determinative entities and hence concludes that all facts 
holding about the realized properties and the microphysical properties of s and its constituents are 
covered by and can in principle be read off from the Microphysical Base Set, Gillett claims that his 
model of dimensioned realization shows that reference to microphysically realized properties such as 
H is unavoidable, because they play a fundamentally determinative role. The determinative role of 
realized properties such as H cannot be appreciated without reference to s; simpler entities will just 
not do the trick. Thus, laws like LE are not entailed by the Microphysical Base Set (these statements, 
by definition, do not refer to individuals like s or properties like H), but are nevertheless 
indispensable for covering all the facts holding of s and its constituents.  
Having said all this we can formulate a conceptualization of emergence that might be useful 
for backing up and clarifying the DST analysis of the Rayleigh-Bénard phenomenon and possibly 
also DST/MC: 
 
[Strong Emergence] A property instance X is Strongly emergent, in an individual s, if and only 
if (i) X is realized by other properties/relations; and (ii) X partially non-causally determines 
the causal powers contributed by at least one of the fundamental microphysical 
properties/relations realizing X. (Gillett 2002b, 115)  
 
Is Gillett’s notion of strong emergence the same as Juarrero’s conception of emergence? 
Gillett does not explicitly apply his notion of strong emergence to dynamical systems, but I see no 
reason why this cannot be done. Furthermore, although Juarrero does not provide a concise 
definition of what she means by emergence the essence of her construal of emergent processes is 
surely that it involves formal causation (i.e. downward constraining). I am aware that a lot more can 
be said about emergence apart from issues concerning causal efficacy of emergent properties. For 
example, in his (2002) Achim Stephan distinguishes several forms of emergence that also involve 
factors such as novelty and predictability. For reasons of clarity I choose to keep these factors in the 
background and focus on what I take to be the central function of emergence in DST/MC, namely 
securing higher-level causal efficacy. 
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Let’s round off these preliminaries. In section 8.3 I stressed the fact that a dynamical system 
is first of all a mathematical entity. DST applies mathematical formalism in order to describe non-
mathematical phenomena such as predator/prey interactions, convection patterns, and mental 
causation. As we have seen the nature of this formalism is purely descriptive and as such is to a 
certain measure neutral towards the different kinds of causal relations relevant in the phenomena 
being modeled. The neutrality, and hence generality, of DST has the advantage that it is applicable to 
many radically different phenomena. On the other hand, a disadvantage following from this general 
applicability is that we ourselves have to fill in the blanks concerning possible causal relations at 
stake.  
The need for a clear metaphysical framework is particularly urgent in the case of an 
application of DST to the problem of mental causation. In my view one such metaphysical 
framework is provided by Gillett. This implies that there might be other metaphysical frameworks 
that can do the job. These alternatives might conflict with Gillett’s framework. Nevertheless, 
whatever would come out of a possible critique of Gillett’s view it remains the case that proper 
evaluation of the DST approach to mental causation requires supplementing some such view.  
 
8.9 Dynamical systems theory and phenomenal consciousness 
Although some might take DST/MC to offer a more attractive picture of mental causation than the 
model provided by Kim, I myself would not put my money on it for the same reasons as given in 
section 3.4, where I distinguished the reificationist approach of people like Kim from Wittgensteinian 
approaches such as Anscombe’s (1957) and Dennett’s (1987). Again, I will not argue for the general 
right-mindedness of the latter approaches, but will just mention them as another influential way of 
thinking about folk-psychological categories such as intentions and beliefs. The important thing to 
note is that the Wittgensteinian approaches dissolve Kim’s problem of mental causation. 
Renouncing reificationism (of propositional attitudes) does not imply that our analysis of 
DST/MC becomes worthless. As announced in section 8.1 I think it provides us with some 
interesting speculations on the kind of processes that might realize phenomenal consciousness. 
Although speculative these DST/MC-inspired considerations are relevant for two reasons. Firstly, 
because they allow for a possible and more specific filling out of the functional identity thesis, the 
result of which I will baptize ‘the dynamical systems theory approach to phenomenal consciousness’ 
or ‘DST/PC’ for short. Secondly, because inserting these speculations on the realizers of 
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phenomenal consciousness into the functional identity thesis generates a possible answer to the 
problem of phenomenal causation.  
Additionally, DST/PC can help us to get clearer on the relation between Libet’s work and the 
problem of phenomenal causation, a thread I left dangling in part I. There I differentiated Kim’s 
problem of mental causation from the problem of phenomenal causation in order to get a better grip 
on what Libet was actually investigating. Given the considerations in this section we will come to see 
that although Libet was arguably very interested in the problem of phenomenal causation he failed to 
clearly address it, partly because he did not clearly separate the problem of mental causation (as 
posed by Kim) from the problem of phenomenal causation.  
My proposal is as follows. Phenomenal experiences are felt causal role states that are flatly 
realized by and extensionally identical to (contextually indicated) information-bearing, behavior-
controlling (biological) functions (possibly extending beyond the brain). The latter, in turn, are 
dimensionally realized by lower-level properties (and their powers) and constituted by lower-level 
individuals. This makes phenomenal facts second-order properties, but I must stress, this does not 
make them less factual (or real) than their first-order realizers. Phenomenal facts are a supposed to be 
full-blown ingredients of our ontology. They are the property of what it is to have, or rather what it 
is to be (embody), a certain first-order property. Apart from the distinction between flat and 
dimensioned realization this was the theory on the nature of consciousness introduced in chapter 7. 
Given the above considerations on DST/MC this proposal can now be further filled out.  
Possible candidates for the first-order realizers of consciousness might plausibly be thought 
to be akin to the higher-level organizational patterns DST/MC associated with intentions. This 
would result in the thesis that the information-bearing, behavior-controlling functions flatly realizing 
phenomenal experience are biobehavioral – probably mainly neural – organizational patterns that, in 
turn, are dimensionally realized by lower-level (ultimately microphysical) properties.  
This is a very general thesis, which in turn can be filled out in many ways. Nevertheless, it is 
not completely unheard of in present science of consciousness. In a very recent paper Cosmelli et al 
(forthcoming) give an overview of work done in the line of DST/PC.88 A rather famous example of a 
project that is at least related to DST/PC is Francis Crick and Cristoph Koch’s work (1990) on the 
neural correlates of (visual) consciousness (NCC) that is essentially inspired by the hypothesis that 
consciousness should be associated with the synchronous firing of distributed neural populations. In 
                                                  
88 Cosmelli et al classify these projects as neurodynamical approaches to consciousness. 
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earlier sections I already referred to work of Freeman, Kelso, and Thompson and Varela, which 
squarely fits into DST/PC. Edelman and Tononi’s Dynamic Core hypothesis (Edelman and Tononi 
2000, Tononi 2004) is another example of DST/PC. According to Edelman and Tononi: 
 
A group of neurons can contribute directly to conscious experience only if it is part of a 
distributed functional cluster that [...] achieves high integration in hundreds of milliseconds 
[…]. To sustain conscious experience, it is essential that this functional cluster be highly 
differentiated, as indicated by high values of complexity. We call such a cluster of neuronal 
groups that are strongly interacting among themselves and that have distinct functional 
borders with the rest of the brain at the time scale of fractions of a second a ‘dynamic core’ 
[…]. A dynamic core is therefore a process, not a thing or a place, and it is defined in terms 
of neural interactions, rather than in terms of specific neural locations, connectivity or 
activity. (Edelman and Tononi 2000, 144; Cosmelli et al forthcoming 2007, 739)  
 
As these examples show there are different ways of filling out DST/PC. The relevant patterns may 
be of very different form and might be found at many levels of organization.89 Nevertheless, 
DST/PC approaches are united in that they:  
 
[…] stress the importance of a certain type of distributed, spatiotemporal pattern of neural 
activity that ‘demarcates’ itself from the background activity of the brain. Such patterns are 
described as ongoing, transient, metastable coordination processes among separate neurons, 
and they are considered to be crucial for the moment-to-moment emergence and formation 
of conscious experience. Another […] feature […] is that these spatiotemporal patterns 
reveal the interplay of two apparently fundamental principles of brain organization and 
function; namely, functional segregation and cooperative interaction or integration. (Cosmelli 
et al forthcoming 2007, 743)    
 
                                                  
89 Cosmelli et al for example differentiate between ‘(i) […] interactions between simultaneous recordings of 
multiple individual neurons; (ii) […] interactions between simultaneous recordings of multiple individual 
LFP’s [local field potentials being the summations of the membrane potentials of populations of neurons, 
TvdL], and (iii) in single LFP recordings’ (Cosmelli et al forthcoming 2007, 746). This list is not exhaustive, 
but it does illustrate the point. 
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There are several reasons for finding DST/PC attractive. Given the fact we are dealing with 
patterns there is room for graduality, which is intuitively compatible with the more than plausible 
thesis that consciousness is not an on-or-off phenomenon. Also DST/PC stresses that we should 
think of the realizers of phenomenal experience as processes that are ongoing which intuively matches 
well with most people’s phenomenality being continuous rather than gappy. Another positive aspect 
of DST/PC is that it really seems to tie phenomenal experience to the perceptual functions of 
biological systems. Given the combination of DST/PC with the functional identity thesis 
phenomenal experiences in an important sense are the biobehavioral (primarily neural) patterns 
involved in biological perceptual processes, however without being an extra (neural) mechanism 
beyond the perceptual processes in question.   
Now, of course this is all very sketchy, however my aim here is not to defend a final theory 
on the lower-level realizers of consciousness, but to illustrate what kind of conceptual work is needed 
to sharpen the suppositions driving our scientific investigations of consciousness and conscious 
intentional action. The functional identity thesis combined with DST/PC is just one way to provide 
such a conceptual framework that can be used – or might in part and possibly tacitly even already be 
used – to really make sense of our experimental data. It is supposed to be an explicit and defensible 
account of how we interpret the data and why we asked the questions and formed the hypotheses 
leading to those data.90 It allows us to clearly point out which problem we are dealing with and how 
the data in question might teach us something about the phenomenon in question.  
Furthermore, it gives us an idea about our (current) limits in investigating the phenomenon 
of interest, in this case consciousness and conscious intentional action. There are at least two general 
limitations that immediately come to mind. Firstly, the complexity of organizational neural processes 
realizing phenomenal experience might turn out to outrun our computational and technical abilities 
                                                  
90 Although probably superfluous, given what has been said in chapter 6, I want to emphasize that I do not 
mean to suggest that we cannot do experimental research into consciousness and conscious intentional action 
without explicitly presenting a set of connected suppositions of the kind and resolution presented in chapter 7 
and 8. There are presently many interesting scientific investigations into consciousness and conscious 
intentional action that do not offer such a conceptual framework. Rather, my point is that although this 
research might often get of the ground without explicitly presenting a clear outline of the methodology-
implying (pre-)suppositions the latter are nevertheless tacitly driving the investigations. Given this it would 
greatly facilitate and smoothen discussions and comparisons of the many research projects available when 
those silent methodology-implying presuppositions were brought to the surface. 
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(at least for some time). And secondly, it might not be possible to formulate the purported structural 
invariants (see also section 6.3) of lived phenomenology with the resolution needed to explicitly and 
interestingly relate it to neural data. Both limitations would make the scientific study of 
consciousness impossible or at least severely constrain its reach. However, considering the available 
literature and the fact that we are talking about a rather young paradigm it seems to me that for the 
time being we are justified in being optimistic about the future of DST/PC.  
Lastly, DST/PC in combination with the functional identity thesis provides us with a 
possible solution to the problem of phenomenal causation. After all, if phenomenal experiences are 
(narrowly) realized by higher-level neural patterns, it is clear that they also are causally efficacious. 
The phenomenal facts do work. Also we can now see that although Libet was probably very much 
interested in the problem of phenomenal causation, he did not clearly distinguish the problem of 
mental causation as posed by Kim from another form of mental causation, namely phenomenal 
causation. The confusion of these two problems is exemplified by Libet’s use of both the words 
‘intention’ and ‘urge’ interchangeably, where the latter is more clearly suggestive of an interest in 
phenomenal causation and the former – although a phenomenal notion in Libet’s work – points into 
the direction of Kim’s problem of mental causation. Libet does address the problem of phenomenal 
causation when he presents us with his conscious mental field theory, however as pointed out earlier 
this model is in fact a rather crude form of emergent dualism that is sensitive to all the problems 
traditionally associated with dualism. Libet does nothing to answer these problems.  
Although the account of DST/PC as presented in this section is very general and speculative 
there are good reason for thinking that things might turn out to be in the vicinity of the picture 
offered in chapter 7 and 8. If so, than we have at least got the beginnings of a deliberate and 
workable account of some important methodology-implying suppositions that are of the right 
metaphysical kind and, most importantly, provide a basis for discussion and clear comparison with 
investigators of other methodological orientations.  
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Chapter 9  
Epilogue 
 
At this point it might be helpful to recapitulate the general line of argumentation in the book. 
Therefore, I shall devote this last brief chapter to giving an overview of the main theses defended 
above and their connections. As mentioned in the preface the purpose of this project is to argue for 
the particular importance of striving for maximal explicitness of methodology-implying 
presuppositions behind scientific research into consciousness and conscious intentional action. It is 
my conviction that the best way to ‘argue’ for this thesis is by looking at and analyzing actual cases 
that illustrate the need of living up to the demand of explicitness. Libet’s experimental investigations 
provide a perfect example of the sort of fundamental unclarity that tacit, unreflected presuppositions 
can result in. This is why part I is given to the analysis of Libet’s research as a typical example of, 
what turned out to be, scientific research into conscious intentional action with implicit methodology-
implying presuppositions. 
 Taking to heart the demand of explicitness, although crucial, particularly in the domains of 
consciousness and conscious intentional action, is not sufficient. We, the scientists of consciousness, 
need also find the right suppositions that, moreover, are of the right kind. To bring about a feel for 
the kind of issues this second task raises I discuss an actual example of a set of deliberately explicit 
methodology-implying suppositions for scientific research into consciousness and conscious 
intentional action that, arguably, are of the wrong kind in several ways, to wit Velmans’ philosophy of 
mind (part II). My analysis eventually lead to the following two general theses: (1) the facts involved 
in the phenomenology of our experiences are often not as straightforward as we might naively think 
them to be, and (2) there is something wrong with the kind of metaphysics offered by for example 
Velmans. The latter teaches us something about the kind of suppositions that are worth wanting 
when embarking on a science of consciousness and, more importantly, which are not. 
 Finally, in part III I defended a positive view on how to deal with the general question of the 
role of phenomenology in scientific investigations of consciousness. Moreover, I presented my own 
preferred suppositions on the nature of consciousness in chapter 7 and 8, which are supposed to be 
of the right metaphysical kind (i.e. do not go not beyond the facts) and are supposed to further 
clarify my view of what are the metaphysical kind of suppositions worth wanting. Although the 
theory on the nature of consciousness defended above is indeed my own view, my primary goal, as in 
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part I and II, is showing what kinds of philosophical problems play in the background of present-day 
cognitive (neuro)science and why they should be explicitly addressed.  
While going through the coarse-grained programme set out above, I argued for several finer-
grained points along the way the most important of which I shall now briefly mention and relate. 
First of all, I argued that we should clearly separate different notions of free will from different 
notions of mental causation. Libet’s preferred conception of free will, which is the libertarianist one, 
understood in the context of his experimental work, brings him close to the problems of mental 
causation. However, there are far more conceptions of free will that should at least be taken into 
consideration before drawing strong conclusions on such an important topic based on the limited 
data provided by Libet.  
Furthermore, when it comes to mental causation it is not clear what Libet is actually after. On 
the one hand he is easily interpreted as presupposing the kind of reificationist view of folk-
psychological categories such as found in the work of Kim. As we saw the same goes for the 
researchers conducting experimental investigations of intentional action that are inspired by Libet’s 
paradigm, such as Haggard and Lau. I pointed out that this reificationist approach is not the only 
approach available on the philosophical market and, moreover, that there are alternative approaches 
that make the problem of mental causation as conceived by Kim dissolve (particularly Anscombe 
1957 and Dennett 1991b). On the other hand there are also good reasons for thinking that Libet was 
in fact interested in another kind of mental causation, namely phenomenal causation.  
The latter involves one directly in the problems of consciousness, some of which I addressed 
in chapter 7 an 8. In chapter 7 I defended the view that there are phenomenal facts and that 
phenomenal experience is functionally identical to a set of multi-modal, discriminative, 
representational processes which deploy information for the control of behavior (see Clark 1997, 51). 
Accepting this claim requires accepting that there is no hard problem of consciousness; in other 
words, that there is in fact no explanatory gap between phenomenal facts and objective facts. In 
chapter 8 I provided a speculative and more detailed account of the nature of consciousness 
combining insights of Kim with DST-metaphors and Gillett’s metaphysical framework of 
dimensioned realization. On the assumption that these speculations are on the right track they show 
how phenomenal causation could be an actual phenomenon and steer the experimental practice of 
our science of consciousness into the direction of what Cosmelli et al (forthcoming 2007) call the 
neurodynamical approach of consciousness. Moreover, they ground the latter experimental approach 
of consciousness.   
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Let me conclude by emphasizing that doing philosophy of mind is an important aspect of the 
science of consciousness and should not be separated from experimental work. In fact, as I hope to 
have shown, there cannot be such a separation in that everybody necessarily brings his or her own 
(tacit) ‘philosophy of mind’ to the scientific shop-floor. Therefore, I suggest that we lower our 
scientific pace, increase our thoughtfulness and bring about an explicit science of the mind, that is, 
one that knows what it is doing. 
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Summary 
 
In this thesis I argue for the importance of striving for maximal explicitness of methodology-
implying assumptions behind scientific research into consciousness and conscious intentional action. 
My strategy in arguing for this is threefold: I discuss a case of scientific investigation into conscious 
intentional action that suffers from unclarity as to its precise subject of investigation, precisely 
because the assumptions involved are tacit and, arguably, confused. Furthermore, I discuss a case of 
deliberately explicit assumptions that are of the wrong kind in several illustrative ways. Lastly, I 
provide and defend my own explicit set of suppositions for scientific investigations into 
consciousness and conscious intentional action. Although the argumentation in this thesis reflects my 
own opinions, it is first of all supposed to function as an illustration aimed at engaging scientists 
working on the topics of consciousness and conscious intentional action with the conceptual 
problems I suggest are at stake in their research. 
The thesis consists of three parts, which each consist of two or more chapters. Below I 
briefly summarize the main theses and conclusions for each part.  
 
Part I: An example of scientific research into conscious intentional action with implicit methodology-implying 
presuppositions 
 
In this first part of the thesis I present and analyze Benjamin Libet’s experimental work which is a – 
probably even the – prototypical example of scientific research into consciousness and conscious 
intentional action where closer scrutiny brings out that it isn’t all that clear what is in fact being 
investigated. This is the case precisely because Libet is silent about certain fundamental suppositions 
driving his research. Libet’s work (Libet et al. 1982, 1985, 1999 and Libet 2004) has become famous, 
because some – among whom Libet himself – take it to have implications for our thinking about free 
will.  
Libet exploited Kornhuber and Deecke’s (1965) finding that voluntary movements are 
preceded by a particular kind of electrophysiologically indicated neural activity called the ‘readiness-
potential’ (RP). What Libet found was that while the RP starts well before the eventual motor act, 
subjects report consciousness of their intention to act only some time after the start of the RP. This 
seems to suggest that the neural processes culminating in the action have an unconscious origin, 
which, according to Libet, undermines the thesis that the action was in fact freely willed. Libet thinks 
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this finding should make us rethink our concept of free will, but not reject it. He suggests that 
although the onset of the RP precedes the conscious intention to act, there is still some time left 
between the onset of the conscious intention and the eventual motor act in which we can veto the 
action (the veto-hypothesis). Apparently, or so says Libet, free will does not consist in the initiation 
of actions, but in the possibility of vetoing actions when one becomes conscious of one’s intention 
to act. 
 In chapter 2 I present Libet’s experimental paradigm, his main conclusions, and some often 
heard methodical critiques. Also I present some related experimental work that I conducted in 
collaboration with some colleagues from psychology and philosophy at the University of Tilburg (the 
Netherlands). In the latter study we tried to replicate an experiment by Grey Walter (1963) that is 
referred to by Dennett and Kinsbourne (1992) and Dennett (2003a), but which probably has never 
really been conducted. We also failed to replicate the experiment, but for illustrative reasons, which is 
why I discuss our experimental excursion in this thesis.  
Grey Walter’s experiment is interesting in that it evades certain problems inherent in Libet’s 
approach. During the Libet-experiments subjects sat in a chair opposing a ‘clock’. At the beginning 
of each trial the clock started of from the twelve ‘o clock position and the subjects were told that 
they could execute a voluntary action at any time after the sweep-second hand of the clock had made 
its first full circle. The relevant brain activity was registered by means of electroencephalography 
(EEG). Letting the subjects perform a flexion of the wrist or finger at a self-chosen moment 
operationalized the voluntary action. The activity in the muscles associated with the motor act was 
recorded using electromyography (EMG). The onset of the motor act as well as the timing of the 
clock were recorded by a computer.  
In one series of experiments subjects were asked to flex their wrist or finger at a self-chosen 
moment after the sweep-second hand of the clock had once fully revolved the clock. These subjects 
were asked to let the urge to act come to them and act spontaneously whenever they wished to do so. 
Some time after every trial the subjects were asked to report the ‘time’ on the clock at the moment 
they became conscious of their intention to act. This approach relies heavily on the subject’s ability 
not only to memorize, but also to actually detect the precise onset of his or her conscious intention. 
This introduces several problems which are mainly discussed in chapter 3.  
In the experiment allegedly conducted by Grey Walter an electrode was placed in the motor 
cortex of the subject in order to record the electrical activity in that part of the brain. The hypothesis 
was that changes in the measured activity must be associated with the initiation of intentional actions. 
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The experimental set up was as follows. Subjects were placed in front of a projection screen and were 
told that they could replace the current projection by pushing a button that would advance a slide-
carousel. What the subjects did not know was that the button was a dummy and that the advancing 
of the slide was in fact caused by an enhanced signal from the electrode in their motor cortex. 
Interestingly, during the experiment subjects allegedly reported having the strange experience of the 
slide projector anticipating their intention to act. Just before the subjects pushed the button in order to 
advance the slide, the slide-carousel (controlled by the activity in the motor cortex) already changed 
the slide. In comparison with Libet’s approach the subjects in Grey Walter’s experiment have a far 
more passive role in that they were not asked to monitor their conscious experience ‘in search for’ 
intentions nor were they required to report on this from memory. However, as announced earlier 
Grey Walter’s experiment has problems of its own. 
Finally, at the end of chapter 2, I present some recent experimental work (Haggard and 
Eimer 1999, Haggard and Clark 2003, Lau et al 2004a/b) that is inspired by Libet’s experiments. In 
chapter 3 this work and Libet’s experiments are analyzed by focusing on some fundamental – often 
tacit – assumptions concerning free will and consciousness (its nature as well as its phenomenology) 
driving the investigations. The questions I will try to answer are the following. Firstly, what are the 
Libet experiments about? In other words: what was Libet investigating? My answer to this first 
question will be that Libet’s work is only superficially related to the problem of free will and insofar 
as it is concerned with this problem it deals with it in a rather uninteresting manner, where 
uninteresting is not a matter of personal taste, but signifies that even when taken on Libet’s own 
terms his data are not particularly shocking. Moreover, the Libet-experiments neither address the 
problem of mental causation, which is the problem of accounting for the idea that our actions are 
caused by mental states such as intentions, beliefs, and desires (see particularly Kim 1998, 2005). In 
my view the Libet-experiments had better be understood as an attempt to experimentally investigate 
intentional action. There are a lot of research groups all around the world working in this domain 
presenting themselves under headings such as ‘Intention and Action’ or ‘Motor Control’. The 
interesting thing about Libet’s research, however, is that besides the cerebral physiology associated 
with intentional action it also explicitly addresses the phenomenology of intentional action. 
Nevertheless, I argue that, unfortunately, Libet misconstrues the phenomenology of intentional 
action.  
The latter aspect inspires the second question to be answered in chapter 3, namely: is that 
which Libet is investigating best approached in the manner he does? In other words: should we apply 
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Libet’s methods in scientifically investigating intentional action? My answer to this second question 
will be negative, but arguing for this is a complex matter, since besides technical doubts concerning 
Libet’s method it also involves critically examining Libet’s suppositions, which are partly tacit, and 
how they influenced his method.  
Finally, I go into the following question: are there defensible alternatives for Libet’s method 
of scientifically investigating intentional action that also take account of the phenomenology 
involved? My answer to this question will be less decisive and more general. To put it briefly, I think 
that at this point in our investigations of intentional action we cannot and should not exclude the 
possibility that there are alternative scientific approaches for investigating intentional action. 
However, figuring out what exactly these alternatives should be is very much an ongoing project 
fundamentally involving the practical dimension of actually doing the experimental work. 
 
Part II: An example of a set of explicit methodology-implying suppositions for scientific research into consciousness and 
conscious intentional action that are of the wrong kind 
 
 While part I is about an example of scientific research into conscious intentional action with implicit 
methodology-implying presuppositions, in part II I present an example of deliberately explicit 
methodology-implying suppositions for scientific research into consciousness and conscious 
intentional action that, however, are of the wrong kind in several ways. Part II shows that being 
explicit about one’s assumptions is not enough; we should also make sure we embrace the right ones. 
Moreover, part II provides an inventory of pitfalls that I set out to avoid when formulating my own 
suppositions in part III.  
In part II I focus on Max Velmans’ philosophy of mind. Velmans describes his general 
project as formulating a theory of consciousness that is compatible both with science and common 
sense (Velmans 2000, 3). An important part of Velmans’ theory of consciousness is his projection-
thesis, which says that in many cases our experiences are projected from our brains into the world 
outside. According to Velmans the projection thesis is backed up by our everyday (common sense) 
phenomenology. I think that Velmans here seriously misdescribes our everyday phenomenology and 
makes a supposition that, although explicit, is of the wrong kind. Velmans’ mistake is illustrative of 
the general insight that the facts involved in the phenomenology of our experiences are not always as 
straightforward as we might initially think them to be (in an important sense they don’t speak for 
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themselves). This insight is of fundamental importance for scientific research into consciousness and 
conscious intentional action. 
In part II I also present the problem of phenomenal causation, firstly to distinguish it from 
the problem of mental causation as it is formulated by Kim (1998, 2005) and secondly, to make a 
more general point about different kinds of metaphysics that might implicitly or explicitly be 
involved in consciousness research. I present the problem of phenomenal causation as it is posed by 
Velmans and discuss the solution he proposes, which is put in terms of a dual-aspect metaphysics. 
Although Velmans poses the problem of phenomenal causation in a clear and forceful manner, I 
think he does in fact not succeed in solving the problem. This again has to do with Velmans’ 
suppositions, which this time are of the wrong metaphysical kind.  
Importantly, I do not (at least not only) mean to say that Velmans is wrong in defending 
dual-aspect monism and that he had better opt for, say, a form of physicalist monism or substance 
dualism. Rather, my worry is that the way of doing metaphysics associated with theories such as dual-
aspect monism, physicalism or substance dualism is of the wrong kind in that it goes beyond the 
facts in a way that makes those theories meaningless. This general insight is relevant for our thinking 
about the role of methodology-implying assumptions behind scientific research into consciousness 
and intentional action, because it tells us something about which kind of suppositions are 
meaningful, and hence can be expected to do some work, and which are just – potentially retarding – 
lumber on the train of thought heading for an understanding of consciousness and conscious 
intentional action.  
 
Part III: Consciousness, facts and methodology 
 
Part III is intended to be the more constructive part of this project in which I present my positive 
view on the role of methodology in the scientific study of consciousness, and my own explicit 
suppositions concerning the nature of consciousness, explicitly minding what has been said in part I 
and II. 
Firstly, I go into the general question of whether and how phenomenology should play a role 
in scientific investigations of consciousness. I approach this question by discussing and comparing 
two general views on this issue that present the two extremes of a range of methodologies available, 
namely Daniel Dennett’s heterophenomenology and Francisco Varela’s neurophenomenology. I 
defend the thesis that we do not have to and should not presently choose between 
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heterophenomenology and neurophenomenology. Progress in working out the right, context- and 
task-sensitive, methods for studying consciousness and the way in which phenomenology is involved 
in them, if at all, is best guaranteed by keeping them both – and all reasonable methodologies in 
between – in the running. Of main concern is that we are explicit about the methodologies we apply 
and the suppositions about consciousness that inspire them.  
Secondly, I present a theory on the nature of consciousness in terms of phenomenal facts, 
basing myself on work by Tim Crane and Thomas Clark. Libet thinks that there is a fact of the 
matter when it comes to the experiences of his subjects. I share this intuition, but since we are doing 
philosophy some work has to be done to at least embed this intuition in a theory on the nature of 
consciousness, in this way justifying its correctness. I defend the view that phenomenal experiences 
are identical to certain biological (particularly neural) functions. This theory can be refined in several 
ways and I provide one speculative suggestion making use of dynamical systems theory and the work 
of both Kim (1998, 2005) and Gillett (among others 2002a). The shortest route to this theoretical 
sketch of the biological implementation of phenomenal consciousness goes via the problem of 
mental causation.  
First, I relate the dynamical systems approach to mental causation (DST/MC) to Kim’s 
(1998, 2005) formulation of the problem of mental causation and his suggestions for solving it. Also 
I show in what way DST/MC might provide an alternative that is worth wanting. My claim is that 
Kim’s model falls prey to the so-called problem of causal drainage (Block 2003), which is the 
problem that if one accepts Kim’s views on mental causation this seems to have the consequence 
that, as Block puts it, the apparent causal power of mental and other macro-properties drain into the 
bottom level of physics (Block 2003, 133), relegating all higher-level causation to the land of illusions. 
DST/MC can be taken to provide an alternative to Kim’s model, however in my view it cannot do 
this without some metaphysical help from the philosopher Carl Gillett (among others 2002a), who 
provides us with a model of realization that is different from Kim’s and which can be used to 
strengthen and clarify DST/MC.  
Although the resulting picture of mental causation might to some – particularly those in the 
tradition of thinking about mental causation following Kim – seem convincing, I think it is spawned 
by mistaken suppositions about the ontological status of folk-psychological categories such as 
intentions. As in Kim’s approach, in DST/MC intentions are reified and thought of as things or 
processes (probably located in the head). That such a reification of for example intentions is not 
mandatory is exemplified by more Wittgensteinian approaches to mental vocabulary such as 
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proposed by G.E.M. Anscombe (1957) or Daniel Dennett (1991b). Adopting one of these 
alternatives would in fact dissolve the problem of mental causation as it is posed by philosophers like 
Kim. Incidentally, this insight is also relevant for the evaluation of Libet’s work since Libet also 
seems to presuppose that intentions are things to be looked for in (or near) the brain. Again, 
although Libet does not take an explicit stance on this issue it might very well have been an 
important inspiration for the questions he chose to ask and the experimental methods he opted for 
in order to answer those questions. 
Next, I show that although DST/MC is mistaken there might be room for dynamical systems 
theory as an approach to phenomenal consciousness. My proposal is the following. Phenomenal 
experiences are felt causal role states that are flatly realized by and extensionally identical to 
(contextually indicated) information-bearing, behavior-controlling (biological) functions (possibly 
extending beyond the brain). The latter, in turn, are dimensionally realized by lower-level properties 
(and their powers) and constituted by lower-level individuals. Possible candidates for the first-order 
realizers of consciousness might plausibly be thought to be akin to the higher-level organizational 
patterns DST/MC associates with intentions (see Juarrero 1999 and Kelso 1995). This results in the 
thesis that the information-bearing, behavior-controlling functions flatly realizing phenomenal 
experience are biobehavioral – probably mainly neural – organizational patterns that, in turn, are 
dimensionally realized by lower-level (ultimately microphysical) properties.  
Importantly, the theory I present, contrary to for example Velmans’ metaphysics of mind, is 
supposed not to go beyond the facts (in the particular sense to be clarified below). In other words, 
my theory is supposed to be of the right (metaphysical) kind. Moreover, if true, this theory also saves 
phenomenal causation.  
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Samenvatting (summary in Dutch) 
 
Dit proefschrift is een pleidooi voor het belang van duidelijkheid en openheid ten aanzien van 
methodologie-implicerende aannames in wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar bewustzijn en bewust 
intentioneel handelen. De opbouw van mijn betoog is drieledig. Om te beginnen bespreek ik een 
concreet voorbeeld van wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar bewust intentioneel handelen dat is 
gebaseerd op stilzwijgende – en bovendien verwarde – vooronderstellingen, waardoor het in eerste 
instantie niet duidelijk is waar het onderzoek precies betrekking op heeft en wat voor conclusies het 
toelaat. Vervolgens bespreek ik een set van expliciete aannames voor onderzoek naar bewustzijn en 
bewust intentioneel handelen die om verschillende redenen onjuist zijn. Ten slotte presenteer en 
verdedig ik mijn eigen expliciete aannames voor wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar bewustzijn en 
bewust intentioneel handelen. Hoewel de analyses en argumentatie in dit proefschrift mijn eigen 
positie weergeven hebben ze wat mij betreft in de eerste plaats een illustratieve functie. Deze 
illustraties zijn erop gericht om wetenschappers die zich bezig houden met bewustzijn en bewust 
intentioneel handelen bewuster te maken van de conceptuele problemen die inherent zijn aan dit 
soort onderzoek. Bovendien geven ze aan hoe deze problemen op meer expliciete wijze meegewogen 
kunnen worden in de vormgeving van onderzoek en in de interpretatie van experimentele data. 
 Dit proefschrift bestaat uit drie delen die elk bestaan uit twee of meer hoofdstukken. In het 
volgende vat ik de centrale stellingen en conclusies per deel kort samen. 
 
Deel I: Een voorbeeld van wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar bewust intentioneel handelen met stilzwijgende 
methodologie-implicerende aannames  
 
In het eerste deel van dit proefschrift bespreek ik experimenteel onderzoek van Benjamin Libet als 
een typisch voorbeeld – zoniet het voorbeeld - van wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar bewustzijn en 
bewust intentioneel handelen, waarbij niet duidelijk is waar het onderzoek over gaat, precies doordat 
er onduidelijkheid is over de gehanteerde vooronderstellingen. Daarnaast lijkt Libet, voorzover hij 
zijn aannames wel expliciet presenteert, zich niet bewust van de eventuele alternatieve 
vooronderstellingen die voorhanden zijn. De invloed van Libets werk (Libet  e.a. 1982, 1985, 1999 en 
Libet 2004) is desalniettemin groot, omdat het volgens sommigen – waaronder Libet zelf – 
fundamentele consequenties heeft voor ons denken over vrije wil.  
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Libet maakte gebruik van de ontdekking dat aan vrijwillige bewegingen een bepaalde 
elektrofysiologische neurale activiteit, de ‘readiness-potential’  (RP) voorafgaat (Kornhuber en Deecke 
1965). Libets experimenten lijken uit te wijzen dat de RP inderdaad ruim voor vrijwillige handelingen 
aanvangt, terwijl de proefpersoon die de handeling uitvoert zich pas na aanvang van de RP bewust 
wordt van zijn intentie om te handelen. Dit lijkt te impliceren dat de neurale processen die tot een 
handeling leiden een onbewuste oorsprong hebben, hetgeen volgens Libet het idee ondermijnt dat de 
handeling in kwestie voortkwam uit een vrije wil. Hoewel Libet van mening is dat zijn experimentele 
data ons dwingen onze ideeën ten aanzien van vrije wil te herzien, denkt hij niet dat ze impliceren dat 
we geen vrije wil hebben. Hoewel de RP inderdaad aanvangt voordat proefpersonen zich bewust zijn 
van hun intentie om te handelen, is er volgens Libet een korte tijdspanne tussen het moment waarop 
proefpersonen zich bewust worden van hun intentie en de uiteindelijke handeling, waarin er de 
mogelijkheid is voor een veto van de handeling (de vetohypothese). Blijkbaar bestaat vrije wil niet in 
het initiëren van handelingen, maar in de mogelijkheid af te zien van het doen van een bepaalde 
handeling (het veto), zodra men zich bewust is van de intentie om te handelen. 
In hoofdstuk 2 beschrijf ik Libets onderzoeksparadigma, zijn belangrijkste conclusies en 
enkele veelgehoorde kritieken ten aanzien van zijn methode. Ook analyseer ik een experiment dat ik 
heb uitgevoerd in samenwerking met enkele collega’s van het departement Filosofie en het 
departement Psychologie van de Universiteit van Tilburg (Nederland). In deze studie hebben we 
gepoogd een experiment te repliceren van Grey Walter (1963), waarnaar wordt verwezen door onder 
meer Dennett en Kinsbourne (1992) en Dennett (2003a), maar dat waarschijnlijk nooit daadwerkelijk 
is uitgevoerd. Hoewel ook wij er uiteindelijk niet in zijn geslaagd het experiment uit te voeren, zijn de 
oorzaken hiervoor relevant voor het begrijpen en beoordelen van het soort onderzoek dat in het 
eerste deel van dit proefschrift wordt besproken. 
Grey Walters experiment is interessant omdat het een aantal problemen ondervangt die 
inherent zijn aan Libets methode. Tijdens de experimenten van Libet zaten de proefpersonen in een 
stoel tegenover een ‘klok’. Aan het begin van iedere proefneming startte de klok vanaf de twaalfuur 
positie en werd de proefpersonen verteld dat ze een vrijwillige handeling mochten doen op elk 
moment nadat de kleine wijzer de klok eenmaal helemaal rond was geweest. De relevante 
hersenactiviteit werd gemeten met behulp van elektromyografie (EMG). De aanvang van de 
handeling en de tijd op de klok werden bijgehouden met behulp van een computer.  
In een van de series van experimenten die Libet uitvoerde met deze opzet werd 
proefpersonen gevraagd om op een zelfverkozen moment hun vinger of pols te bewegen. Deze 
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beweging is de operationalisering van de vrije handeling. De proefpersonen werd gevraagd om de 
aandrang tot handelen vanzelf te laten opkomen en vervolgens spontaan te handelen op een moment 
dat zij dat zelf wilden. Enige tijd na elke proefneming werd de proefpersoon gevraagd de kloktijd de 
rapporteren van het moment waarop zij zich bewust werden van hun intentie om te handelen. Deze 
benadering steunt niet alleen zwaar op het vermogen van de proefpersoon om de aanvang van zijn 
bewuste intentie te bepalen, maar ook op diens vermogen om zich dit moment te herinneren tot op 
het moment van rapportage na de proefneming.   
In het experiment dat gedaan zou zijn door Grey Walter werd er een elektrode in de motor 
cortex van de proefpersoon geplaatst waarmee de activiteit in dat deel van de hersenen werd 
gemeten. De hypothese was dat veranderingen van activiteit in de motor cortex geassocieerd moeten 
worden met het initiëren van intentionele handelingen. De experimentele opzet was als volgt: 
proefpersonen werden voor een projectiescherm geplaatst en hen werd verteld dat ze de huidige 
projectie zouden kunnen vervangen door een andere door op een knop te drukken die de projector 
aanstuurt. De proefpersonen wisten niet dat de knop eigenlijk een dummy was en dat de diaprojector 
in werkelijkheid zou worden aangestuurd door een versterkt signaal afkomstig van de elektrode in 
hun motor cortex. Volgens de overlevering rapporteerden de proefpersonen in het experiment dat ze 
het gevoel hadden dat de diaprojector hun intentie om te handelen anticipeerde. Net voordat de 
proefpersonen de knop indrukten om een nieuwe dia te laten verschijnen schakelde de diaprojector – 
aangestuurd door activiteit in de motor cortex van de proefpersoon – reeds door naar de volgende 
dia.  
In vergelijking met de proefpersonen in het experiment van Libet spelen de proefpersonen in 
het experiment van Grey Walter een veel passievere rol. Immers, in het laatstgenoemde experiment 
wordt proefpersonen niet gevraagd hun bewuste ervaring af te speuren naar intenties en evenmin om 
later op basis van hun geheugen hun bevindingen te rapporteren. Al met al lijkt het experiment van 
Grey Walter te voorzien in een tamelijk natuurlijke taak en is in dit opzicht misschien te verkiezen 
boven het experiment van Libet. Echter, zoals reeds aangekondigd, heeft het experiment van Grey 
Walter zo zijn eigen problemen die eveneens in deel I besproken worden. 
Aan het einde van hoofdstuk 2 bespreek ik enkele recente experimentele onderzoeken die 
zijn geïnspireerd door het werk van Libet (Haggard and Eimer 1999, Haggard and Clark 2003, Lau et 
al 2004a/b). In hoofdstuk 3 analyseer ik deze projecten en het werk van Libet zelf door in te gaan op 
een aantal fundamentele – veelal stilzwijgende – aannames ten aanzien van vrije wil en bewustzijn  
die dit soort onderzoek vormgeven en sturen. Ik zal hierbij allereerst een antwoord geven op de 
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vraag waar de experimenten van Libet eigenlijk over gaan? Met andere woorden: wat wordt er door 
Libet onderzocht? Mijn antwoord op deze vraag is dat - in tegenstelling tot wat hij zelf beweert – 
Libets werk slechts op oppervlakkige wijze is gerelateerd aan de problematiek van vrije wil en 
bovendien dat, voorzover zijn onderzoek wel betrekking heeft op het probleem van vrije wil, het een 
weinig interessante relatie betreft. Bij dit laatste oordeel gaat het niet om mijn persoonlijke smaak, 
maar om het feit dat zelfs gegeven Libets eigen uitgangspunten de door hem gepresenteerde data niet 
zonder meer schokkend zijn. Daarnaast helpt het experiment van Libet ons ook niet met een ander 
probleem waarop het in eerste instantie betrokken lijkt te zijn, te weten het probleem van mentale 
veroorzaking. Het probleem van mentale veroorzaking is het probleem hoe we de intuïtie kunnen 
verantwoorden dat onze handelingen veroorzaakt worden door onze intenties, overtuigingen en 
verlangens (zie met name Kim 1998, 2005).  
In mijn optiek kunnen we de experimenten van Libet het beste begrijpen als een poging om 
intentioneel handelen experimenteel te onderzoeken. Er zijn vele onderzoeksgroepen verspreid over 
de hele wereld die in dit domein werken en zich presenteren met labels als Intention and Action of 
Motor Control. Het uitdagende aan Libets werk is dat het naast de hersenprocessen die worden 
geassocieerd met intentioneel handelen ook expliciet vraagt naar de fenomenologie van intentioneel 
handelen en de wijze waarop dit laatste zich verhoudt tot genoemde hersenprocessen. In dit 
proefschrift zal ik echter verdedigen dat Libet een verkeerd beeld oproept van de fenomenologie van 
intentioneel handelen. 
Dit laatste is de aanleiding voor de tweede vraag die ik in hoofdstuk 3 wil beantwoorden, 
namelijk: is het een goed idee om Libets methodes toe te passen als we intentioneel handelen 
wetenschappelijk willen onderzoeken? Ik beantwoord deze vraag ontkennend, maar het 
beargumenteren van dit antwoord is een complexe aangelegenheid, omdat het naast methodische 
twijfels ook vereist dat we Libets aannames – die deels impliciet zijn –  kritisch bestuderen en 
bepalen hoe ze zijn methode hebben beïnvloed. 
In hoofdstuk 3 ga ik ten slotte nog in de op de vraag of er alternatieven zijn voor Libets 
methode voor het experimenteel onderzoeken van intentioneel handelen die ook de fenomenologie 
van handelen in het onderzoek betrekken. Mijn antwoord op deze vraag is minder beslist en meer 
algemeen van aard. Naar mijn idee kunnen en moeten we op dit punt in ons onderzoek naar bewust 
intentioneel handelen niet uitsluiten dat er alternatieve wetenschappelijk verantwoorde benaderingen 
mogelijk zijn. Echter, bepalen wat de mogelijke alternatieven zijn is een project met een 
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onvermijdelijke en fundamenteel praktische dimensie van het daadwerkelijk uitvoeren van 
experimenteel onderzoek. 
 
Deel II: Een voorbeeld van een set van expliciete, doch foutieve, methodologie-implicerende aannames voor 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar bewustzijn en bewust intentioneel handelen 
 
In het eerste deel van dit proefschrift behandel ik een voorbeeld van wetenschappelijk onderzoek 
naar bewust intentioneel handelen met impliciete methodologie-implicerende aannames. In het tweede 
deel bespreek ik een voorbeeld van uitdrukkelijk expliciet geformuleerde, doch onjuiste, 
methodologie-implicerende aannames voor wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar bewustzijn en bewust 
intentioneel handelen. Daarnaast voorziet het tweede deel in een overzicht van filosofische valkuilen 
die ik tracht te ontwijken in het derde deel van dit proefschrift waar ik mijn eigen aannames 
uiteenzet. 
 In deel II concentreer ik me op het werk van Max Velmans. Velmans beschrijft zijn project 
als een poging tot het formuleren van een theorie over bewustzijn die compatibel is met wat we 
(denken te) weten over bewustzijn op basis van zowel wetenschappelijk onderzoek als alledaagse 
ervaring (Velmans 2003, 3). Een belangrijk onderdeel van Velmans’ theorie van bewustzijn is zijn 
projectiethese die stelt dat onze bewuste ervaringen in veel gevallen door de hersenen op de ons 
omringende wereld worden geprojecteerd. Volgens Velmans wordt de projectiethese gestaafd door 
onze alledaagse (common sense) fenomenologie. Velmans geeft hier naar mijn idee echter een 
verkeerd beeld van onze alledaagse fenomenologie en maakt daarmee een aanname die, hoewel 
expliciet, niet klopt. Velmans’ stelling is illustratief voor het algemene inzicht dat de feitelijke 
fenomenologie van bewuste ervaring niet zo gemakkelijk is vast te stellen als we op het eerste gezicht 
misschien zouden denken (de fenomenologie van ervaring is niet ‘vanzelfsprekend’). Dit inzicht is 
van fundamenteel belang voor wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar bewustzijn en bewust intentioneel 
handelen.  
 In deel II ga ik ook in op het probleem van fenomenale veroorzaking (phenomenal causation, zie 
bijvoorbeeld Tye 1995, 18). Ik onderscheid het probleem van fenomenale veroorzaking van het 
probleem van mentale veroorzaking zoals geformuleerd door Kim (1998, 2005). Daarnaast wil ik 
naar aanleiding van de problematiek van fenomenale veroorzaking een meer algemeen punt maken 
ten aanzien van de verschillende soorten van metafysica die, impliciet dan wel expliciet, een rol 
kunnen spelen in onderzoek naar bewustzijn. Ik presenteer Velmans’ weergave van het probleem van 
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fenomenale veroorzaking en bespreek zijn antwoord op dit probleem, te weten een twee-aspecten 
metafysica. Hoewel Velmans het probleem van fenomenale veroorzaking helder uiteenzet lost hij het 
probleem naar mijn idee uiteindelijk niet op. De oorzaak hiervan is dat Velmans’ aannames van de 
verkeerde metafysische soort zijn. 
 Het is niet mijn bedoeling – althans niet uitsluitend - te beweren Velmans’ twee-aspecten 
metafysica onjuist is en dat hij beter zou kunnen kiezen voor een fysicalistisch monisme of 
substantiedualisme. Mijn zorg is daarentegen dat de wijze van metafysica bedrijven die moet worden 
geassocieerd met theorieën zoals twee-aspecten monisme, fysicalisme of substantiedualisme van de 
verkeerde soort is, omdat ze op dusdanige manier voorbij de feiten gaat dat de theorieën in kwestie 
betekenisloos worden. Dit inzicht is relevant voor het denken over de rol van methodologie-
implicerende aannames achter wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar bewustzijn en bewust intentioneel 
handelen, omdat het ons enerzijds iets vertelt over het soort aannames dat betekenisvol is - en 
waarvan derhalve verwacht mag worden dat ze op een of andere manier werk doen (een verschil 
maken) - en, anderzijds, over de aannames die slechts betekenisloze ballast vormen bij ons streven 
naar een beter begrip van bewustzijn en bewust intentioneel handelen. 
 
Deel III: Bewustzijn, feiten en methodologie 
 
Het derde deel van dit proefschrift is het meer constructieve deel van mijn project, waarin ik mijn 
eigen visie op de rol van methodologie in wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar bewustzijn en mijn eigen 
expliciete aannames met betrekking tot de aard van bewustzijn presenteer, daarbij uitdrukkelijk 
rekening houdend met de problemen die zijn behandeld in deel I en II. 
 Allereerst ga ik in op de algemene vraag of de fenomenologie van ervaring een rol moet en 
kan spelen in wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar bewustzijn. Ik behandel deze vraag aan de hand van 
een vergelijking tussen twee posities die gezien kunnen worden als de tegengestelde extremen op het 
spectrum van mogelijke methodologieën, namelijk Daniel Dennetts heterofenomenologie en 
Francisco Varela’s neurofenomenologie. Ik verdedig de stelling dat we gegeven de huidige stand van 
zaken in het onderzoek naar bewustzijn niet kunnen, niet hoeven en niet moeten willen kiezen tussen 
heterofenomenologie en neurofenomenologie. Vooruitgang met betrekking tot het vinden van de 
juiste, context- en taakgevoelige, methodes voor het bestuderen van bewustzijn en de eventuele rol 
van fenomenologie daarin, wordt het best gewaarborgd door het toelaten van beide – en alle 
tussenliggende - methodologieën. Daarbij is vooral van belang dat we zo expliciet mogelijk zijn over 
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onze (verschillende) methodologieën en de aannames met betrekking tot bewustzijn waardoor ze zijn 
geïnspireerd. 
 Vervolgens presenteer ik een theorie over de aard van bewustzijn die is gebaseerd op het 
werk van Tim Crane en Thomas Clark en vertrekt vanuit het idee van fenomenale feiten. In deel I 
blijkt dat Libet van mening is dat het bij de bewuste ervaring van zijn proefpersonen gaat om een 
feitelijke werkelijkheid. Er lijkt met andere woorden een fact of the matter te zijn ten aanzien wat de 
proefpersonen – en mensen in het algemeen - ervaren. Ik deel deze intuïtie en probeer haar verder te 
legitimeren door haar in te bedden in een bredere theorie over de aard van bewustzijn. Daarbij 
verdedig ik de stelling dat bewuste ervaring identiek is aan bepaalde biologische (waarschijnlijk 
voornamelijk neurale) functies. Deze algemene theorie kan op verschillende manieren worden 
uitgewerkt. Ik doe daartoe één speculatieve suggestie waarbij ik gebruik maak van dynamische 
systeem theorie in combinatie met werk van Kim (1998, 2005) en Gillett (onder meer 2002a). De 
kortste route naar deze theoretische schets van een mogelijke biologische implementatie van 
bewustzijn loopt via het probleem van mentale veroorzaking. 
 Allereerst relateer ik de dynamische systeem benadering van mentale veroorzaking 
(DST/MC) aan Kims (1998, 2005) formulering van het probleem van mentale veroorzaking en de 
door hem voorgestelde oplossing. Ook laat ik zien dat DST/MC wellicht een aantrekkelijk alternatief 
biedt voor de oplossing van Kim. Mijn these is dat het model van Kim ten prooi valt aan het 
probleem van causale drainering (causal drainage, Block 2003). Het probleem van causale drainering 
houdt in dat als men ten aanzien van mentale veroorzaking de positie van Kim accepteert, de causale 
effectiviteit van mentale eigenschappen en andere macro-eigenschappen lijkt ‘weg te stromen’ naar 
het niveau dat beschreven wordt door de microfysica (Block 2003, 133), waardoor alle veroorzaking 
op hogere niveaus dan het door de microfysica beschreven niveau illusoir wordt. DST/MC kan 
opgevat worden als een alternatief voor Kims model waarbij het probleem van causale drainering 
wordt ontweken. Echter, wil DST/MC een geloofwaardig alternatief zijn dan moet het beter 
metafysisch worden onderbouwd, hetgeen ik probeer te doen op basis Carl Gilletts model van 
realisatie (onder meer 2002a). 
 Hoewel het model van mentale veroorzaking waar ik vervolgens op uit kom sommigen – met 
name diegenen die mentale veroorzaking begrijpen in de traditie van Kim – wellicht zal aanspreken 
ben ik zelf van mening dat dit model voortkomt uit onjuiste aannames ten aanzien van de ontologie 
van volkspsychologische categorieën, zoals intenties. Evenals in Kims benadering, worden mentale 
categorieën in DST/MC verstoffelijkt (reified) en worden ze opgevat als dingen of processen die 
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waarschijnlijk te lokaliseren zijn in het hoofd. Dat een dergelijke verstoffelijking (reification) van 
bijvoorbeeld intenties allerminst noodzakelijk is, zien we in meer wittgensteiniaanse benaderingen 
van onze mentale woordenschat, zoals voorgesteld door G.E.M. Anscombe of Daniel Dennett 
(1991b). Wanneer men van een van deze alternatieven uitgaat, verdwijnt het probleem van mentale 
veroorzaking zoals begrepen in de traditie van Kim. Dit inzicht is tevens relevant in een evaluatie van 
het werk van Libet, aangezien ook Libet lijkt te veronderstellen dat intenties dingen danwel 
processen zijn die we moeten zoeken in (of dichtbij) de hersenen. Hoewel Libet geen duidelijk 
standpunt inneemt in deze discussie mag het duidelijk zijn dat het soort vragen dat hij stelde en de 
experimentele methode die hij verkoos om deze vragen te beantwoorden zeer goed voortgekomen 
kunnen zijn uit een stilzwijgende acceptatie van de ontologie van mentale categorieën in de lijn van 
Kim.  
 Hoewel ik van mening ben dat DST/MC onjuist is, verdedig ik in deel III ten slotte de 
stelling dat er wel ruimte is voor een dynamische systeem benadering van fenomenenaal bewustzijn. 
Ik bepleit dat bewuste ervaringen gevoelde causale-rol-toestanden zijn die ‘plat’ gerealiseerd (flatly 
realized, Gillett 2002a, 317) zijn  door en extensioneel identiek zijn aan (per context geïndiceerde) 
informatiedragende en gedragcontrolerende (biologische) functies (die zich mogelijkerwijs deels 
buiten de hersenen bevinden). Deze laatsten worden op hun beurt ‘dimensioneel’ gerealiseerd 
(dimensionally realized, Gillett 2002a, 317) door eigenschappen (en hun causale vermogens) en 
geconstitueerd door eenheden op lagere niveaus. Mogelijke kandidaten voor de eerste-orde 
realiseerders van bewustzijn zijn het soort zelforganiserende patronen dat DST/MC associeert met 
intenties (zie Juarrero 1999 en Kelso 1995). Samen resulteert dit in de stelling dat de 
informatiedragende, gedragcontrolerende functies die in ‘platte’ zin bewuste ervaring realiseren 
biologische – waarschijnlijk voornamelijk neurale – zelforganiserende patronen zijn die op hun beurt 
weer ‘dimensioneel’ gerealiseerd zijn door eigenschappen op lagere niveaus (en uiteindelijk het 
microfysische niveau). 
 De theorie die ik presenteer wordt verondersteld niet voorbij de feiten te gaan zoals 
bijvoorbeeld het geval is bij Velmans’ metafysica. Met andere woorden, de door mij gepresenteerde 
theorie is van de juiste metafysische soort. Daarnaast voorziet deze theorie, indien juist, ook in een 
antwoord op het probleem van fenomenale veroorzaking.  
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